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1. Introduction
The distinction between rules and similarity is at the heart
of cognitive psychology. This is hardly surprising given the
strong intuitive sense of rules operations versus similarity
ones. For example, few researchers would claim that rules
are not involved when “we recognize why 24,683 is an odd
number, and why Priscilla Presley is a grandmother (Arm-
strong et al. 1983), know that an offspring of raccoons that
looks and acts like a skunk is nonetheless not a skunk (Keil
1989), joke that one cannot be a little pregnant” (Marcus et
al. 1995, p. 245). By contrast, in similarity judgments there
is nearly always a sense of more flexibility, less certainty, and
more emphasis on individual memories (Sloman & Rips
1998). Research across cognitive psychology has led to sev-
eral formalisms for understanding the rules versus similar-
ity distinction. A common thesis in most of these for-
malisms is that rules and similarity are separate (in a way
that will be explained shortly). The aim of this paper is to
argue against this thesis and propose that rules operations
are simply a special case of similarity ones.
2. A proposal for rules and similarity
The claim that rules and similarity are separate or inde-
pendent can be understood as implying that one operation
cannot be reduced to the other; that there is no model of
rules that could be incrementally modified to lead to a cor-
responding model of similarity; that the cognitive parame-
ters that have an influence on one operation do not neces-
sarily have an influence on the other. The present proposal
constitutes a unitary understanding of rules and similarity,
in a sense opposite to the above, whereby one extreme of
the same similarity process can be associated with rules and
the other extreme with overall similarity.
Let us consider the form of such an all-encompassing
similarity process. Goldstone (1994a) discusses various
conceptions of similarity, from straightforward perceptual
similarity to similarity operations that involve arbitrary ab-
stract properties of the objects compared (i.e., properties
that are not directly derived from perceptual information
about the object). He argued that although perceptual sim-
ilarity is too restricted to accommodate the kind of cate-
gorical relations to which people are sensitive, if one allows
abstract properties in similarity comparisons then such
comparisons might be arbitrarily flexible (Goodman 1972).
Thus, our ability to conceive of a useful notion of similar-
ity depends largely on whether there is a principled frame-
work to restrict the flexibility of similarity when abstract
properties are taken into account; we will address this is-
sue next by introducing some rudimentary notion of rele-
vance.
A generic form of the problem addressed in this paper is
that of determining whether an object is or is not a mem-
ber of a category. The members of a category will cohere
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partly because they uniquely have in common a particular
set of properties or features, as research in basic level cate-
gorization and spontaneous classification shows (Pothos &
Chater 2002; Rosch & Mervis 1975). I postulate that the ob-
ject properties relevant in deciding how to categorize it
amongst a number of candidate categories are the proper-
ties uniquely common to the instances of each category (cf.
Aha & Goldstone 1992). For example, in order to decide
whether my car keys are a member of the category ‘things
to take out of my house when it is on fire,” I will have to con-
sider only whether car keys match the uniquely common
properties of the other members of that category (“credit
cards,” “my cat,” “my university diploma”) (Barsalou 1991).
Note that the present proposal does not involve any com-
mitment about the form of features or properties (cf. Marr
1982). We simply require that at some level it is possible to
represent objects in terms of discrete entities (perceptual
features, abstract properties, and so forth). This notion of
relevance is essential to make categorization judgments
somewhat principled, partially circumventing the problems
articulated by Goldstone (1994a) and Goodman (1972), but
of course it does not explain category coherence as such
(Murphy & Medin 1985; but category coherence is outside
the scope of this target article).
So, given a set of categories and an object, we can estab-
lish a particular representation of the object relative to
these categories that could include perceptual properties,
abstract properties, or both. We can then categorize the ob-
ject as a member of one of the categories, or not – in this
work nothing is said about how this process of categoriza-
tion takes place; rather, we are interested in providing a
framework for characterizing the categorization as a rules
process or an overall similarity one. We postulate that when
the object categorization is determined by a small subset of
the relevant object properties, then categorization should
be understood as a rules process. By contrast, when cate-
gorization is determined by most of the relevant object
properties, broadly equally weighted, then categorization is
best understood as an overall similarity process. In subse-
quent discussions, the kind of rules postulated here would
be indicated as “Rules” and the kind of overall similarity
process as “Similarity”; in this way, the present Rules versus
Similarity proposal can be contrasted from alternative rules
versus similarity ones. Thus, the categorization of an object
reflects a continuum of similarity processes, whose ex-
tremes will be argued to be consistent with the conven-
tional notions of rules and overall similarity. At the same
time, the present proposal implies that there will be oper-
ations in middle ranges of the continuum for which a char-
acterization in terms of Rules and Similarity is not appro-
priate. Note, finally, that in most cases we will be able to
distinguish between Rules and Similarity at the level of in-
dividual judgments. Where this is not possible, a distinction
between Rules and Similarity will be attempted at the level
of an assembly of judgments, whereby we will examine
whether, on average, a small subset or most of the proper-
ties of each object in a group are used in processing the ob-
jects (e.g., see sects. 4.4 and 5.4).
3. General hypotheses about rules and similarity
We consider here how the present Rules versus Similarity
distinction relates to general approaches to understanding
rules and similarity.
3.1. Certainty and compositionality
Sloman and Rips (1998) introduce a special issue of the
journal Cognition, on rules and similarity, by identifying the
characteristics of cognitive processes that appear to provide
the most compelling motivation for a rules versus similarity
distinction. For these investigators, certainty and composi-
tionality, and their cousin virtues systematicity and produc-
tivity, are all aspects of rules processes but not of similarity
ones (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). Conversely, the
strength of similarity processes is centered on flexibility:
Some similarity judgment will always be possible for any
two objects, whereas the scope of application of a given rule
is often very restricted. In a sense, these observations re-
flect the rundown of intuition of what it is that makes rules
and similarity different.
Consider two kinds of judgments for an object, one that
involves a single property of the object (a Rule), and another
that involves more or less all the properties of the object
(Similarity). Take, for example, “the object is red” versus “the
object is a telephone.” In establishing either of the two judg-
ments, some of the features of the object must be examined.
Each time a feature is examined there is some uncertainly.
Therefore, on average we expect that the more the features
that need to be examined for a judgment, the more uncer-
tain the judgment will be. For example, the color of the ob-
ject might be plainly red or it might correspond to a border-
line color between red and purple. Contrast the uncertainty
in this examination with the uncertainty in determining
whether the object can transmit and receive speech; whether
its size, shape, and weight are suitable for holding the object
in certain ways; whether its material is durable enough to
support the object’s function; and so forth. Overall, there are
many more ways in which an object can or cannot be a tele-
phone compared with the ways in which an object can or can-
not be red. In general, therefore, a Rules judgment will be
more certain (but less flexible) than a Similarity one.
A system of operations is compositional when it is possi-
ble to build more complex representations out of simpler
components in such a way that the meaning of the compo-
nents is unchanged in different representations; productiv-
ity implies that there is no limit to the number of such new
representations (e.g., sentences that are consistent with the
rules of grammar and syntax of a language). A systematic
operation is one that applies in the same way to a whole
class of objects (e.g., the default past tense inflection in En-
glish). Let’s focus on compositionality, on the understand-
ing that an account of compositionality could be trivially ex-
tended to systematicity and productivity as well. For
compositionality to work we must unambiguously be able
to pair certain objects with others, subject to the restrictions
defined in the compositional system (e.g., noun objects
with verb objects). Consider then a compositional system
specified in terms of Rules and a system specified in terms
of Similarity. With Rules, we have to decide whether ob-
jects having property A (e.g., nouns) can be paired with ob-
jects having property B (e.g., verbs). With Similarity, we
must decide whether objects having properties A, B, C, D,
E, . . . (e.g., a cat) can be paired with objects having prop-
erties A1, B1, C1, D1, E1 . . . (e.g., ate). For a compositional
system to have practical value, pairings must be general
enough to apply to large classes of objects (Sloman & Rips
1998). Therefore, by the present account, compositional
systems are consistent with Rules and not Similarity.
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3.2. Strict versus partial matching
Hahn and Chater (1998) argue that in rule operations the
antecedent of the rule must be strictly matched for the rule
to apply, whereas for a similarity comparison two objects
need only be partially matched. Also, rule operations in-
volve matching a more specific representation with a more
general one (e.g., “if it barks it is a dog”). Consistent with
Hahn and Chater, a Rule requires deciding whether an ob-
ject (a general representation) is compatible with the small
subset of properties named in the Rule (the more specific
representation). Also, since Rule application involves few
properties, if a strict match is not possible, then the Rule
does not apply to the object (cf. the certainty point in sect.
3.1). By contrast, in Similarity judgments more properties
are involved, therefore it does not matter whether any par-
ticular property is not matched.
3.3. Rules as abstraction
Rules are often associated with abstract knowledge. There
are two separate issues here. The first is whether abstract
knowledge necessarily involves rules, and the second,
whether developing abstract knowledge necessarily re-
quires learning processes different from those leading to
similarity knowledge.
The first issue is relatively easy to address. Suppose par-
ticipants are shown string MSSX and are asked to decide
whether strings MSSXS, GLLT, and GLWEW are compat-
ible with it (cf. Artificial Grammar Learning [AGL] in sect.
4). The selection of MSSXS would be characterized as Sim-
ilarity since this string shares many letters with MSSX. Se-
lecting GLLT is also considered Similarity because this
string has the same abstract structure as string MSSX: If we
were to represent the two strings in terms of abstract sym-
bolic variation (e.g., “one symbol, followed by a different
one,” etc.) then they are identical. Consistent with the pre-
sent proposal, in AGL this process has been labeled abstract
analogy and considered similarity (Brooks & Vokey 1991).
Finally, selecting GLWEW is considered Rules, since ob-
ject compatibility is guided by a single feature (the first two
symbols in both strings are different).
Relating to the second issue, many investigators believe
that learning based on co-occurrence statistics between a
set of elements, associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh 1983;
Pearce 1987; Wasserman & Miller 1997), can give rise only
to similarity knowledge and not abstract knowledge. There-
fore, maybe abstract knowledge has to be developed
through some alternative learning process, possibly involv-
ing explicit rules. For example, Herrnstein et al. (1989)
found that pigeons were unable to learn a discrimination
task that involved a relational feature, which suggests that
it is not possible to develop abstract knowledge through as-
sociative learning. Wills and Mackintosh (1998) observed
that if their participants adopted an explicit rule in an asso-
ciative learning task they could generalize in a way incon-
sistent with co-occurrence statistics. If similarity and rules
knowledge have different learning origins, then there may
not be a continuous relation between them, as suggested in
the present proposal.
Gentner and Medina (1998) discussed empirical evi-
dence showing how comparisons between two objects lead
to re-representation of the objects involving more abstract
properties. Similarly, Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) ar-
gued that abstract properties can be derived from percep-
tual information, because such properties are implied in the
representation of perceptual information (e.g., the property
“in front of” is implied in the representation of two objects
suitably arranged). Thus, it seems that in the same way in
which we are aware of perceptual properties, we can be-
come aware of abstract ones when we perceive an object
(note that this is not in any way a claim that associative
learning of perceptual properties can give rise to abstract
ones). If both perceptual and abstract properties can be
recognized, then presumably both kinds of properties can
be concurrently involved in learning processes (cf. negation
or omission in associative learning; Shanks & Darby 1998;
Skinner 1936), and hence perceptual and abstract knowl-
edge can be developed in analogous ways. The fact that per-
ceptual and abstract properties can be perceived and in-
volved in learning processes in analogous ways is one of the
central assumptions in this work.
Thus, abstraction applies in principle equally to Rules
and Similarity.
3.4. Similarity as associative knowledge
Associative learning is often considered to lead to similarity
knowledge, hence this section complements the previous
one.
Consider a learning mechanism X that reflects the auto-
matic cognitive process of encoding co-occurrence statis-
tics between the elements that make up the objects in a do-
main. If this learning mechanism is associative, then
familiar combinations of elements (fragments) would be
more salient in object processing. Fragments can be
thought of as object features. Thus, for example, when a
new object is recognized as familiar because it is made of
many familiar fragments, then this is a process of Similar-
ity, consistently with the associative learning literature (e.g.,
Shanks & Darby 1998; cf. Tversky 1977). Now suppose that
while X is the dominant learning mechanism, other learn-
ing mechanisms Y1, Y2, Y3 . . . can lead to the creation of
fragments in a way that deviates from co-occurrence statis-
tics. This implies that in processing an object, the salience
of some fragments would be suppressed or enhanced in a
way that cannot arise from X. The crucial point is that the
Y1, Y2, Y3 . . . fragments are created independently from
each other and therefore could likewise influence an object
process independently; hence, such fragments could be
Rules and a combination of such fragments a Rules net-
work. By contrast, X fragments are all automatically taken
into account in an object process, depending on their
salience, as this is the nature of the specification of an as-
sociative learning process; hence a combination of such
fragments is generally Similarity.
As an example, consider Shanks and Darby (1998), who
trained participants to associate individual foods (A, B) with
an allergy outcome (O), but not the combination of foods
(ArO, BrO, ABrno O). Some participants generalized in
a way consistent with their training, but others would asso-
ciate individual foods plus their combination with the out-
come (ArO, BrO, ABrO). The latter kind of generaliza-
tion has been interpreted in terms of feature overlap, and
hence similarity. By contrast, the former kind has been in-
terpreted as requiring knowledge of the patterning rule
from training. Within the present framework, Shanks and
Darby’s results can be described in the following way. To-
gether with the perceptual elements, A, B, and O, relevant
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properties are “individually predictive symptoms” or
“jointly predictive symptoms.” Hence, ArO, BrO, ABrO
is Similarity by feature overlap; but in ArO, BrO, ABrno
O, the property “jointly predictive symptoms” overrides the
salience of all the other relevant properties, therefore this
is a Rule. In a sense, although the overall conclusion is not
different from that of Shanks and Darby (1998), the present
proposal allows us to provide a specific conception of what
Rules and Similarity are and how they relate to each other.
Thus, associative learning can lead equally to Rules and
Similarity.
3.5. Rules as general knowledge
General knowledge usually refers to our naïve understand-
ing of the world. This naïve understanding often has a qual-
ity of knowledge about the causal links between objects,
people, situations in life, and so forth. For example, polar
bears are white so as to camouflage themselves in the arctic
landscapes where they live, but there is no particular reason
why refrigerators are white (cf. Keil et al. 1998). Some in-
vestigators have argued that feature associations cannot give
rise to the knowledge that supports our naïve understanding
of the world, and so rules are necessarily implicated in such
knowledge (Keil et al. 1998). The nature of general knowl-
edge is such that Rules are more likely to be involved than
Similarity, because Rules can be facts about the world that
are certain (sect. 3.1). These “facts” are our intuitions about
causal links between objects, people, and situations in our
life (but this conclusion is undermined by the lack of a con-
vincing specific model for general knowledge; cf. sect. 6.3).
4. Learning
In this section I restrict the discussion to AGL, since this has
been an experimental paradigm for learning where the prob-
lem of rules versus similarity has been addressed extensively.
AGL involves the learning of stimuli created from finite state
languages; finite state languages are a set of continuation re-
lations among symbols that allow the specification of symbol
sequences (Chomsky & Miller 1958). The sequences that
comply with the continuation relations of a given finite state
language are called grammatical (G), while the ones that do
not are called non-grammatical (NG); whether a sequence
is G or NG is the grammaticality of the string. Typically, AGL
stimuli are instantiated as sequences of letters. A frequently
adopted AGL paradigm involves simply asking participants
to observe a subset of the G sequences in a training phase
without any information about the nature of the sequences.
In the test phase, participants are presented with other,
novel, G sequences and with NG ones, and they are asked
to discriminate between the two (no corrective feedback is
provided). Participants are generally able to identify G se-
quences with above-chance accuracy.
4.1. Common conceptions of rules in learning
According to Reber, the knowledge participants acquire in
an AGL task is “a valid, if partial, representation of the ac-
tual underlying rules of the language” (Reber 1967; Reber
& Allen 1978, p. 191). Knowledge of Reber’s rules is pre-
sumably manifest in terms of a network of interconnected
and interrelated rules, so that any given decision will de-
pend on the entirety of the rule system collectively. Reber
argued that since in an AGL task the G/NG distinction is
defined in terms of the rules of a finite state language, suc-
cessful discrimination between G and NG sequences im-
plies knowledge of these rules. While the evidence for Re-
ber’s rules is indirect, it is hard not to characterize as rules
the independent, explicit tests relating to properties of the
training items participants employed to distinguish be-
tween test G and NG items in Dulany et al.’s (1984) exper-
iments. To describe this notion of “microrules,” Dulany et
al. note that “Ss evidently acquired . . . personal sets of con-
scious rules, each of limited scope and many of imperfect
validity” (p. 541). Dulany et al. supported their hypothesis
by asking participants to explicitly justify each of their gram-
maticality decisions and finding that this knowledge was
sufficient to account for participants’ overall accuracy.
4.2. Common conceptions of similarity in learning
Vokey and Brooks (1992) modeled similarity effects in AGL
using edit distance, a commonly used similarity measure in
artificial intelligence, according to which the similarity be-
tween two strings is higher if fewer symbol changes are
needed before the two strings become identical. Edit dis-
tance can be related to recent suggestions of understanding
the psychological similarity between two objects in terms of
the ease with which we can transform one object to the
other (Chater & Hahn 1997). Vokey and Brooks found that
both similarity and grammaticality influenced participants’
selections in test. Pothos and Bailey (2000) found that an
exemplar model of categorization, Nosofsky’s Generalized
Context Model (GCM) (Nosofsky 1991), could explain sig-
nificant variance in participants’ selections. According to
the GCM, the probability of a test item being selected as G
would be determined by the similarity of that item to all the
training ones. In Pothos and Bailey’s study, the similarity in-
formation required in order to apply the GCM was ob-
tained by presenting all the AGL task stimuli in pairs and
asking participants to rate their similarity. Perruchet and
Pacteau (1990) argued for an associative model of AGL per-
formance, according to which participants learn about
which symbols co-occur in the training items and in this way
form fragments, units of two or three symbols. Perruchet
and Pacteau found that in an AGL test phase, strings made
of fragments that were familiar from training were more
likely to be selected as G than those made of unfamiliar
fragments. Knowlton and Squire (1994; 1996) extended
Perruchet and Pacteau’s work by providing specific com-
putational measures of fragment overlap, the most basic of
which they called global associative chunk strength: A test
item would have a higher associative chunk strength if it is
made of fragments that occurred frequently in training.
Knowlton and Squire’s results showed significant effects of
grammaticality and global associative chunk strength.
Other measures of associative chunk strength have ap-
peared that differentially weigh the importance of chunks
in different positions of a string (e.g., Meulemans & van der
Linden 1997).
4.3. Attempts to disambiguate rules and similarity in
learning
In sections 4.3, 5.3, 6.3, and 7.3, we present some of the em-
pirical findings and theory on the basis of which the rules
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versus similarity distinction has been developed in each of
the covered areas, without any attempt of interpretation in
the context of the present proposal. To facilitate this expo-
sition, in Table 1 we consider the most common types of ar-
guments that have been used in rules versus similarity in-
vestigations. The different types of arguments are not
meant to be mutually exclusive or non-overlapping, rather
just a convenient way to characterize rules vs. similarity dis-
cussions.
Using a classification dissociation approach, Vokey
and Brooks (1992) and Knowlton and Squire (1994) de-
signed their AGL test stimuli so that the G items could be
equally divided into high and low similarity items with re-
spect to the training items, and likewise for the NG items
(Vokey and Brooks assessed similarity in terms of edit dis-
tance and Knowlton and Squire in terms of global associa-
tive chunk strength). In this way, these investigators re-
ported that some G, dissimilar items would be selected as
G (to infer an influence of rules) and likewise for some NG,
similar items (to infer an influence of similarity). In the
same vein, Johnstone and Shanks (1999) and Pothos and
Bailey (2000) used multiple regression analyses to model
influences of rules and similarity concurrently on test item
selections. In both studies, significant influences of rules
and similarity on performance were observed. Further,
Pothos and Bailey took into account possible overlap be-
tween rules and similarity influences and in this way re-
ported independent effects of rules and similarity.
In transfer AGL experiments the symbols used to create
the training sequences are different from the ones used to
create the test ones; for example, the training stimuli might
be composed of M, S, X, V, R and the test ones of J, O, P,
G, T. Participants are able to successfully discriminate be-
tween G and NG sequences in test even in such transfer ex-
periments. The original claim was that because the super-
ficial similarity between training and test sequences was
null, similarity influences would be suppressed and par-
ticipants’ decisions had to be based on rules knowledge
(Reber 1989). Brooks and Vokey (1991; also Redington &
Chater 1996), however, argued that their measure of simi-
larity could be extended straightforwardly to the transfer
paradigm: For example, MSSSXV is similar to FEEETY,
because both sequences have the same “abstract” structure.
Brooks and Vokey (1991) defined a measure of abstract
analogy and thus showed that both grammaticality and sim-
ilarity would influence AGL performance. Their research
provides a compelling example where abstraction is not
seen to imply rules performance, consistent with the pre-
sent proposal (contrast with Marcus et al. 1999, in lan-
guage).
Research on the rules versus similarity distinction is con-
siderably motivated by our intuition that in some cases cog-
nitive processes involve rules (e.g., Wittgenstein 1953/
1998). Dulany et al. (1984) employed an introspective
methodology to show rules in AGL. They asked their par-
ticipants to indicate in each test item the part of the item
that made it G or NG. In this way, Dulany et al. compiled a
set of the “microrules” each participant employed. The va-
lidity of each microrule was then defined as the probability
that it correctly categorized a test item as G or NG. The
mean validity of the microrules correlated highly with an
overall G/NG distinction accuracy measure, and hence Du-
lany et al. concluded that the reported microrules are in-
deed implicated in AGL performance.
4.4. Discussion of the rules versus similarity distinction
in learning
The purpose of sections 4.4, 5.4, 6.4, and 7.4 is to examine
whether the presently advocated Rules versus Similarity
distinction provides an adequate account of the operations
that have been considered as rules and similarity in learn-
ing, reasoning, categorization, and language.
Perruchet and Pacteau’s (1990) fragment proposal and
Knowlton and Squire’s (1994) global associative strength
can be equated with Similarity: A test item is selected as G
if it is made of many features that are familiar from train-
ing. In these approaches the salience of fragments in clas-
sification decisions is a strict function of co-occurrence sta-
tistics between the basic elements making up the stimuli.
However, in some cases the salience of certain fragments
would increase beyond such co-occurrence statistics. Par-
ticipants may, for example, note that most training items
start with the same pair of letters, say MS, and decide that
all G items in test must start with MS (sect. 3.4). According
to the present proposal, the use of fragment information in
this way corresponds to Rules, specifically Dulany et al.’s
(1984) microrules, because a single fragment of a stimulus
is the basis for classifying the test stimulus, or a set of frag-
ments independently influence classification. A straightfor-
ward Similarity measure in AGL is Vokey and Brooks’s
(1992) edit distance, which can be understood to a good
approximation of feature overlap. By contrast, Pothos and
Bailey’s (2000) GCM approach cannot be characterized as
Similarity or Rules without more information on how par-
ticipants rated the similarity between the AGL stimuli (cf.
sect. 6.4).
The situation is more complicated for alternative mea-
sures of chunk strength that differentially weigh the influ-
ence of certain chunks (e.g., anchor chunk strength,
wherein anchor positions of a string are its beginning and
end). On the one hand, all fragments (properties) of a test
stimulus are concurrently taken into account in classifying
Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
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Table 1. A broad classification of the types of arguments 
employed in the rules versus similarity debate in 
different areas of cognitive psychology
Classification dissociation: In generalizing from some initial 
instances, is it the case that rules and similarity knowledge lead
to different selections of novel instances?
Suppression: In a process where we assume both a rules and 
a similarity influence, can we identify situations where one 
influence would be entirely eliminated (suppressed)?
Introspective: Do people believe they are using rules or 
similarity in a cognitive operation?
Differential performance: In a process where we assume
both a rules and a similarity influence, are there factors that 
selectively affect one influence but not the other?
A priori: Can we make a case for the relevance of rules or 
similarity for a cognitive process on the basis of some logical 
argument, in the absence of any experimental results?
the stimulus, a process that looks like Similarity. On the
other hand, some of these properties will be more impor-
tant in the classification of the stimulus; at the extreme, we
can weigh, for example, anchor fragments to such an ex-
tent that they guide classification without any other infor-
mation – this would be a Rules process by the present pro-
posal. The conclusion is that measures of chunk strength
that deviate from basic associative principles will have, in
general, ambiguous interpretation with respect to the
Rules versus Similarity distinction. In other words, they
correspond to similarity operations that are between the
extremes that we were able to identify unambiguously as
Rules or Similarity. Note how a purely Similarity measure
(weights of all fragments equivalent) can be continuously
related to a purely Rules measure (highest weighing for
some fragments).
According to the present proposal, but supported by
common intuition as well, Reber’s rules are different from
Dulany et al.’s rules, the former corresponding to a network
of interconnected, integrated rules and the latter to more
or less individual tests. In AGL, stimuli can be perceived in
terms of individual symbols, fragments, and so forth, but
also in terms of abstract properties (this is one of our main
assumptions). For example, the string MSS could be en-
coded as an “M” then an “S” then another “S” or as “a sym-
bol followed by a symbol of a different kind followed by the
same symbol.” We see that as soon as the representation of
a stimulus is dissociated from surface characteristics, struc-
tures that look like rules emerge (cf. Gentner & Medina
1998; sect. 3.3). We assumed that abstract properties are
subject to associative learning in the same way that surface
ones are, so that composite abstract properties can develop
(sect. 3.3). For example, the properties “string starts with
two different symbols” and “string ends with the two same
symbols” might develop to “string starts with two different
symbols and ends with the same two symbols.” Note that
the scope of abstract Rules is much wider than that of mi-
crorules (compare “last two symbols of a string are SS” with
“last two symbols of a string are of the same kind”). Two ab-
stract properties are far more likely to co-occur than two
microrules; it follows that combinations of abstract proper-
ties would develop more rapidly than combinations of mi-
crorules. Thus, consistent with existing research, in the pre-
sent proposal microrules would tend to correspond to
individual tests, and given enough training, abstract prop-
erties would eventually be organized into a network of in-
terconnected Rules along Reber’s lines (cf. Meulemans &
van der Linden 1997; but see next paragraph as well). It is
in this way that the present proposal interprets the rules/
microrules distinction in AGL.
It might seem that perfect knowledge of the rules of a fi-
nite state grammar subsumes Similarity/abstract analogy.
For example, having seen item MSSV in training we may
equally recognize item FGGR in test as G either by abstract
analogy or by applying our knowledge of the rules/Rules of
the grammar (an analogous point of course applies to the
no-transfer AGL task, but the corresponding discussion is
subsumed by this one). This overlap is not problematic for
the present proposal: In some cases Similarity and Rules
judgments could converge, and if we want to characterize
participants’ behavior as more Rules- or Similarity-ori-
ented, then we have to examine an assembly of judgments.
For example, consider a simple case where all G sequences
are generated as “a single symbol, followed by a different
symbol and any number of symbols identical to it, followed
by a final different symbol,” and a training set of stimuli
consisting of MSSV and MSV. In test, stimulus FEER could
be equally selected as G on the basis of (abstract) Similar-
ity or Rules. If test stimulus FEEEEEEER is selected as
G, we have a process of Rules, since of the relevant prop-
erties of the stimulus a relatively small subset is taken into
account. This is saying, in other words, that some proper-
ties in judging FEEEEEEER are assigned a salience be-
yond co-occurrence statistics of the (abstract) symbols of
the training items. Thus, abstract (and/or integrated) Rules
are inferred as a result of deviances from performance ex-
pectations on the basis of basic associative learning knowl-
edge, in the same way concrete Rules are (see also sects. 3.3
and 3.4).
5. Reasoning
The emphasis here is on logical reasoning (e.g., Wason
1960; Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972), even though most of
the arguments would apply to decision-making generally.
5.1. Common conceptions of rules in reasoning
According to a view essentially originating in antiquity, clas-
sical rules of logic are the basis for human reasoning, and
indeed their use characterizes human beings as rational
(see Evans et al. 1991, for an overview). In modern psy-
chology this view has been developed to models whereby
rules derived from formal logic are combined according to
“a reasoning program for using the schemas [rules]; a basic
universal routine and a set of acquired strategies to account
for individual differences” (Braine et al. 1995, p. 264). Such
rules are context-free and correspond to legal arrange-
ments of content free symbols. For example, “if there is
smoke there is a fire; there is smoke; therefore there is a
fire” would be represented as “if p then q; p; therefore, q.”
A problem solution is logically valid if the symbolic struc-
ture of the premises and the solution corresponds to a valid
arrangement of symbols as specified by the logic rules. A
well-studied experimental paradigm in logic is the Wason
selection task (Wason 1960), which involves four cards and
a conditional rule. The rule could state “if there is an even
number on one card side, then there must be a consonant
on the other.” Four cards are presented to participants in
such a way that one card has a vowel on the shown side, an-
other a consonant, another an even number, and the last
one an odd number. The question is which card(s) need be
selected to check whether the rule is correct. Most partici-
pants select the card showing an even number (consistent
with classical logic, since if there is a vowel on the card’s hid-
den side the rule must be false) but also the card showing a
consonant (against classical logic; if there is an even num-
ber on the card’s hidden side there is some rule confirma-
tion, but there is nothing we can conclude if there is an odd
number). Thus, participants fail to select both of the two
cards that are consistent with classical logic and could indi-
vidually allow definite falsification of the rule (the even
number and vowel cards). While these results have chal-
lenged the ubiquitous relevance of classical logic in human
reasoning, there is evidence that people sometimes employ
rules of this sort naturally (e.g., Braine 1978; Henle 1962;
Rips 1983; 1994).
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Other researchers have argued that human reasoning
rules arise as a result of experience in specific domains (and
hence could be incompatible with classical logic). Cheng
and Holyoak (1985, p. 395) call such rules pragmatic rea-
soning schemas that consist “of a set of generalized, con-
text-sensitive rules, which, unlike purely syntactic rules, are
defined in terms of classes of goals (such as taking desirable
actions or making predictions about possible future events)
and relationships to these goals (such as cause and effect or
precondition and allowable action).” To support their hy-
pothesis, Cheng and Holyoak presented the Wason selec-
tion task in different thematic contexts. Participants’ per-
formance was correct (according to classical logic) only
when the problem context corresponded to one of these
privileged domains of human everyday reasoning (e.g., per-
mission situations: “You cannot enter unless you are 18
years old or older”; see also Griggs 1983).
Classical logic and pragmatic rules need not be inconsis-
tent and they could, in principle, operate in conjunction.
Furthermore, it is possible that rules develop indepen-
dently as a means of encoding knowledge and dealing with
new experience. For example, according to Anderson
(1993), reasoning (and thinking) are guided by a set of pro-
duction (conditional) rules that can be combined to address
reasoning problems of arbitrary complexity. Finally, some
of the proposals for heuristics and biases in reasoning could
be thought of as involving rules. For example, in the Wason
selection task, Wason (1960) noted a confirmation bias, ac-
cording to which participants attempt to confirm the con-
ditional examined, not refute it.
5.2. Common conceptions of similarity in reasoning
The case-based reasoning (CBR) approach postulates that
similarity guides reasoning. Each problem solution is in-
dexed and stored in memory so that the CBR system “re-
members previous situations similar to the current one and
uses them to help solve the new problem” (Kolodner 1992,
p. 4; Schank 1982). The CBR approach has been criticized,
particularly with respect to how problem solutions are in-
dexed in a way that takes into account the possible utility of
such information in all future situations (cf. Goodman
1972). CBR, however, provides a good operational model
of how reasoning could be guided by similarity to previous
instances, a position advocated in a general form by several
investigators (Griggs & Cox 1982; Medin & Ross 1989).
CBR will generally be associated with Similarity and we do
not discuss it separately in section 5.4.
Osherson et al. (1990) suggested that people solve cate-
gorical problems (e.g., “all Siamese cats chase mice; is it the
case that all cats chase mice?”) on the basis of the similar-
ity between the premise and the conclusion category. Anal-
ogous are the representativeness and availability heuristics
of Kahneman and Tversky (1972; Tversky & Kahneman
1983). For example, the availability heuristic corresponds
to judgments that a statement is probable (e.g., “most cars
are red”) depending on how easy it is to think of examples
that illustrate the statement to be true. In the Wason selec-
tion task, Evans (1972) reported a matching bias: Partici-
pants would select the cards with the (e.g.) letters and num-
bers stated in the conditional. Finally, Sloman (1996)
suggested that similarity judgments in reasoning involve an
associative component, that is, elements co-occurring to
the extent that the presence of one implies the other. In this
way, similarity reasoning would be guided by associative
knowledge and rules reasoning by symbolic structures that
have logical content (for a discussion, see Gigerenzer &
Regier 1996).
5.3. Attempts to disambiguate rules and similarity in
reasoning
An a priori argument for classical logic reasoning is that,
because of classical logic’s inherent mathematical validity,
people should reason in a way consistent with classical logic
and such reasoning should be more intuitive, compelling,
and so forth (i.e., classical logic reasoning is normative; Wa-
son & Johnson-Laird 1972). Thus, given “if there is smoke
there must be fire” and “there is smoke,” we must conclude
that “there is fire.” In practice, human reasoning deviates
quite substantially from classical logic (sect. 5.1; Evans
1991; see also Osherson 1990). One approach in dealing
with such deviations is to assume that reasoning is ulti-
mately guided by classical logic but everyday reasoning in-
volves shortcuts in the form of heuristics and biases. How-
ever, this interpretation of heuristics and biases is not
universally accepted, and it is possible that heuristics and
biases are all there is to our reasoning process (for discus-
sions see Griggs 1983; Pollard 1982). Moreover, the nor-
mative status of classical logic has been questioned by the
appearance of alternative reasoning frameworks (e.g.,
Isham 1989; Paris 1994). For example, in the Wason selec-
tion task, Oaksford and Chater (1994; cf. Anderson 1990)
suggested that participants should be selecting the cards
that reduce the information theoretic uncertainty with re-
spect to the veracity of the conditional; classical logic and
information theory predictions were often found incom-
patible. Nowadays, many researchers no longer “follow the
practice of describing reasoning data as yielding right and
wrong answers, as though formal logic were an undisputed
authority of good and bad reasoning” (Evans et al. 1991;
p. 34).
Smith et al. (1992) discuss differential performance
criteria in reasoning that could distinguish between simi-
larity and rules envisaged as symbolic structures (cf. Sloman
1996). Smith et al. suggest that rule application should not
differ with familiar and unfamiliar items, as well as novel
and abstract material. Likewise, a rules process can be
overextended to rule exceptions. If two domains are char-
acterized by the same abstract rule, training in one domain
would facilitate/prime rule application in the other. The
psychological complexity of a problem would depend on
the number of rules utilized in order to solve it. Smith et al.
note that, overall, “the contrast between rules on the one
hand and cases on the other, comes down, in large part, to
the question of how abstractly we represent problems”
(p. 4).
Finally, Oaksford and Chater’s (1994; see also Chater
1997) information theoretic approach to reasoning appears
not to have an interpretation in terms of rules or similarity.
The same applies to mental models theory, whereby people
are assumed to reason by initially constructing models of
the premises that illustrate the premises to be true and sub-
sequently examining whether these models can be com-
bined so as to achieve a more parsimonious representation
of the premises (Johnson-Laird 1993). According to the
present proposal, any reasoning process can be examined as
to whether it reflects a Rule or Similarity, depending on fea-
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ture overlap between premises and conclusion. Thus, in
principle we can examine any reasoning account in terms of
whether the kind of conclusions it tends to favor share few
(Rules) or many (Similarity) properties with the problem
premises (of course, there would be cases in which there is
no clear-cut characterization in terms of Rules or Similar-
ity). However, such an examination for mental models or
the information theory approach is beyond the scope of the
present work.
5.4. Discussion of the rules versus similarity distinction
in reasoning
In the present proposal there is no a priori basis to favor one
Rules system (e.g., classical logic) from another, and hence
the proposal is neutral with respect to a priori arguments.
However, because Rules are certain (sect. 3.1), if a set of
Rules were interconnected (e.g., a reasoning Rules system),
these Rules would have to be mutually compatible. Such a
compatibility constraint could prevent highly idiosyncratic
Rules systems from developing across individuals, so it is
possible that specific Rules systems for reasoning might be
favored over others. Whether classical logic could be fitted
into such a developmental framework is an issue for further
work (cf. Inhelder & Piaget 1958).
Let us assume that Anderson’s (1993) production rules
are developed independently, so that we have to consider
each one individually with respect to whether it reflects
Similarity or Rules. The more particular the situation a pro-
duction rule refers to, the more it would correspond to Sim-
ilarity (in the sense that it would involve more properties)
and the less useful it would be. For example, “If there is
white-gray smoke coming out of the kitchen oven where
I’ve had fish cooking for the last three hours, then there is
a fire” would be applicable in far fewer situations than “If
there is smoke, then there is a fire.” Hence, production
rules would generally be developed as Rules. Also, heuris-
tics like availability and representativeness are straightfor-
wardly considered Similarity, since a conclusion is pre-
ferred to the extent that it matches representations in
memory (Sloman & Rips 1998). The same is true for the
matching bias, because it “matches” conclusions in terms of
overlap with the premises. Other heuristics and biases are
ambiguous with respect to a Rule/Similarity classification,
but not for any profound reason; for example, the belief bias
could be Similarity or Rules, depending on how believabil-
ity is established (a conclusion could be believable because
it is Similar to a previous instance or compatible with some
Rule; likewise for the confirmation bias).
Suppose that a group of participants are presented with
a set of conditional problems that all have the same struc-
ture: “Given if p then q, and p, what can be concluded?” We
are asking how experience with these conditionals can bring
to bear on a novel conditional problem. Existing reasoning
research suggests that conditional knowledge could be in
the form of similarity, pragmatic rules, or abstract rules.
First, suppose that in every single case participants make
the inference: “If p then q; p; therefore q.” Participants
must be using a Rule, since all instances are encoded in
terms of one aspect of their representation (namely their
structure as conditional statements), but not (abstract or
otherwise) Similarity: If participants were reasoning on any
single conditional by Similarity then they could be deduc-
ing “q” by Similarity to certain previous instances, but “not
q” by Similarity to others, hence they would not be consis-
tent in their deductions. (Conversely, the basis for differ-
entiating between the “q” and “not q” deductions would
have to be properties of the conditional statement other
than its conditional structure; an analogous argument can
be made to show that such Rules are not pragmatic reason-
ing schemas.) Now, suppose that in some cases participants
deduce “not q” (the inference is: “if p then q; p; therefore
not q”). Then, it must be the case that participants are tak-
ing into account some of the content of the conditional; they
are presumably using context-sensitive Rules, such as prag-
matic reasoning schemas. Equivalently, they might be rea-
soning on the basis of Similarity to previous instances. In
this case, the distinction between Rules and Similarity is
tenuous, since judgments appear to depend both on the
logical structure of the conditional and on content infor-
mation. Finally, suppose that in about half the conditionals,
participants deduce “not q.” Then, it is clearly the case that
participants are taking into account all the content infor-
mation in the conditional and so this is a Similarity process.
Note that if we were to look at only a single conditional, we
could not ordinarily decide whether participants are de-
ducing “q” or “not q” on the basis of Similarity, pragmatic
Rules, or abstract Rule knowledge of other conditionals.
Overall, for everyday conditionals it looks as though a case
could be made for pragmatic Rules or Similarity, but not for
abstract Rules.
Generalizing the above to examine Smith et al.’s (1998)
criteria for rule application, suppose that we are asked 
to solve a problem A specified in terms of properties,
x1y1z1w1, x2y2z2w2, x3y3z3w3, x4y4z4w4, x5y5z5w5. A
property can be represented using one (highest abstrac-
tion) to four (highest specificity) symbols (such a represen-
tational scheme is clearly of limited validity so it is used 
here only for illustration). A Rules process involves few
properties, for example, a production Rule might involve
x2y2z2, an abstract Rule z1, z2, z5 and a pragmatic one
x1z1, x2z2, x5z5. A conclusion derived on the basis of most
properties, for example, x1y1z1w1, x2y2z2w2, x3y3z3w3 or
x1y1z1, x2y2z2, x4y4z4, x5y5z5, would be Similarity. Now,
the more unambiguously a process can be considered a
Rule, the fewer the properties of the problem that need be
taken into account to decide whether the Rule applies or
not. Hence, with a Rules process, most properties of the
problem would be ignored and therefore it does not matter
whether it is familiar or unfamiliar, abstract or concrete.
In a sense, we can conceive of a Rule as specifying a re-
stricted representation space for a problem in terms of the
Rule-relevant properties of the problem; in a such a space,
problems superficially different might be nearly identical
(in that the fewer the properties along which two repre-
sentations are compared, the smaller the chance that the
representations will be found to differ along some of these
properties). Likewise, since problems involving the same
Rule would be matched with respect to the Rule proper-
ties, solving one in terms of a Rule would facilitate Rule ap-
plication in the other. Finally, if a problem requires more
Rules, more matches across different subsets of its proper-
ties would have to be made, which suggests a higher cogni-
tive load or difficulty. Overall, Smith et al.’s (1998) criteria
are consistent with the present proposal, but for the fol-
lowing three points: First, even if abstraction is usually as-
sociated with Rules, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for Rules, since Rules can be concrete (cf. mi-
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crorules in sect. 4.4) and Similarity abstract (cf. abstract
analogy in sect. 4.4). Second, Smith et al.’s criteria appear
to implicate a fairly clear-cut distinction between rules and
similarity. By contrast, within the present proposal prag-
matic rules or abstract similarity would border on the
threshold between Rules and Similarity rather than being
clear cases of either. Third, in some cases it may not be pos-
sible to distinguish between Similarity and Rule perfor-
mance on a single judgment.
6. Categorization
6.1. Common conceptions of rules in categorization
Consider categorization judgments based on critical fea-
tures (Pothos & Hahn 2000): A concept (e.g., “bachelor”)
has a necessary feature (e.g., “male”) if its absence pre-
cludes classification of an object as a member of that con-
cept. The presence of a sufficient feature (e.g., “mating with
other robins”) automatically enables classification of an ob-
ject as a member of a concept (e.g., “robins”). Critical fea-
tures clearly correspond to Rules. Evidence that critical
features individually underlie concept representations in
some cases has been extensive (Braisby et al. 1996; Gelman
& Wellman, 1991; Keil 1989; Rips 1989; 2001). However,
this has not been the case for the classical view of concep-
tual structure, according to which concepts are definitions,
that is, a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
(critical) features (Barsalou 1985; Katz 1972; Rosch &
Mervis 1975). Moreover, it appears that sometimes people
behave as if there were critical features when there are not.
The proposal of psychological essentialism is that we be-
lieve natural kinds to have “essences” that determine what
they are, even if we do not know what these essences are
(Malt 1990; Medin & Ortony 1989; see also Putnam 1975).
In a way analogous to the above, Nosofsky et al. (1989)
suggested that rules in categorization correspond to “verbal
descriptions of category membership” (p. 284), whereby
object features would be combined according to set-theo-
retic logic operations, for example, the category of “blue 
triangles or red squares.” Nosofsky et al. note that for such
categories, category membership would generally be un-
ambiguous and also that more complex category descrip-
tions would increase the difficulty of learning the category
(cf. Smith et al. 1998; sect. 5.3). Also, classification of an in-
stance would be considered to reflect the influence of rules
x, y, z . . . (e.g., “blue triangles and red circles”) if this in-
stance were more similar to all the possible instances im-
plied by rules x, y, z . . . (e.g., “all possible blue triangles and
red circles”).
For objects represented as points in a psychological
space (Shepard 1987), Erickson and Kruschke (1998) sug-
gested that rules correspond to dimensional boundaries or-
thogonal to dimensions in the psychological space. A rule
judgment for an object would correspond to examining
which side of the dimensional boundary the object falls
into, for example, “rectangles with horizontal size above 5
cm are A’s.” Use of a dimensional boundary implies unam-
biguous classification and arbitrary generalization of some
initial instances to novel ones (cf. Wills & Mackintosh
1998). Note that according to Erickson and Kruschke’s pro-
posal, objects grouped together on the basis of rule com-
pliance would have to appear in like regions in psychologi-
cal space (contrast with, e.g., Marcus et al. 1995; sect. 7.4).
6.2. Common conceptions of similarity in categorization
For exemplar models of classification, such as the GCM,
novel instances are considered as members of a concept if
they are similar to existing concept instances (e.g., Hintz-
man 1986). Exemplar models differ in their computational
specification, but in their most general form (interactive
cue models) they are consistent with very complex category
structures (Ashby & Alfroso-Reese 1995; McKinley &
Nosofsky 1995; Nosofsky 1990). Part of the flexibility of ex-
emplar models arises because in similarity computations
different object dimensions/properties can be differentially
weighted depending on their salience in the categorization
process (Medin & Schaffer 1978; Nosofsky 1988). Also, ex-
emplar categorization has been argued to implicate recog-
nition memory of individual category exemplars (e.g.
Nosofsky & Zaki 1998). According to prototype classifica-
tion models, a prototype develops for each of our concepts
as a summary representation of all concept instances. The
similarity of a new object with the concept prototype will
determine whether the object will be considered a member
of the concept (Posner & Keele 1968; Reed 1972). Despite
the superficial differences between prototype and exem-
plar models, some restricted classes of such models are for-
mally identical, and more generally exemplar models com-
putationally (largely) subsume prototype ones (Ashby &
Alfonso-Reese 1995). Therefore, in sections 6.3 and 6.4 we
will discuss only exemplar models. Finally, exemplar (and
prototype) models can be thought of as specifying closed
category boundaries for concepts, that is, continuously con-
nected boundaries in some psychological space such that on
the one side classification as a member of a concept is likely,
on the other it is not (cf. Ashby & Perrin 1988).
6.3. Attempts to disambiguate rules and similarity in
categorization
In a classification dissociation study, Nosofsky et al. (1989)
had participants learn to separate some stimuli into two
predetermined categories, either in terms of explicit rules
describing the categories or without any specific instruc-
tions. In the first case, participants’ generalization would be
best described by knowledge of rules, but in the second by
knowledge of overall similarity to previous instances (see
also Medin & Smith 1981). The flexibility of exemplar cat-
egorization models has been argued to reduce the com-
pelling nature of such results, since a powerful enough ex-
emplar model can always be found to account for any
pattern of classification (e.g., using selective weighting of
dimensions or even individual instances; see also sect. 7.3).
Rips (1989) was also able to dissociate rules/similarity by
telling participants about a bird that because of a toxic waste
contamination ended up looking like an insect. However,
this bird was still able to mate with others of its kind, and
the offspring looked like ordinary birds. Participants classi-
fied the transformed bird as a “bird,” so that it seems they
were using “mating” as a critical feature (Pothos & Hahn
2000).
Allen and Brooks (1991) showed participants a set of sim-
ple schematic stimuli, which corresponded to two cate-
gories of hypothetical animals. Initially, participants were
given a rule that could perfectly classify the animals into
their respective categories. In a later part they had to use
the rule to classify new animals that were either typical or
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atypical members of their corresponding category. Partici-
pants took longer to respond and were more likely to make
errors when they were categorizing atypical members, de-
spite knowledge of the rule that could perfectly classify the
animals into their respective categories (for analogous dif-
ferential performance results see Rips 1989; Rips & Collins
1993; Smith & Sloman 1994).
Smith et al. (1998) contrasted a rules classification model
based on critical features with a similarity model based on
the retrieval of stored exemplars. They reasoned that if crit-
ical features determine classification, it must be possible to
examine them individually, so that the corresponding ob-
jects must be perceived analytically (i.e., object features can
be perceived independently of each other; e.g., the length
and height of a rectangle). By contrast, for similarity judg-
ments object properties would be equally weighted, which
would generally be the case if objects are perceived holisti-
cally (i.e., object properties cannot be perceived separately;
e.g., the hue and saturation of a color). Finally, rules would
generally involve confusable objects, whereas similarity
would involve perceptually distinct ones.
Murphy and Medin (1985) argued that concept repre-
sentation involves general knowledge information that goes
beyond similarity to exemplars or prototypes. For example,
knowledge of “chair” involves information that when we go
to a restaurant we usually expect to sit on chairs; that a chair
with a loose fitting leg could be dangerous; and so forth.
Some research associates general knowledge with rules
(sect. 3.5; Keil et al. 1998), but there are notable exceptions
(Heit 1997; Kaplan & Murphy 2000; Wisniewski 1995).
Overall, there has not been a single dominant proposal for
understanding general knowledge and therefore we do not
consider this in section 6.4.
6.4. Discussion of the rules versus similarity distinction
in categorization
A possible way to understand critical features is that such
features determine the psychological representation of
some concepts. This understanding is incompatible with
the present proposal, since critical feature effects might be
incidentally manifest in an object categorization process, or
not, depending on the context of the process: Context may
affect which object features are relevant, which in turn will
affect (by the present proposal) whether some associated
object classification is considered a Rule or a Similarity
process. Consistent with this view, some recent research
shows critical feature effects not to be robust (Pothos &
Hahn 2000). Moreover, within the present proposal, psy-
chological essentialism reflects a statistical expectation that
for certain concepts categorization more often involves crit-
ical features than otherwise. Finally, Nosofsky et al.’s (1989)
verbal descriptions of categories are Rules insofar as they
involve critical features.
With respect to the flexibility of exemplar categorization
models, the present proposal implication is that such mod-
els are flexible enough to accommodate both Rules and
Similarity effects; they cannot be universally assumed to re-
flect Similarity (cf. Medin & Smith 1981; Nosofsky et al.
1989). A Rules process would be one in which most object
dimensions are suppressed via selective weighting; a Simi-
larity process would be one in which most dimensions re-
ceive equivalent weighting (another example of how a
Rules process could be continuously related to a Similarity
one). Central to the present proposal is that no other, more
formal, distinction between Rules and Similarity is forth-
coming. Applying this reasoning to dimensional bound-
aries, if processing of an object is based on dimensional
boundaries orthogonal to a few object dimensions, then we
have a process of Rules (Erickson & Kruschke 1998). How-
ever, category boundaries more generally cannot be associ-
ated with Rules (cf. Ashby & Perrin 1988).
Applying a Rule on an object requires suppression of all
the object properties other than the ones involved in the
Rule (see Table 1). Thus, what Allen and Brooks’s (1991)
differential performance results show is that with novel,
schematic stimuli, such a process of suppression is not im-
mediately possible. Now, in some cases, Rule classification
is apparently not subject to Similarity influences (e.g., rec-
ognizing even numbers). Hence, it seems that with enough
practice we can suppress Similarity influences (cf. Hahn et
al. 2002). This leads us to a consideration of Smith et al.’s
criteria so as to examine whether particular circumstances
encourage the development of Rules.
When we are trying consciously to develop a Rule for a
group of objects, we must be able to identify a common
small set of properties amongst the objects; thus, the ob-
jects would have to be perceived analytically. However, in
general, Rules can clearly develop without conscious effort
or awareness and manifest themselves in human perfor-
mance as general intuition. Indeed, this is Reber’s (1989)
rules/Rules hypothesis in AGL, and it appears that lan-
guage Rules knowledge is of the same form as well (sect.
7.4). The analytic/holistic criterion appears to apply even
less for Similarity judgments, whereby there have been for-
malisms that motivate Similarity operations for objects that
can be perceived both holistically and analytically (Shepard
1987). Now, using a Rule with an object effectively deter-
mines a restricted representation of the object, one
whereby Rule-relevant properties are more salient than the
object’s other properties (salience refers to the importance
of properties in the categorization process, not to whether
they are consciously perceived as such or not). Therefore,
objects categorized by a Rule would be more confusable
with each other (as discussed in sect. 5.4); by contrast, for
objects categorized by Similarity there would be more ways
in which the objects could differ (sect. 3.1), so that such ob-
jects would be more discriminable (and so more likely to be
distinctly accessible in memory; Nosofsky & Zaki 1998). In
this way Smith et al.’s criteria and the present proposal are
consistent.
7. Language
7.1. Common conceptions of rules in language
The psychological representation of grammatical/syntacti-
cal knowledge in language has been widely assumed to in-
volve rules (e.g., Chomsky 1957; 1965; Pinker 1994). Typi-
cally, three kinds of rules are postulated. Phrase structure
rules are hierarchically organized: They determine the or-
der in which words can be combined into larger structures
(e.g., noun phrase  determinant followed by noun) and
how these larger structures can be combined with each
other (e.g., verb phrase can follow noun phrase). Morpho-
phonemic rules allow the processing of certain elements in
a sentence, as specified by phrase structure rules (e.g., pas-
sive formation: be  en  been, but be  hit  hit). Trans-
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formation rules convert particular phrase structures into
derived ones (e.g., an active sentence to a passive one).
Also, language rules have been considered as default oper-
ations involving abstract symbols. A default is “an operation
that applies not to the particular sets of stored items or to
their frequent patterns, but to any item whatsoever, as long
as it does not already have a precomputed output listed for
it” (Marcus et al. 1995; p. 192). An abstract symbol (e.g.,
nouns, verbs, etc.) “can uniformly represent an entire class
of individuals, suppressing the distinctions between them”
(Marcus et al. 1995, p. 196).
Default rules and abstract symbols suggest an algebraic
view of language knowledge (Boole 1854; Marcus 2001). An
alternative kind of language rules are redundancy rules,
which describe language regularities that are limited in
scope, for example, semiregular inflections restricted to a
small number of phonologically similar verbs in English
past tense inflectional morphology (e.g., drink, drank; Jack-
endoff 1975).
7.2. Common conceptions of similarity in language
The case for similarity in language involves primarily neural
networks (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986). Such models
often consist of three layers of units: input, hidden, and out-
put. All units between layers are connected to each other.
The goal of a neural network is to correctly associate cer-
tain inputs with outputs by modifying the connection
strengths between units. The hidden unit layer recodes the
input patterns in a way that facilitates this association.
When the neural network is presented with a novel pattern,
its response is determined by the similarity of the repre-
sentation of the novel pattern at the hidden layer to the hid-
den layer representations for the other patterns. Thus,
neural networks have been considered to reflect similarity
operations, as they do not “rely in any obvious way on rules”
(Plunkett & Marchman 1991, p. 44). Investigators have
used neural networks to model most of the results offered
as evidence for rules in language (sect. 7.3) so as to claim
that (effectively) analogy operations are adequate for lan-
guage processing.
7.3. Attempts to disambiguate rules and similarity in
language
Chomsky’s a priori argument was that frequency of occur-
rence cannot be the basis for grammatical/syntactical lan-
guage knowledge since sentences like “Colorless green
ideas sleep furiously,” although entirely meaningless and
hence extremely unlikely, are nevertheless instantly and ef-
fortlessly recognized as grammatical. Thus, according to
Chomsky, language must involve rules, specifically phrase
structure, transformational, and morphophonemic ones, as
outlined in section 7.1 (but not finite state grammar rules,
sect. 4.1; Chomsky 1957). Chomsky and collaborators also
proposed that the complexity of the language-learning
problem necessitates some guidance in the form of innate
knowledge about the general rule structure of languages
(Pinker 1979; 1994; see also Crain 1991; Gold 1967). This
poverty of stimulus argument has been partially refuted by
research showing language statistics to be sufficient for de-
veloping some aspects of language (e.g., Baker & McCarthy
1981; Gallaway & Richards 1994; MacWhinney 1993).
Moreover, if innate knowledge is needed for language
learning, such knowledge need not be in the form of rules
(Elman 1996).
Differential performance results in favor of rules relate
to syntactic priming, the observation that using a type of
sentence in language production makes it more likely that
the same type will be subsequently used (Bock 1986; Pick-
ering & Branigan 1999). Since syntactic priming is inde-
pendent of lexical or thematic aspects of a sentence, it ap-
pears that it relates to its syntactical/grammatical rules
structure. Also, Pinker and Prince (1988; see also Marcus
et al. 1995) noted that in English the speed and ease of past
tense inflection of irregular verbs is affected by verb fre-
quency, as would be expected of a similarity process, but
this is generally not the case for regular verbs. Thus, Pinker
and Prince suggested that past-tense inflection in English
is a dual route process, involving a default rule for regulars
and an associative component for irregulars. In favor of sim-
ilarity, in Ramscar’s (2002) experiments the same nonsense
verbs were presented in different contexts that implied dif-
ferent meanings for the verbs. Ramscar found that the non-
sense verbs were inflected in a way consistent with seman-
tically similar known verbs.
A focal point for differential performance discussions in
language is the U-shaped learning profile of English past
tense inflectional morphology (Berko 1958; Cazden 1968).
Children who have initially learned the correct past tense
inflection of common irregular verbs would go through a
period of indiscriminably applying the “ed” suffix to both
regular and irregular verbs. For example, children who
have initially learnt “went” might produce at some point
“goed” before reverting to the correct past tense inflection
again. This observation has been taken to indicate that ini-
tially children employ an analogy process to inflect verbs.
When they recognize the default “-ed” suffixation rule, they
apply it indiscriminately to all verbs they encounter before
learning to separate regulars from irregulars (Pinker &
Prince 1988). However, Rumelhart and McClelland (1986)
showed that neural networks learning the English past
tense inflection can demonstrate a U-shaped learning
curve, and so they argued that psychological development
of English past tense inflection can be guided by analogy; a
rule-learning step need not be implicated (see Plunkett &
Marchman 1991; 1993 for refinements of Rumelhart and
McClelland’s demonstration).
In English past tense inflectional morphology, the de-
fault inflection corresponds to the majority of verbs. Thus,
“dual-route and connectionist [neural network] approaches
can both explain the preponderance of regular responses to
novel forms by English speakers but for different reasons:
the dual-route account exploits a default rule which at-
tempts to regularize any form. . . . The connectionist ac-
count exploits the skewed distribution in favor of regular
forms” (Plunkett & Nakisa 1997, p. 810). This problem has
been addressed by classification dissociation studies of the
German plural inflectional morphology (Koepcke 1988).
“German . . . has inflections that are not regular or rule-
governed in the descriptive sense (it does not apply to the
vast majority of forms) but are regular and rule-governed in
the psychological sense (speakers generalize it to any new
word that bears the mental symbol ‘verb’ or ‘noun’ regard-
less of availability from memory)” (Marcus et al. 1995,
p. 192). According to Marcus et al. (1995), because there is
a default inflection that applies only to a small proportion
of dissimilar patterns, this default constitutes a psychologi-
Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:1 11
cal rule and is outside the scope of neural networks and sim-
ilarity models more generally. However, Hare et al. con-
structed neural network models that can partly accommo-
date rule-like operations even when these do not apply to
the majority of instances (Hare et al. 1995; see also Hahn &
Nakisa 2000; Plunkett & Nakisa 1997). The ultimate draw
of classification dissociation results with neural networks is
reduced by the fact that, given enough units at the hidden
layer, a neural network can learn any association between
input and output (Churchland 1990; cf. the discussion of ex-
emplar models of classification in sects. 6.3, 6.4).
Finally, Marcus et al. (1999; see also Saffran et al. 1996)
presented 7-month-old infants with utterance patterns that
had a specific structure (e.g., “ga-ti-ga”) in a training phase.
Subsequently, the infants saw patterns that had the same
underlying structure but a different superficial form (e.g.,
“se-la-se”) as well as patterns that had a different structure
(cf. transfer AGL experiments, sect. 4.3). Because the in-
fants were able to discriminate between the two kinds of
patterns, Marcus et al. concluded that infants have been
able to encode the rule structure of the training patterns.
We have already seen in sections 4.4 (transfer AGL) and 5.4
(conditionals) that such situations could equally reflect ab-
stract Similarity or Rules knowledge, so these results are
not further discussed.
7.4. Discussion of the rules versus similarity distinction
in language
Consistent with Chomsky, linguistic knowledge must in-
volve Rules. That is, to assess grammaticality, words or
groups of words would be encoded using properties like
“verb,” “noun phrase,” and so forth. Otherwise, there would
be no basis for recognizing rare sentences as grammatical.
Let us take it that an adequate Rules representation of
grammar/syntax must approximate the morphophonemic,
phrase structure, and transformation rules that Chomsky
(1957) envisaged. Then, if two sentences reflect the same
grammatical Rules, processing of one would facilitate pro-
cessing of the other, since both sentences would be the
same in terms of their Rules structure (syntactic priming;
cf. Smith et al. 1992; sect. 5.3). With respect to whether lan-
guage statistics is sufficient to develop language, the pre-
sent proposal is neutral. However, note that language sta-
tistics could include information implicit in linguistic input
(e.g., that certain kinds of words typically appear before
others; cf. Goldstone & Barsalou 1998; sect. 2) and need not
be restricted to, for example, word co-occurrence informa-
tion.
In the present proposal, learning the English past tense
implies grouping verbs according to how they are inflected:
Because regular verbs are so diverse, the only basis for
grouping them is a single aspect of their representation:
their characterization as regular. By contrast, different ir-
regular inflections are typically associated with groups of
verbs that are more similar (share many properties) to each
other. Hence, regular inflection is a Rules operation and ir-
regular inflection would generally be a Similarity one; re-
dundancy rules would be Rules or Similarity depending on
how similar the verbs they apply to are. In this way, inflec-
tion would be least sensitive to frequency for regulars, since
for the purpose of an inflection all regulars look the same.
Neural networks learn by modifying the similarity space of
a set of instances so that instances associated with the same
output are grouped together. Hence, to the extent that
neural networks successfully learn English past tense in-
flection they must be learning a Rule for regular verbs –
that is, grouping regular verbs in such a way that all their
(phonological representation) differences are suppressed
and made distinct from groups of irregulars. Indeed, Di-
enes (1992; see also Davies 1995; Hadley 1993), who ex-
amined the basis for a neural network’s operation in AGL,
concluded that the network would be “abstracting a set of
representative but incomplete rules of the grammar”
(p. 41).
Although we may envisage how the similarity space of
English verbs could be modified so that regulars were
grouped together, this is not the case for a situation like that
of the German plural system. As Marcus et al. (1995) ob-
served, in a phonological representation of German nouns
we find clusters of irregulars (semi-regulars), but the regu-
lar nouns are simply all over the place and generally could
overlap with clusters of irregulars. Hence, according to
Marcus et al., a default rule is needed; that is, an operation
applied to instances regardless of their locality in some in-
ternal psychological space (contrast with Erickson and Kr-
uschke’s [1998] dimensional boundaries, sect. 6.1). The
crucial point is that in the present proposal the relevant
properties in determining the inflection of a (verb or) noun
need not be restricted to phonology (as is typically as-
sumed), but could include, for example, semantic proper-
ties as well. Taking into account both semantic and phono-
logical properties of German nouns, the prediction is that
it would be possible to separate regulars from irregulars.
This prediction would also validate the neural network re-
searchers’ rejection of the necessity of psychological default
operations to account for inflectional morphology compe-
tence, and is consistent with the documented influence of
semantic information in inflection under specific circum-
stances (Ramscar 2002).
Overall, it appears that Rules and Similarity are equally
within the modeling scope of neural networks. Consider
two concerns against this view: First, Marcus (2001) notes
that while neural networks can successfully capture rule-
like regularities, they cannot arbitrarily generalize and so
they do not extract psychological rules. For example, if I be-
come familiar with the notion of even numbers by studying
2, 8, and 16, I would also recognize 342,043,468 as even.
Now, in the present proposal, applying a Rule to an object
implies processing only the Rule-relevant properties of the
object. Thus, as long as an object is an instance of a Rule it
matters little what other properties it has. Hence, Rules can
be arbitrarily generalized, consistent with Marcus (2001).
Whether neural networks can perform such arbitrary gen-
eralizations is a somewhat open issue and beyond the scope
of this target article (but see, e.g., Altmann & Dienes 1999;
Dienes et al. 1999). Second, Smith et al. (1992) note that
“connectionist models are incompatible with the claims
that a rule can be represented explicitly as a separate struc-
ture, and that this structure is inspected by distinct
processes” (p. 5). It has been argued that neural networks’
performance sometimes simply covaries with rules in the
sense that “When we fall down . . . our behavior conforms
to certain rules of physics, but no one would want to claim
that we are actually following these rules” (Smith et al.
1998, p. 3; cf. Searle 1980). In the present proposal, there
is no conception of what it would mean for Rules to exist,
other than as emergent properties of assemblies of neurons,
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for both human brains and neural networks. The situation
is analogous to that for, say, temperature or pressure, which
feel real but actually exist only as emergent properties of as-
semblies of molecules (for a discussion see Dulany 2003).
8. Summary of evidence
Table 2 provides an overview of the most common types of
argument used in the rules versus similarity discussion in
the cognitive psychology areas we reviewed. The aim of this
section is to summarize how the Rules versus Similarity dis-
tinction advocated here covers (or does not cover) these ar-
guments. Classification dissociation studies aim to identify
situations where participants’ performance reflects non-
overlapping influences of rules and similarity. However, as
we have seen in categorization (GCM; sect. 6.3) and lan-
guage (neural networks; sect. 7.3), even if a particular sim-
ilarity model makes distinct performance predictions from
a particular rules model, it appears always possible to
slightly modify one or the other so that the performance
predictions are identical (cf. Hahn & Chater 1998). In the
present proposal, this problem is addressed by postulating
that a formal distinction between Rules and Similarity is not
possible, so that a similarity model such as the GCM would
be able to capture both across its range of operation. This
contrasts with much of existing research, wherein investi-
gators have sought separate models for rules and similarity.
In the same vein, although suppression and introspective
results clearly show us that there are operations that should
be broadly considered rules and others that should be con-
sidered similarity, we argued that such results do not impli-
cate a form of rules/similarity other than Rules/Similarity.
Differential performance results are understood by recog-
nizing that applying a Rule on an object implicates a re-
stricted representation for the object in terms of only the
Rule-relevant properties. Thus, the more an operation is a
Rule, the more it will look like a default; it will be insensi-
tive to exemplar frequency and context effects, and it will
be associated with a perception of certainty. In general, ex-
perimental results show many psychological processes to be
in-between (extreme forms of) Rules and Similarity, so that,
for example, even if a process is based on a small subset of
an object’s properties, the other properties of the object
would not be entirely suppressed. The a priori arguments
we considered for rules in reasoning (sect. 5.3) and rules in
language (sect. 7.3), if valid, might show a need for a spe-
cial kind of rules: rules that cannot necessarily be under-
stood as operations in the same continuum as similarity
ones. We argued that the aspects of such arguments that we
could maintain were consistent with the distinction be-
tween Rules and Similarity.
It appears, then, that the reviewed research is consistent
with an identification of rules and overall similarity as the
opposite extremes of the same similarity process. However,
at this point one can question the general utility of retain-
ing a distinction between rules and similarity; if a Rules
characterization of a cognitive process versus a Similarity
one is partly a definitional issue along the same similarity
continuum, then why not simply call all cognitive opera-
tions similarity ones and aim to describe in more detail sim-
ilarity? First, because we would like to use different labels
for cognitive processes in a way that is consistent with our
naïve intuitions about the differences between these
processes. As discussed in the Introduction, there is cer-
tainly a strong intuitive sense of rules judgments being dif-
ferent from similarity ones. Second, scientifically, a Rules
versus Similarity distinction enables a distinction between
a set of processes that are considered Rules and a set of
processes considered Similarity. Clearly, it would be useful
to distinguish between these two sets of processes, to the
extent that they can be shown to vary in theoretically im-
portant and experimentally verifiable ways. The research
reviewed certainly suggests this to be the case.
9. Future directions
First, the objective of most existing research on rules ver-
sus similarity has been to identify models of rules separate
from similarity; we suggest that it is more appropriate to un-
derstand rules and similarity in a unified way (e.g., within a
model such as the GCM or a neural network). Second, it
should be possible to model the influence of exemplar fre-
quency, context, general knowledge, and so forth, on the
basis of how pure a Rule operation is. Third, processing an
object in terms of a Rule or a Similarity operation implies
that the object will be perceived in different ways (e.g.,
grouping a set of objects in terms of a Rule implies that the
Rule-relevant features will be most salient in the percep-
tion of the objects). A Similarity process appears to be the
default, since a Rules process requires that many proper-
ties of an object be suppressed. In examining how Rules are
developed for a set of objects, the research that shows how
different categorizations for a set of objects alters how we
perceive these objects appears extremely relevant (e.g.,
Goldstone 1994b; 1995; Harnad 1987; Schyns & Oliva
1999). Fourth, even if Similarity is the default, it is possible
Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
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Table 2. The scope of rules vs. similarity investigations 
in different areas of cognitive psychology
Classification Suppression Introspective Differential A priori
dissociation performance
Learning x x x x
Reasoning x x
Categorization x x
Language x x x
that some objects might be processed spontaneously in
terms of a Rule. We can recognize this to be a problem of
category coherence, that is, a Rule might be preferred to
Similarity if it provides a more psychologically intuitive
grouping for a set of objects (Murphy & Medin 1985; cf.
Pothos & Chater 2002). For example, possibly, the more di-
verse the range of objects grouped together, the more likely
that a Rule would be spontaneously used to encode the 
objects. With future work we hope to examine further im-
plications of the present proposal and also to pursue more
specific formalizations of the Rules versus Similarity dis-
tinction in the relevant areas.
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Abstract: Normative accounts in terms of similarity can be deployed in
order to provide semantics for systems of context-free default rules and
other sophisticated conditionals. In contrast, procedural accounts of deci-
sion in terms of similarity (Rubinstein 1997) are hard to reconcile with the
normative rules of rationality used in decision-making, even when suitably
weakened.
Many of the examples of context-free rules provided by the author
in his analysis of reasoning are conditionals, that is, they are state-
ments of the form if p, then q. Since at least the 1950s there has
been a fair amount of work in philosophical logic devoted to make
explicit the patterns of validity implicit in conditional reasoning
(see Cross & Nute 1998 for an overview).
The underlying idea behind models of conditionals, is that in
order to evaluate a conditional if p, then q with respect to an epis-
temic state K, the agent should suppose that p is the case and ver-
ify whether q holds in this suppositional scenario. This presup-
poses a model of supposition, which is nontrivial in cases where
the supposition is counterdoxastic or counterfactual. This presup-
poses, in turn, deploying a grading of events incompatible with the
current state K. This grading admits multiple interpretations, in-
cluding a notion of similarity (Lewis 1973), when the conditional
is interpreted ontologically; an epistemic notion of plausibility,
(Spohn 1988); or an interpretation in terms of informational value,
(Levi 1980; 1996). The result of supposing p with respect to K,
therefore, might be represented as the most plausible (most sim-
ilar, etc.) event (with respect to K) where p is the case.
The syntax that thus arises typically violates some classical laws.
A good example is the so-called law of monotony, which permits
inferring if p and q, then r from if p, then r. Much of the work in
artificial intelligence in recent years has gravitated around the
study of nonmonotonic or default logics. However, the condition-
als studied via these methods can be classically axiomatized as ex-
tensions of standard logic, (Arló-Costa & Shapiro 1992; Gabbay
1985). A completeness result for any of these systems shows that
semantic considerations in terms of similarity (plausibility, en-
trenchment, informational value, etc.) can be completely repre-
sented in terms of syntactic manipulations of context-free logical
rules (Arló-Costa 1996).
These rules encode patterns of validity one should endorse on
reflection. As an example (first proposed by Vann McGee [1985]),
consider a spinner and a dial divided into three equal parts: 1, 2,
and 3. You (fully) believe that the spinner was started and landed
in 1. After the fact it would be reasonable to accept:
(I) If the spinner had landed in an odd-numbered part, then if it
had not landed in 1, it would have landed in part 3.
It seems pretty clear that you should you should accept (I). But
then it is also obvious that in this situation you should reject:
(q) If the spinner had not landed in part 1, then it would have
landed in part 3.
Here the pattern if p, then q; p, therefore q is violated. Actually
the agent, if rational, will endorse not q (when p coincides with the
antecedent of [I]). This indicates that instances of modus ponens
wherein conditionals appear in the consequent of other condi-
tionals might fail to be valid. Users of this syntax will sometimes
deduce q, sometimes not q when confronted with modus ponens
(for different instances of q). But one can argue that the rules used
in this case are not pragmatic rules, appealing to the content of the
conditionals. They are context-free logical rules. Of course, one
can specify acceptance conditions for these rules, which will be
sensitive to the given context (see Arló-Costa 1999; 2001). But
even in this case, one can axiomatize (via context-free rules) the
sentences accepted in every possible epistemic context (Arló-
Costa 1996; 1999).
The general idea behind this research program is to accommo-
date and systematize the validity patterns utilized in everyday con-
ditional reasoning as an extension of the classical notion of valid-
ity. Normative notions of similarity, plausibility, or informational
value can be used in order to do so. Performance in the Wason task
can then be seen as the result of the fact that the conditional of
classical logic does not exhaust our intuitions about conditional
reasoning (or about cognitive errors, which tend to diminish when
the stakes are higher and attention is more focused).
There is, nevertheless, a very different appeal to similarity as a
heuristic (reported by the author). The following experiment can
illustrate the latter kind of use of similarity: Subjects are asked to
choose from among the following two lotteries, represented as
(prize, probability):
L3  (4000, 0.2) and L4  (3000, 0.25)
Most subjects choose L3. On the other hand, they are faced with
the following choice:
L1  (4000, 0.8) and L2  (3000, 1.0)
Here, the vast majority of subjects choose L2. This pattern of
choice, which is similar to the so-called Allais paradox, is incon-
sistent with the axioms of classical expected utility. Rubinstein
(1988; 1997) explains the first choice in terms of similarity. He
posits a purely procedural (see Rubinstein 1997, Ch. 2, for a gen-
eral introduction to procedural models of decision making) ac-
count of choice, where one first checks for domination, and if this
is not decisive one appeals to similarity (choosing the highest prize
for similar probabilities, as in the first choice, or the higher prob-
ability for similar prizes). If the second step is not decisive then
one moves to a third step, which is not specified, like risk aversion,
which could be an important motivational factor in the second
choice. Rubinstein has shown that this procedure is consistent
only with the optimization of an almost-unique preference rela-
Commentary/Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
14 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:1
tion. The first two steps of the procedure overdetermine prefer-
ence, and this casts doubts about whether decision makers who
use such a procedure can be described as maximizers of transitive
preferences. In other words, it seems that it is hard to make com-
patible the use of similarity as a heuristic with the axioms of ex-
pected utility. On the other hand, procedures of this kind recom-
mend choices that are impossible to accommodate as rational even
in strong weakenings of expected utility that abandon the axiom of
ordering and use imprecise probabilities (see Levi 1986). More-
over, even when this use of similarity provides an explanation for
much of the data that led to the specification of Prospect Theory,
it also entails consequences that put this and other descriptive al-
ternatives to expected utility into question (see Leland 1994). So,
on the one hand, proponents of procedural models of decision in
terms of similarity (Leland 1994) have argued that these models
offer a better description of the actual patterns of choice behavior
(than well-known alternatives like Prospect Theory or Regret
Theory). There are antecedents of this view in psychology. For ex-
ample, Smith and Osherson (1989) argue that the limitations of
Prospect Theory should be found in its neglect of issues related to
representation and process. They offer a computational alterna-
tive in terms of similarity and prototypes that intends to remedy
this defect by providing boundary conditions to phenomena
demonstrated only in the empirical literature on choice. But, on
the other hand, similarity (as a heuristic) cannot be seen as the
fundamental concept to which one can reduce the rules of ratio-
nality used in decision-making (even for weak or deviant articula-
tions of such rules). None of the alternatives to expected utility
(EU) that are attentive to the role of similarity in judgment under
uncertainty (including procedural models of decision) has been
offered as a replacement for the rules of rationality encoded by EU
or some weakened version of EU. They intend to offer accurate
descriptions of patterns of behavior that in limited cases might vi-
olate these rules.
Empirical dissociations between rule-based
and similarity-based categorization
F. Gregory Ashby and Michael B. Casale
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
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Abstract: The target article postulates that rule-based and similarity-
based categorization are best described by a unitary process. A number of
recent empirical dissociations between rule-based and similarity-based
categorization severely challenge this view. Collectively, these new results
provide strong evidence that these two types of category learning are me-
diated by separate systems.
The target article presents a useful summary of a variety of inter-
esting differences between two different types of category learn-
ing tasks. In one type, which we refer to as rule-based tasks, “ob-
ject categorization is determined by a small subset of the relevant
object properties,” as Pothos writes (target article, sect. 2, para. 4),
and he suggests that in tasks of this type “categorization should be
understood as a rules process.” In a second type of task, which we
refer to as information-integration tasks, “categorization is deter-
mined by most of the relevant object properties, broadly equally
weighted” and Pothos suggests that in tasks of this type “catego-
rization is best understood as an overall similarity process” (sect.
2, para. 4).
A number of recent results, not mentioned in the target article,
severely challenge the view that rule-based and information-inte-
gration category learning are mediated by the same unitary
process. The results in question all describe empirical dissocia-
tions that collectively provide strong evidence that learning in
these two types of tasks is mediated by separate systems.
A number of these results show that the nature and timing of
trial-by-trial feedback about response accuracy is critical with in-
formation-integration categories, but not with rule-based cate-
gories. First, in the absence of any trial-by-trial feedback about re-
sponse accuracy, people can learn some rule-based categories, but
there is no evidence that they can learn information-integration
categories (Ashby et al. 1999). Second, even when feedback is
provided on every trial, information-integration category learn-
ing is impaired if the feedback signal is delayed by as little as five
seconds after the response. In contrast, such delays have no 
effect on rule-based category learning (Maddox et al. 2003).
Third, similar results are obtained when observational learning
is compared to traditional feedback learning. Ashby et al. (2002)
trained subjects on rule-based and information-integration cate-
gories using an observational training paradigm in which subjects
were informed before stimulus presentation of which category
the ensuing stimulus is from. Following stimulus presentation,
subjects then pressed the appropriate response key. Traditional
feedback training was as effective as observational training with
rule-based categories, but with information-integration categories,
feedback training was significantly more effective than observa-
tional training.
Another set of studies established that information-integration
categorization uses procedural learning, whereas rule-based cate-
gory learning does not. First, Ashby et al. (2003) had subjects learn
either rule-based or information integration categories using tra-
ditional feedback training. Next, some subjects continued as be-
fore, some switched their hands on the response keys, and for
some the location of the response keys was switched (so that the
Category A key was assigned to Category B, and vice versa). For
those subjects learning rule-based categories, there was no differ-
ence among any of these transfer instructions, thereby suggesting
that abstract category labels are learned in rule-based categoriza-
tion. In contrast, for those subjects learning information-integra-
tion categories, switching hands on the response keys caused no
interference, but switching the locations of the response keys
caused a significant decrease in accuracy. Thus, it appears that re-
sponse locations are learned in information-integration catego-
rization, but specific motor programs are not. The importance of
response locations in information-integration category learning
but not in rule-based category learning was confirmed in a recent
study by Maddox et al. (2004b). These information-integration
results essentially replicate results found with traditional proce-
dural-learning tasks (Willingham et al. 2000).
A third set of studies establish the importance of working mem-
ory and executive attention in rule-based category learning and si-
multaneously show that executive function is not critical in the
learning of information-integration categories. First, Waldron and
Ashby (2001) had subjects learn rule-based and information-inte-
gration categories under typical single-task conditions and when
simultaneously performing a secondary task that requires working
memory and executive attention. The dual task had a massive
detrimental effect on the ability of subjects to learn the simple uni-
dimensional rule-based categories (trials-to-criterion increased by
350%), but had no significant effect on the ability of subjects to
learn the complex information-integration categories. This result
alone is highly problematic for unified accounts of rule-based and
similarity-based categorization. Arguably the most successful ex-
isting single-process model of category learning is Kruschke’s
(1992) exemplar-based ALCOVE model. Ashby and Ell (2002)
showed that the only versions of ALCOVE which can fit the Wal-
dron and Ashby data make the strong prediction that after reach-
ing criterion accuracy on the unidimensional rule-based struc-
tures, participants would have no idea that only one dimension
was relevant in the dual-task conditions. Ashby and Ell reported
empirical evidence that strongly disconfirmed this prediction.
Thus, the best available single-system model fails to account even
for the one dissociation reported by Waldron and Ashby (2001).
Second, Maddox et al. (2004a) tested the prediction that feed-
back processing requires attention and effort in rule-based cate-
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gory learning, but not in information-integration category learn-
ing. In this study, subjects alternated a trial of categorization with
a trial of Sternberg (1966) memory-scanning. In a short feedback-
processing-time condition, memory scanning immediately fol-
lowed categorization, whereas in a long feedback- processing-time
condition, categorization was followed by a 2.5 second delay and
then by memory scanning. Information-integration category
learning was unaffected by manipulations of this inter-trial inter-
val, whereas rule-based category learning was significantly im-
paired when subjects had only a short time to process the catego-
rization feedback.
It is important to realize that these dissociations are not driven
simply by differences in the difficulty of rule-based versus infor-
mation-integration tasks. First, in several cases the experimental
manipulation interfered more with the learning of the simple rule-
based categories than with the more difficult information-inte-
gration strategies (Maddox et al. 2003; Waldron & Ashby 2001).
Second, most of the studies explicitly controlled for difficulty dif-
ferences either by decreasing the separation between the unidi-
mensional rule-based categories, or by using a more complex two-
dimensional conjunction rule in the rule-based conditions. Both
manipulations increase the difficulty of rule-based categorization,
yet in no case did such increases in rule-based task difficulty af-
fect the qualitative dissociations described above.
Finally, we note that all of these dissociations were predicted in
a parameter-free, a priori manner by the dual-system category-
learning model COVIS (Ashby et al. 1998).
Rules work on one representation; similarity
compares two representations
Todd M. Bailey
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3YB, United Kingdom.
baileytm1@cardiff.ac.uk http://www.cf.ac.uk/psych/home/baileytm1
Abstract: Rules and similarity refer to qualitatively different processes.
The classification of a stimulus by rules involves abstract and usually do-
main-specific knowledge operating primarily on the target representation.
In contrast, similarity is a relation between the target representation and
another representation of the same type. It is also useful to distinguish as-
sociationist processes as a third type of cognitive process.
It is not the number of features, it is what you do with them that
counts. The conceptual difference between rules and similarity
has more to do with the number of object representations on
which they operate than with the number of object features they
process. For example, in a study of rhythm learning, Bailey et al.
(1999) evaluated various models for determining which syllable in
a word gets the main stress (e.g., si-mi-LA-ri-ty, not si-MI-la-ri-ty).
The classical approach in linguistics involves rhythm rules that ap-
ply one after the other (e.g., Halle & Vergnaud 1987). These rules
operate on a single representation, namely the one representing
the phonological structure of the target word. In contrast, an ex-
emplar model of stress assignment like the one described by Bai-
ley et al. has comparisons between two representations at its core
– the phonological representation for the target word is compared
to a familiar word whose representation is recalled from memory.
One could argue that the classical rules refer to only a small sub-
set of the target word’s phonological features, and that perhaps the
similarity process underlying the exemplar model refers to more
of these features. However, that small quantitative distinction
misses the fact that the cognitive mechanisms hypothesized by
these two models are qualitatively quite different. The rules re-
quire a working memory capable of representing the phonology
of a single word, along with an abstract body of knowledge that ef-
fectively categorizes the target word so that it receives stress on a
particular syllable. The exemplar model requires representations
for two words to be juxtaposed so that a similarity relation can be
computed between them (along with some additional secondary
machinery to aggregate across multiple pairwise comparisons and
classify based on the result).
Cognitive processes operate on representations, and these ex-
amples illustrate the distinction between unary and binary opera-
tions. Another theory of stress assignment, based on optimality
theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993), is a system of soft (violable)
constraints on rhythm structures (Tesar 1997). Variations of the
target word with different rhythm structures are evaluated against
the set of constraints, and the optimal variation, the one that is
most consistent with the highest-ranking constraints, determines
the stress pattern. The core of this constraint-satisfaction process
is the evaluation of a single representation with respect to a set of
domain-specific constraints. Those constraints, and their relative
rankings, embody abstract knowledge of stress patterns. What is
not involved in the constraint-satisfaction process is juxtaposition
between two phonological representations. In this regard, opti-
mality theory is similar to classical linguistic rules and qualitatively
distinct from the exemplar model and its similarity comparisons.
The same can be said for the “non-metrical” constraints on stress
proposed in Bailey (1995).
The distinction between unary and binary operations yields sen-
sible classifications for many models of cognitive processes, in-
cluding those mentioned in the target article. Nevertheless, it may
be helpful for a gross taxonomy of cognitive models to include as-
sociationist models as a third type. For example, the perceptron
model of stress assignment (Gupta & Touretzky 1994) determines
the location of stress using a two-layer connectionist network. The
model is unary in the sense that it involves a single active phono-
logical representation – that of the target word. However, the op-
eration performed on this one representation is not determined
by abstract domain-specific knowledge, but by a transparent map-
ping based on statistical properties of previous representations.
Stress assignment for a word could also be determined based on
the familiarity of its component chunks, along the lines of frag-
ment models of artificial grammar learning (e.g., Perruchet &
Pacteau 1990; Servan-Schreiber & Anderson 1990). Superficially,
one might be tempted to think that fragment models are like ex-
emplar models because familiar fragments, like exemplars, can be
represented individually in a memory store. However, unlike ex-
emplars, fragments are fundamentally incommensurate with the
target representation in exactly the same sense that a wheel is in-
commensurate with a car – they stand in a part-whole relation.
Decomposing the target representation into its component frag-
ments and assessing their familiarity yields a measure of how the
target relates to aggregate statistical properties of past targets of
one type or another. In this sense, fragment models are similar to
connectionist models and therefore belong in the same class of as-
sociationist models.
The three-way distinction between abstract unary operators
(rules, constraints, etc.), binary operators (comparison to an ex-
emplar or prototype), and associative mappings (connectionist
networks, fragment models) preserves the intuitive distinction be-
tween rule-based processing and other sorts of models. It also
provides a sensible way to think about certain hybrid models, like
Hummel and Holyoak’s (1997) theory of analogical access and
mapping. In relating a proposition like “John loves Mary” to “Bill
likes Susan” versus “Peter fears Beth,” Hummel and Holyoak’s
system relies on associative mappings from individual predicate
and object units (John, Mary, etc.) to a distributed semantic mem-
ory. At the same time, it maintains representations for two (or
more) propositions in working memory, and relates one to the
other to determine their analogical similarity. This is a good ex-
ample of a hybrid model composed of an associative component
and a binary similarity component. Using Pothos’s proposed con-
tinuum we could describe it as a hybrid of two Similarity pro-
cesses, but that is unnecessarily uninformative. The continuum
between Rules and Similarity is interesting, but overlooks impor-
tant qualitative differences among models of cognitive processes,
including the difference between rules and similarity.
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Instantiated rules and abstract analogy: Not a
continuum of similarity
Lee R. Brooks and Samuel D. Hannah
Department of Psychology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4K1,
Canada. brookslr@mcmaster.ca hannahsd@mcmaster.ca
Abstract: We agree that treating rules and similarity as dichotomous op-
posites is unproductive. However, describing all categorization operations
as a continuum of varied similarity process obscures a multidimensional
contrast. We describe two processes, instantiated rules and abstract anal-
ogy, both of which have aspects of rules and similarity, and question
whether they can be compared informatively as points on a continuum.
We agree with Pothos that treating rules and similarity as di-
chotomous opposites is inappropriate and we strongly endorse his
review of the literature supporting a more subtle treatment. How-
ever, we are concerned that describing all categorization opera-
tions as variations of a similarity process obscures what is essen-
tially a multidimensional comparison. To make our case, we first
describe what we think is a common process in categorization.
We have argued (Brooks & Hannah 2000; submitted; Hannah
& Brooks, submitted a; submitted b) that identification rules
commonly act as a control of attention and learning, not as a com-
plete decision procedure in themselves. Such rules name features
whose manifestations in known items are to be learned, and then
classify new items by heavily weighting any of those named fea-
tures whose manifestations are similar to any of those previously
experienced. For example, if a medical student is told that the skin
disease lichen planus sometimes presents with polygonal-shaped
papules (medium-sized solid bumps), the student can at least con-
sider that diagnosis when anything that can be called a polygonal
bump appears. If a new instance of a polygonal papule were a near
twin of a previously seen papule, the student would be confident
that the feature bore on the correct diagnosis. However, if the
papule were perfectly regular, 10 cm across and bright blue, then
that student should rightly be very cautious about deciding that it
had anything to do with lichen planus. One component of exper-
tise is probably knowledge of the variety of ways a feature can look
and still be relevant to the category.
This proposal that rules are applied by attending to the particu-
lar appearance of the named features also helps us to understand
the fact that most “rules” given either by medical experts or by un-
dergraduates describing everyday concepts are actually only lists of
features lacking any specific decision procedure (Brooks & Han-
nah 2000). A bird, for example, could be described as an animal
that flies, sings, and has feathers, without giving any indication of
how many of these features it must have or how they should be
weighted. However, the terms in the rule have led to learning ex-
amples of how bird-like flying, bird-like feathers, and bird-like
singing appear. Such learning would allow the learner to immedi-
ately reject the word “bird” for an opera singer with a feather boa
flying on a plane, even though she has all of the features mentioned
in the “rule.” That is, no bird had been seen flying in a manner even
remotely resembling a jet or singing even a remote approximation
to Verdi. The fact that most everyday and expert rules do not have
a fixed decision procedure (“best 2 out of 3 features” or “put heav-
iest weights on these cardinal features”) suggests that people nor-
mally are using something other than just the number or weight-
ing of features. The additional information normally used, we
suggest, is the “goodness” of the feature manifestations, the extent
to which they match previously experienced manifestations – in-
formation that is not captured in a frequency-based multiple re-
gression. The rule, then, is represented in a much richer fashion
than just as a list of terms that rely solely on the resources of the
general language for their use. Without some correspondence to
general language meanings, the rule would not be useful for initial
instruction. However, such general language groundings are insuf-
ficient to describe the performance of people with even a modicum
of experience. Clearly, the terms in the rule must also have some
concept-specific grounding, often to manifestations that are ex-
tremely diverse across different members of the same category.
The “instantiated rule” process just described applies most obvi-
ously to learning with explicit instruction, to double checking or
justifying an initial categorization, and to framing an explicit policy.
This idea that the terms in a rule are represented in both an in-
formational (sparse, general language) and an instantiated (per-
ceptual, detailed) form has allowed us to produce and control cat-
egorical biasing (Hannah & Brooks, submitted a) and to control
the weighting given to familiar manifestations of features (Han-
nah & Brooks, submitted b). Without representing features in
both forms, we were unable to produce important phenomena in
concept learning and utilization.
Consistent with Pothos’s proposal, these “instantiated rules” are
difficult to fit into a strong dichotomy between rule and similarity
processes. The matching of a presented feature to the acceptable
manifestations of the features for a given category clearly has char-
acteristics that Pothos attributes to similarity. However, the verbal
list of features in explicit versions of such instantiated rules have
characteristics of rules, including a concentration on small por-
tions of the stimulus and an at least partial failure to track the co-
variation structure of the domain.
However, to say that this instantiated rule process is part of a
continuum of similarity processes, potentially modeled by GCM,
seems to be a misleading simplification. Many applications of ab-
stract analogy (e.g., Goldstone et al. 1991; Brooks & Vokey 1991)
also have an “in-between” position on this proposed continuum in
that the features are selective and abstract (Rules) but the com-
parison process is neither certain nor limited to a small number of
terms (Similarity). However, the formation and generalization of
abstract analogies is very different from the instantiated rule
process of accumulating a rich store of perceptually specific rep-
resentations around which to generalize. Presumably, a version of
GCM (or some other similarity-based model) could model the cat-
egorization of new items, but only after specifying a space based
on the appropriate features; that is, only after much of the work of
psychological interest had already been accomplished. We further
suspect that there are critical differences between the authorita-
tive status of the medical rule and the less specific and changeable
structure of a discovered abstract analogy in controlling the deci-
sion process. While sympathetic to the value of rejecting a rule/
similarity dichotomy, the multiple differences between instanti-
ated rules and abstract analogies are not informatively captured as
two middling points on a continuum.
Rules, similarity, and the
information-processing blind alley
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Department of Philosophy, University of Murcia, Campus de Espinardo,
Murcia 30100, Spain. fjcalvo@um.es
http://www.um.es/~logica/paco_calvo/paco_calvo.htm
Abstract: Pothos’s revision of rules and similarity in the area of language
illustrates the impression that the classicist/connectionist debate is in a
blind alley. Under his continuum proposal, both hypotheses fall neatly
within the information-processing paradigm. In my view, the paradigm
shift that dynamic systems theory represents (Spencer & Thelen 2003)
should be submitted to critical scrutiny. Specific formalizations of the
Rules versus Similarity distinction may not lead to a form of unification un-
der Generalized Context Models or connectionist networks.
Pothos’s revision of rules and similarity in the area of language
(sect. 7) is perhaps the latest episode in a series of exchanges (e.g.,
Marcus & Berent 2003; Seidenberg et al. 2003) that serves to il-
lustrate the impression of a growing minority: that the classicist/
connectionist debate in cognitive science is in a blind alley. The
friends of classical orthodoxy (Marcus et al. 1999) continue to
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search for cognitive abilities that, defying statistical explanation
under the poverty of the stimulus lens, embarrass their foes. Rule-
following skeptics (Calvo & Colunga 2003) rejoin by finding eco-
logical data that (1) can be exploited statistically and (2) allow con-
nectionist networks to remain computationally adequate. Put
bluntly, the connectionist’s overall strategy is to show that stimuli
are not so poor after all! Although things are never black and
white, the debate has moved along these lines since the re-emer-
gence of connectionism in the mid 1980s. The debate has been
fruitful insofar as contributions have filled in empirical gaps at al-
gorithmic levels of description.
It is noteworthy, however, that under Pothos’s continuum pro-
posal, both hypotheses, the classical and the connectionist, fall
neatly within the information-processing paradigm that has
shaped the discipline over the last century. The architecture of
cognition has been questioned, but assumptions about its compu-
tational underpinnings have remained unchallenged. The past-
tense debate (Pinker & Ullman 2002; Ramscar 2002), the system-
aticity debate (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988; Hadley 1999), and, in the
last five years, the algebra-versus-statistics debate (Calvo & Col-
unga 2003; Marcus et al. 1999), have benefited partially from the
classical-connectionist, within-paradigm “battle to win souls.”
This is, however, a “cognitive decathlon” (expression borrowed
from Anderson & Lebiere 2003), in which we might never be able
to declare a winner! Perhaps we are stuck in an endless dialectic
of positing challenges to connectionism and then trying to account
for them statistically, forever and ever. In view of this scenario, we
may need to consider turning to questions concerning the role that
potential contenders, such as Dynamic Systems Theory (DST)
(Thelen & Smith 1994) may play in the future.
Unlike information-processing-based frameworks, DST tries to
model and explain the behavior of concrete systems by identify-
ing them with sets of variables that change continually over time.
A dynamical system, in this way, can be analyzed in terms of the
differential equations that contain the quantitative variables
whose interdependencies describe the laws that govern the be-
havior of the system. DST has proved extremely useful in the
physical sciences. Limb movement is a classical example in the lit-
erature. Kelso (1995) studied the wagging of index fingers, and a
number of properties were successfully described and predicted
dynamically. The phenomenon could be explained as a property
of a nonlinear dynamical system that achieves self-organization
around certain points of instability. Thelen et al. (2001), on the
other hand, go exhaustively over the literature on the well-known,
but still highly controversial, “A-not-B error,” and offer a non-clas-
sical explanation of motor control and development in that con-
text. In their view, the A-not-B error can be perfectly explained,
with no need to invoke information-processing concepts and op-
erations. Specifically, the dynamical evolution of the coupling of
perception, movement, and memory can explain by itself the A-
not-B error. Crucially, cognitive activity cannot be accounted for
without considering the perceptual and motor apparatus that fa-
cilitates in the first place the agent’s dealing with the external
world.
It must be emphasized that DST aims not merely at cashing out
the axioms of the information-processing paradigm in trendy math-
ematical terms, but, rather, at articulating a brand new way to un-
derstand cognition. In this way, Thelen et al. (2001) speculate as
to how higher-level phenomena may be dynamically modeled. A
model of mental activity must respect the same principles of non-
linearity, time-dependence, and continuity that are generally in-
voked in explanations of bodily interactions and neural activity
(Freeman 2000). The working hypothesis is that the same mathe-
matical tool kit of differential equations can be put to the use of
describing and explaining cognitive activity in general. By con-
trast, an information-processing agent counts as a computational
system insofar as its state-transitions can be accounted for in terms
of manipulations on representations.
In my view, the paradigm shift that DST represents should be
submitted to critical scrutiny in this context. Its continuous and
situated approach may lead us back to the main road by eschew-
ing, rather than revising, the (computationalist) function-approx-
imator approach of connectionism. The question of whether
“complex cognitive functions depend on a mixture of statistical
and algebraic (rule) mechanisms” (Marcus & Berent 2003), may
simply vanish once the continuous interplay that dynamic system
theory calls for between brain, body, and environment is modeled
in detail. The information-processing paradigm posits sets of in-
ternal mechanisms that serve the purpose of information manip-
ulation and storage. Cognitive activity is thus marked by the pro-
cessing of representational states. Put bluntly, in its classical form,
cognition amounts to the manipulation of symbols according to
sets of explicit (algebraic) rules. In its connectionist form, cogni-
tion would amount to the manipulation of sub-symbols according
to sets of implicit (statistical) rules. In my view, no further progress
can be made unless the very issue of whether cognition must nec-
essarily be accounted for in information-processing terms is ad-
dressed by the scientific community. Dynamic systems theory fur-
nishes us with an appropriate theoretical and mathematical tool
kit to make (experimental) predictions in cognitive psychology.
According to these predictions, specific formalizations of the
Rules versus Similarity distinction may not lead to a form of uni-
fication under Generalized Context Models (GCM; Nosofsky
1991) or connectionist networks. Traditionally, dynamicism is seen
as taking sides with Gibsonian approaches, whereas connection-
ism pertains to the domain of information processing. Rules and
Similarity in the context of information processing, I contend, may
simply be the wrong framework.
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Epistemological requirements for a cognitive
psychology of real people
John Campion
1 Bembrook Cottage, Woodmans Green, Linch, Liphook, Hants GU30 7NE,
United Kingdom. TJCampion@aol.com
Abstract: Pothos’s analysis is difficult to relate to real human mental
processes. He tackles four quite different areas of psychology and adduces
evidence from a large number of paradigms. Yet despite this very large
scope, he employs a single, simplistic descriptive framework. An episte-
mological analysis, supported by illustrations from real world decision-
making, shows that this steers us away from, rather than towards, an un-
derstanding of real human cognitive processes.
I shall focus on the issue of psychological reality as it relates to
Pothos’s article and illustrate my argument with reference to hu-
man decision-making.
Pothos declares that the large array of psychological phenom-
ena that he wishes to address (which runs from human decision-
making through to discrimination learning in pigeons) can all be
construed as a categorisation process. Further, he states that
“nothing is said about how this process of categorization takes
place; rather, we are interested in providing a framework for char-
acterizing the categorization as a rules process or an overall simi-
larity one” (sect. 2, para. 4). He also states “there is no conception
of what it would mean for Rules to exist, other than as emergent
properties of assemblies of neurons . . . [this] is analogous to . . .
temperature or pressure, which feel real but actually exist only as
emergent properties of assemblies of molecules” (sect. 7.4, last
para.).
These views present us with something of an epistemological
conundrum in that Pothos seems to adopt a position of naïve re-
alism with regard to molecules and assemblies of neurons (they
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really exist) yet a position of solipsism with regard to air pressure
and rules (they merely emerge). However, a molecule is surely just
as much an emergent property of subatomic particles as air pres-
sure is an emergent property of molecules; it simply emerges at a
different (in this case, lower) level of description. Both “really ex-
ist” in the sense that they represent properties of the world that
we can detect, respond to, and, indeed, form theories about.
Because they really exist (in the above sense) it is important that
the language used to represent them captures their true charac-
teristics at the level chosen. The problem with Pothos’s article is
that not only is the level chosen unclear, it is also unclear whether
the language of categorisation is intended to represent real cogni-
tive processes within someone’s head. I have to assume that it is
so intended; otherwise we have no criteria by which to judge the
characterisation. I shall further assume that, because of the sort of
illustrations used by Pothos, it is reasonable to judge the adequacy
of his characterisation at the level of the Task.
Pothos claims that I decide whether my car keys are a member
of the category “things to be taken out of my house when it is on
fire” by deciding whether they possess properties uniquely shared
by other members of the category, but a thought experiment sug-
gests I do the following:
1. Construct a hierarchy of importance categories: for example,
People, Animals, Valuables, Work important, Sentimental value,
Others.
2. Populate these categories with items from a mental list us-
ing some algorithm such as mentally scanning the rooms.
3. Establish a logical list of items to remove based on impor-
tance within each category.
4. Establish a practical list based on this but factoring in prac-
tical matters such as accessibility and safety.
I decide about my keys by placing them in one of the categories,
not by matching their properties to those of other members (a log-
ical and practical impossibility), but by judging whether they con-
stitute an instance of that category.
Explaining how these task components are carried out would
require a lower-level description, probably involving various types
of knowledge structure. However, we are steered away from such
interesting and theoretically important matters by Pothos’s prior
adoption of a descriptive framework consisting only of objects,
features, and a categorisation process.
This is epistemologically interesting because it has an effect
similar to that of Radical Behaviorism: It forces complex mental
phenomena into a simplistic framework they just can’t fit into. A
classic example would be Skinner’s (1957) treatment of language.
Yes, a “partially conditioned autoclitic frame” can be construed as
a sort of response, but only by letting “response” become a strange
sort of beast that then doesn’t really do the job that it normally
does. It feels like forcing a jigsaw piece into not quite the right-
shaped space.
The extent of the violence done to the understanding of real hu-
man cognitive processes by the a priori adoption of such a sim-
plistic descriptive framework may be seen if we consider another
more complex example – in this case, not a thought experiment,
but, rather, an example derived from observation and interroga-
tion of a naval commander (Campion et al. 1996). The description
is again expressed informally at the Task level, and in parentheses
I have given the appropriate, more technical, term that might be
used within cognitive psychology.
A naval commander is in charge of a group of ships under threat
of air attack. Rules of engagement dictate that he may only attack
aircraft that are clearly intending to attack him (a rule). He has es-
tablished that an intention to attack (instantiation) may be recog-
nised as an aircraft emitting a certain class or radar (categorisa-
tion) and travelling fast and low and towards the task group, not
in an air lane, and armed with missiles (feature matching). An air-
craft is detected exhibiting all of the above characteristics, except
that visual contact is needed to establish whether it is armed or
not. The commander is inclined to attack it but he recalls that sim-
ilar events (similarity) had been occurring over the past days with-
out actual attack (script), indicating that the enemy were simply
probing his defences and testing his resolve (inference). He can-
not, however, assume that the pattern will repeat (confirmation
bias). He needs to seek the single feature that will demonstrate a
change from the previous pattern (disconfirmation) so he orders
supporting fighters to intercept the incoming aircraft, check visu-
ally if it is armed (feature matching), and, after appropriate warn-
ings, if it is armed (contingency rule) to shoot it down (production
rule).
We can see here that the many processes identified by Pothos
are genuinely and importantly different at the level of the Task,
and that what he and others have referred to as “heuristics,” “bi-
ases,” and “irrationality” are actually the products of a very subtle
psychological mechanism responding to the demands of a com-
plex task environment. The mechanism embodies complex knowl-
edge structures configured to suit the particular demands of this
environment. The Wason task (and logic tasks generally) are not
some “pure” process or “gold standard” by which the imperfec-
tions of humans may be judged; they are simply tasks of a peculiar
and uncontrolled nature requiring knowledge structures that
logic-naïve subjects don’t have.
I feel that the Pothos paradigm hinders rather than helps our
understanding of these important and interesting phenomena.
Real rules are conscious
Axel Cleeremans and Arnaud Destrebecqz
Cognitive Science Research Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Fonds
National de la Recherche Scientifique, B-1050, Belgium. axcleer@ulb.ac.be
adestre@ulb.ac.be http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/axc.html
Abstract: In general, we agree with Pothos’s claim that similarity and rule
knowledge are best viewed as situated on the extreme points of a single
representational continuum. However, we contend that a distinction can
be made between “rule-like” and “rule-based” knowledge: Rule-based,
symbolic knowledge is necessarily conscious when it is applied. Awareness
thus provides a useful criterion for distinguishing between sensitivity to
functional similarity and knowledge of symbolic rules.
In his treatment of the rule versus similarity distinction, Pothos ar-
gues that rules and overall similarity are best viewed as the ex-
treme points of a continuum involving only processes of similar-
ity. We very much agree with this position, having previously
defended similar views (Cleeremans 1997). The point is made par-
ticularly salient by the performance of certain connectionist net-
works. Under some circumstances, such networks develop inter-
nal representations that are structured in a manner that is clearly
reflective of abstract properties of the stimulus material – the
nodes of a finite-state grammar that the network has only seen ex-
emplars of (Cleeremans & McClelland 1991); relational features
that depend not on the surface similarity but on the functional
similarity between different exemplars of the domain (Hinton
1986). Yet, under other circumstances, the very same networks
may end up developing internal representations that are much
more closely tied to specific properties of the exemplars the net-
work has been trained on.
Clearly then, (1) abstract representations and exemplar-based
representations can both occur in the very same representational
medium, and (2) when abstract representations are achieved, they
can function just as if an actual symbolic rule had been learned.
Such networks can thus behave as though they followed a rule, but
without actually having learned anything that one could charac-
terize as a symbolic, propositional, “IF . . . THEN” rule.
Both points are congruent with Pothos’s proposal, and the sec-
ond – achieving rule-like behavior without using actual rules – is
in our view the strongest illustration of the power of simple asso-
ciative learning mechanisms. However, as Clark and Karmiloff-
Smith (1993) pointed out, there is a crucial difference between a
Commentary/Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:1 19
network that exhibits rule-like behavior and an agent that actually
possesses rule-based knowledge: Rule-like knowledge is “knowl-
edge in the network,” but it is not “knowledge for the network.” In
other words, there is no sense in which a network that has acquired
rule-like knowledge about some domain also has knowledge that
it has this knowledge: The sorts of emergent representations
learned by networks do not automatically afford corresponding
meta-representations. Yet it is clear that such meta-representa-
tions are always present when humans apply a rule.
How then, can we distinguish between rule-like and rule-based
behavior? Pothos notes, along with many others, that this has
proven to be extremely difficult to achieve empirically, and some
of these challenges in fact constitute his main motivation for de-
fending the notion that the distinction between similarity-based
and rule-based processing should be abandoned in favor of a
wholly gradualist perspective. In the rest of this commentary, we
would like to suggest that the difference between rule-like and
rule-based knowledge is a crucial one, and offer ways in which the
two can be distinguished from each other.
Our first point is that an important prediction of any rule-based
account is that the rules should eventually, after sufficient train-
ing, apply equally well to familiar and novel stimuli. All definitions
of the notion of “rule” take this feature as a defining one. That is,
if I do indeed “have a rule” which I use to perform some classifi-
cation task, then, by definition, and after sufficient training, any
decision I take based on the rule should apply equally well to items
that I have had experience with than to items that are completely
novel (e.g., items instantiated with novel features). Exploring this
issue in the context of laboratory settings is challenging because it
can always be argued that participants lacked sufficient time to in-
duce the rule. Pacton et al. (2001) addressed this challenge by ex-
amining what happens over five years of exposure to orthographic
regularities that can easily be described by a rule, such as the fact
that no word in French may begin with a double consonant.
Pacton et al. found that even after such extensive exposure to rel-
evant material, participants still exhibited “transfer decrement,”
that is, depressed performance on novel forms as compared to fa-
miliar material. They concluded that the persistence of transfer
decrement invalidates what they called the “abstractionist” posi-
tion. Interestingly, the rules that Pacton et al. explored are never
actually taught explicitly. This brings us to our second point,
namely, the fact that it strikes us that a crucial difference between
rule-like and rule-based performance is that when you have a rule,
you also know explicitly that you have the rule.
This point is made clear by a recent study concerning the ef-
fects of sleep on insight. Wagner et al. (2004) used a modified ver-
sion of the Number Prediction Task, in which the participants’
goal is to determine the value of the final digit of a string of digits.
To do so, participants sequentially apply one of two simple trans-
formation rules to each pair of digits of the initial string. Each ap-
plication reduces the length of the string by one digit. Unknown
to participants, a hidden abstract rule can be used to determine
the value of the last digit based on the identity of the second digit
of the initial string. Once this regularity has been identified, the
task therefore becomes trivial. All participants tend to respond
faster with increasing practice on the task, but only those who
gained insight of the abstract rule showed an abrupt and qualita-
tive shift in responding. Wagner et al. further showed that sleep
enhances insight, but only for those participants (the “solvers”)
who had exhibited antecedent of insight. According to Wagner et
al., sleep exerts a different effect on “solvers” and “non-solvers”
because they developed different and overlapping representa-
tions of the material. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe
that these different kinds of representations are subtended by
different cerebral regions – insight might involve activity in the
hippocampus and related medial temporal structures, which, in
relation with prefrontal areas, are associated with conscious pro-
cessing.
Rule-based knowledge might thus be based on different repre-
sentations than those based on similarity, and even recruit differ-
ent brain areas. Similarity-based – and possibly implicit – repre-
sentations may be “rule-like,” but genuine, symbolic rule knowl-
edge is necessarily conscious and is accompanied by a qualitative
shift in behavior. This argument is in line with previous sugges-
tions by Shanks et al. (1997), who also view genuine rule knowl-
edge as necessarily conscious.
Availability to consciousness therefore appears to us as one im-
portant criterion that one can use to distinguish “rule-based” be-
havior from “rule-like” behavior. Note that this is another manner
in which one can dispute Marcus et al.’s (1999) claim that 7-
month-old infants possess rule-based knowledge. Indeed, were
we to believe Marcus’s claim, we would also have to admit one of
two equally unsatisfactory possibilities: That either unconscious
rule manipulation and application is possible (therefore endorsing
the strong computationalist metaphor that Searle [1992] and oth-
ers have convincingly rejected) or that 7-month-old infants can
engage in conscious reasoning in the same manner that adults can.
In the face of this quandary, it appears much more plausible to
simply reject the notion that symbolic, propositional rules can be
represented and used unconsciously, and to accept, in line with
Pothos’s proposal, that rule-like behavior can occur (and be indis-
tinguishable from rule-based behavior) on the basis of a learned
sensitivity to functional (abstract) similarity.
Yet, by our account, we do have rules nevertheless – but then,
these rules must be available to consciousness when applied. We
conclude that conscious awareness, as revealed by the availability
of relevant verbalizable meta-representations, is the single feature
that genuinely distinguishes between similarity-based (and possi-
bly rule-like) knowledge on the one hand, and rule-based knowl-
edge on the other. Understanding how and when the shift be-
tween these two forms of knowledge occurs is clearly an important
challenge for the sub-symbolic perspective on cognition.
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Two types of thought: Evidence from aphasia
Jules Davidoff
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College, London SE14 6NW, United Kingdom. j.davidoff@gold.ac.uk
Abstract: Evidence from aphasia is considered that leads to a distinction
between abstract and concrete thought processes and hence for a distinc-
tion between rules and similarity. It is argued that perceptual classification
is inherently a rule-following procedure and these rules are unable to be
followed when a patient has difficulty with name comprehension and re-
trieval.
The inability to carry out tasks requiring categorisation is a com-
mon consequence of aphasia, though one insufficiently related to
the question of rules versus similarity in recent research. Today,
the more commonly examined questions revolve around knowl-
edge loss and the consequent impact on category structures (Cara-
mazza & Mahon 2003; Chertkow et al. 1997). In a simple form,
such debate could, for example, examine whether aphasic patients
are over- or under-inclusive in the attributes of objects that for
them define a category (Grossman 1981). It is possible to trace the
current line of research back to Wernicke (cf. Vignolo 1999) and
a formulation of aphasia as being one of a lexical impairment. A
contrasting view in early neuropsychological research, stemming
from Hughlings Jackson (see Vignolo 1999) held that the aphasic
condition was one derived from an impairment in the use of sym-
bols. In that tradition, Goldstein (1948) remarked on the particu-
lar difficulty that patients with amnesic (anomic) aphasia show
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when categorisation requires the ability to think abstractly. What
was lost, according to Goldstein, was a way of thought, and what
he called an abstract attitude.
One group of researchers in the Wernicke tradition (Cohen et
al. 1980; Kelter et al. 1976) distinguished between types of cate-
gorisation tasks in aphasic impairments. Their tasks, similar in de-
sign to those used in the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard
& Patterson 1992), asked the patient to decide which two out of
three pictures go together. They found that aphasic patients were
considerably more impaired if the connection was “perceptual”
rather than “situational.” For example, aphasic patients failed to
connect that a snowman should go with a swan because both are
white but succeeded in a task that required putting together a gui-
tar and a bull because both are connected with Spain. Now, it is
not a matter of the number of attributes that promotes the dis-
tinction, as this number could be small in each case. However, po-
tentially against the case put forward by Pothos, it is possible to ar-
gue that decisions about perceptual attributes require rule
following whereas this is not the case for situational attributes
(Davidoff & Roberson 2004).
Patients with the type of aphasia named after Wernicke actually
have difficulty with taxonomic rather than thematic relationships
(Bisiacchi et al. 1976; Gardner & Zurif 1976; Semenza et al. 1980)
and the reverse has been claimed for more anterior patients (Se-
menza et al. 1992). Now, if the use of the different procedures is
merely situationally dependent, as was argued for the cases in Zu-
rif et al. (1974), then Pothos’s line of reasoning would not be seri-
ously damaged by the data from aphasia. However, if, as Goldstein
argued, the inability to produce names resulted in a chronic in-
ability to think abstractly, then the need would be for rule-based
thought distinct from that based on association (similarity).
The particular difficulty a patient might have for perceptual
classification is shown by the performance of an aphasic case,
LEW (Davidoff & Roberson 2004; Roberson et al. 1999). The pa-
tient, who was unable to name perceptual attributes (e.g., colours,
shapes), was completely bewildered by the task of sorting colours
as, indeed, were Goldstein’s many similar cases. Roberson et al.
(1999) argued after Dummett (1975) and Wright (1975) that clas-
sification of continuous perceptual attributes is impossible with-
out some non-perceptual mechanism such as a name. Thus, the
name acts as a rule whereby the classification takes place. Not all
classifications took place in the same fashion for the patient. He
could easily divide animals as foreign or British, which he claimed
to have done by whether they would be found in a zoo. He could
easily decide which colour was the correct one for a particular ob-
ject by similarity matching to his visual memory.
It could be argued that classification of “foreignness” is multi-
faceted and that colour classification is not, but that seems to miss
the point. Perceptual classification is inherently rule-following
and the other could be a matter of association. Moreover, rather
against what one might expect upon the “different in complexity
but not different in kind” argument proposed by Pothos, the pa-
tient’s difficulty is for the task where there is only one way of pro-
ducing a classification. And furthermore, the research on LEW
would imply that rule-based reasoning cannot be bootstrapped
from the other. LEW was asked to do analogical reasoning tasks
of the type used by Gentner (1988; Gentner & Medina 1998).
Though his level of performance on analogical reasoning was only
that of a 4- or 5-year-old child, it far surpassed his ability to follow
rules of perceptual classification.
Studies of categorisation are not the only data in aphasia that
speak to a distinction between abstract and concrete concepts.
Aphasic patients, in general, show a concrete advantage in word
retrieval (Goodglass et al. 1969), but not always (Breedin et al.
1994; Franklin et al. 1995; Goldstein 1948; Warrington 1975). Of
course, abstract words are generally less frequent, longer, and so
forth, but these, too, have been shown insufficient to explain their
difficulty in an anomic patient (Henaff Gonon et al. 1989). The
taxonomic difficulty will be seen especially for perceptual terms,
such as colour, because these are essentially abstract. Colour, for
example, only allows for taxonomic classification. For colour, there
are not alignable differences (Markman, 2001) or thematic con-
fusions; hence, their particular difficulty in categorisation tasks.
“Commitment” distinguishes between rules
and similarity: A developmental perspective
Gil Diesendruck
Department of Psychology and Gonda Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan
University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel. dieseng@mail.biu.ac.il
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Abstract: A qualitative difference between Rules and Similarity in cate-
gorization can be described in terms of “commitment”: Rules entail it,
Similarity does not. Commitment derives from people’s knowledge of a do-
main, and it is what justifies people’s inferences, selective attention, and
dismissal of irrelevant information. Studies show that when children have
knowledge, they manifest these aspects of commitment, thus overcoming
Similarity.
Pothos presents an ambitiously parsimonious proposal, according
to which Rules and Similarity processes are mere poles within a
continuum of similarity. In categorization, for example, the con-
tinuum may be described in terms of how many object features
the categorizer focuses on, the calibration of feature weights, or
the extent of selective attention, suppression of irrelevant dimen-
sions, or perception of salient features. In Pothos’s view, these con-
tinua capture the most important psychological implications of
categorization. Taking a Rules perspective, in the present com-
mentary I sustain that the most crucial psychological implications
of categorization derive from why categorizers narrow, calibrate,
select, suppress, or perceive; and why do they do it in the partic-
ular ways in which they do? I offer the notion of “commitment” as
an answer to these questions, and more generally as a character-
istic that distinguishes between Rules and Similarity processes.
Rules (theories, essentialism) derive from beliefs that constrain
boundaries, and degrees of relevance and similarity. But psycho-
logically, rules are more than mere propositions. Rules have a mo-
tivational and stabilizing force that derives from people’s commit-
ment to rules. Rules are enforced and not given up easily. In
categorization, commitment is what warrants expectations about
what might and might not be a member of a category and the con-
sequent search for particular kinds of evidence. Commitment is
what licenses leaps of faith, allowing categorizers to draw infer-
ences even about novel categories and properties in familiar do-
mains. Commitment is also what gives categorizers the incentive
to maintain the rule despite seemingly contradictory evidence.
Similarity, in turn, has no commitments. Similarity is free, dy-
namic, and changeable. When operating under similarity, one
does not commit because there is nothing to commit to. Every-
thing might be relevant, nothing can be dismissed a priori.
The literature on children’s categorization is filled with exam-
ples of this distinction. When children know a rule, they show all
signs of commitment. When they do not, they resort to similarity,
and promiscuity. Classic examples come from studies by Gelman
and Markman (1986) on preschool children’s induction. Children
were shown triads of animals, in which the target and a test ani-
mal were physically similar but belonged to different categories,
and the target and the other test animal were physically dissimilar
but belonged to the same category. When asked to infer which of
the animals shared some internal property, children responded
based on physical similarity. Crucially, when told the category
names of the animals, children ignored similarity, switching to in-
fer based on category membership. The knowledge of the cate-
gory prompted the rule, committing children to suppress similar-
ity, to use Pothos’s term.
Different categories may have different rules. Different rules
impose different commitments. Studies with preschool children
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show that the properties they rely on for judging category mem-
bership vary with the category. For example, internal properties
determine category membership for animals, but not for artifacts
(Diesendruck et al. 1998), and for the very same entities, differ-
ent physical features determine categorization depending on
whether they are described as animals as opposed to artifacts
(Booth & Waxman 2002; Keil 1995). Calculations of similarity –
and of category membership – depend on children’s beliefs about
what is being categorized. Similarity is in the mind’s eye of the cat-
egorizer.
Especially with children, we cannot take for granted that they
will know when a rule is called for. But provide them with the cru-
cial knowledge, and they will operate by the rule. For example,
many studies show that children categorize artifacts based on
physical similarity (e.g., Smith et al. 1996). Accordingly, we found
that children treated two similarly shaped objects as belonging to
the same category (Diesendruck et al. 2003). But when we showed
them that one of the objects was actually a container for the other,
they abandoned shape similarity (instantiating classification dis-
sociation). What was crucial was what the objects were made for.
The similarity was the same, what changed was how children con-
ceived of the objects. Without knowledge, rules are slippery; with-
out rules, there is no commitment.
Indeed, given Similarity’s lack of commitment, categorizers op-
erating under Similarity need to remain open, and thus suscepti-
ble, to contextual variations in the presentation of information.
Rules, in turn, do commit to specific kinds of information, direct-
ing the categorizer to neglect contextual variations. A recent study
conducted in our laboratory demonstrates this distinction (Ham-
mer & Diesendruck 2005). Children and adults saw triads of com-
puter-animated novel artifacts, consisting of a target and two test
objects. For half of the participants, the test objects were func-
tionally, but not physically, very distinct one from the other. For
the other half, the test objects were physically, but not function-
ally, very distinct. Participants were asked to decide which of the
test objects belonged to the same category as the target. We found
differential performance. Whereas children’s decisions were de-
termined by the relative distinctiveness of the test objects’ prop-
erties, adults consistently categorized based on functional proper-
ties. Differences in the knowledge children and adults have about
the domain of artifacts led the former to categorize by Similarity
and the latter by Rules. Children were promiscuous, adults com-
mitted.
What all these studies show is that when children have enough
knowledge about a given category, they commit to the rules ap-
propriate to its domain, thus ignoring similarity considerations.
For children, conceptual commitments carry the most meaning-
ful psychological implications. Pothos dismisses knowledge-based
accounts apparently because “there has not been a single domi-
nant proposal for understanding general knowledge” (sect. 6.3,
last para.). I am not convinced a single similarity-based account
can explain the findings presented in this brief review. If anything,
the review leads to the opposite conclusion than what Pothos ad-
vocates: rather than dismissing knowledge-based accounts, seek
them out.
The discontinuity between rules and
similarity
Peter F. Dominey
Institut des Sciences Cognitives, 69675 BRON Cedex, France.
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Abstract: In arguing for a rules-similarity continuum, Pothos should
demonstrate that a single process or mechanism (a neural network model,
for example) can handle the entire continuum. Pothos deliberately avoids
this exercise as beyond the scope of the current research. In this context,
I will present simulation, neuropsychological, neurophysiological, and ex-
perimental psychological results, arguing against the continuity hypothe-
sis.
In section 3.1 (para. 2) Pothos asks us to “Consider two kinds of
judgments for an object, one that involves a single property of the
object (a Rule), and another that involves more or less all the prop-
erties of the object (Similarity).” This characterization of rule –
matching a single property – is a huge simplification of what a rule
can be, and reveals the fundamental problem in Pothos’s analysis:
that there are aspects of rule-based behavior that cannot be ac-
counted for by similarity.
One particular case of interest is the use of abstract rules that
can be used to generate (or categorize) new sequences in a se-
quence learning or an artificial grammar learning context. This is-
sue is partially addressed in the discussion of artificial grammar
learning in section 4, and it is again mentioned in section 7.3, but
in neither case is the problem handled in sufficient detail. Let me
proceed by proposing a behavioral task, and human performance
in the task, that cannot be explained by the rule-similarity contin-
uum hypotheses.
Consider the abstract rule 123213 in which a triplet of elements
is followed by the same triplet that has been systematically re-
ordered. This rule can be used to generate an open set of se-
quences such as ABCBAC, RSTSRT, and so on. We observed that
under implicit learning conditions, human subjects could learn se-
quences following this rule, but failed to transfer their knowledge
to new “isomorphic” sequences following the same rule. In con-
trast, we observed that subjects that were explicitly aware of the
possibility of some underlying rule structure learned the training
sequence and could then transfer this knowledge to new isomor-
phic sequences (Dominey et al. 1998). Interestingly, the process-
ing of rules and instances in this context appears to rely on differ-
ent neural substrates (Lelekov et al. 2000).
In an accompanying simulation study we demonstrated that a
temporal recurrent network (TRN) performed like subjects in im-
plicit conditions: it learned the serial order of the sequence but
failed to acquire knowledge that could transfer to the isomorphic
sequence. In order to do this, an additional short-term memory
had to be added to the model along with a recognition function
that compared the current sequence element with the short-term
memory contents in order to encode the abstract structure. Like-
wise, Dienes et al. (1999) demonstrate that the simple recurrent
network (SRN) must have additional mapping capabilities in or-
der to realize these transfer tasks of abstract knowledge. In refer-
ence to this issue, in the context of Marcus (2001), Pothos states
that “Whether neural networks can perform such arbitrary gener-
alizations is a somewhat open issue and beyond the scope of this
work” (sect. 7.4, para 4). I think that this is not so. Pothos proposes
a characterization of rules and similarity “whereby one extreme of
the same similarity process can be associated with rules and the
other extreme with overall similarity” (sect. 2, para. 1). In this case,
Pothos is obliged to make the effort to show that a system can span
this continuity and account for behavior at both extremes.
Similarly, the problem of compositionality has been handled
without getting to the hard issue. The claim that “compositional
systems are consistent with Rules and not Similarity” (sect. 3.1,
last para.) does not seem to illuminate the issue in a deep manner.
If there is a continuum along which context free grammars (rules)
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and associative memories for pattern completion (similarity) lie,
then the real work is to demonstrate the continuous transition
from one end to the other.
Rules, similarity, and threshold logic
Wlodzislaw Duch
Department of Informatics, Nicholaus Copernicus University, 87100 Torun,
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Abstract: Rules and similarity are two sides of the same phenomenon, but
the number of features has nothing to do with transition from similarity to
rules; threshold logic helps to understand why.
Discussion of the psychological aspects of the Rules versus Simi-
larity distinction in psychology could benefit from more precise
understanding of what are Rules and what is Similarity. The main
thesis of the target article – that rules and similarity operations are
extremes in a single continuum of similarity operations – may be
argued also on formal, mathematical grounds. Surprisingly, in var-
ious fields that try to understand structure of data (classification,
data mining, pattern recognition, machine learning, and compu-
tational intelligence) this distinction is quite strong. Machine
learning (Mitchell 1997) is focused on inductive methods of rule
extraction from symbolic data. Pattern recognition (Schalkoff
1992) uses statistical discriminant analysis that is neither Rules nor
Similarity. Only very recently (Duch & Grudzinski 2001; Duch et
al. 2004), logical rules based on simplified similarity measures
have been introduced as an alternative to rules based on feature
subsets and intervals. Selection of prototypes, features, and simi-
larity measures are the key to convert similarity-based methods
into methods that provide rule-like description of the data.
Are neurons (or discriminant functions) computing rules or are
they evaluating similarity? In fact they do both, depending on the
point of view. A binary input (xi  0 or 1) neuron with N excita-
tory synapses simply sums the inputs and compares the result with
the threshold  providing threshold logic rule: “IF i xi  ,
THEN True.” Such rules are frequently used in reasoning, for ex-
ample “if majority agrees then the motion is approved” (here the
threshold is   N/21). Threshold logic rules for binary inputs
are equivalent to a requirement of a minimum distance of all log-
ical input values xi to their true values, that is, D(X,1)  i (1 
xi)  N   (here D is a Hamming distance; Schalkoff 1992). Sim-
ilarity may be measured as S(X,1)  1D (X,1)/N [0,1], and
thus the equivalent rule is S(X,1)  /N. If similarity to the anony-
mous approval is higher than 0.5, the motion is approved.
Threshold logic rule may be regarded as Rules or Similarity, in-
dependent of the number of terms. If all features xi are important
then threshold   N  1 and a rule if A, then B is obtained,
wherein A is a conjunction of all features – this is the only form of
logical rules discussed in the target article. Weighting the influ-
ence of features i Wi xi allows for transition from threshold logic
to conjunctive logic form, but it is independent of the number of
terms left in the conditions A. Weights may initially result from
saliency (due to attention processes), but after frequent repetition
the behavior is internalized by associative learning creating synap-
tic changes. Weighted combination of features is also used in dis-
criminant analysis (Schalkoff 1992).
The rule if all lights are on, then start is a rule, independent of
the number of lights one has to inspect. Depending on the
arrangement of lights that need to be inspected, it may be per-
ceived as a rule (for extended linear arrangement), or as a pattern
of lights that is similar to the target pattern (for some compact two-
dimensional arrangements). More conditions obviously define the
subject better, but do not imply less Rules and more Similarity. A
simple rule: “if the results of all tests are above the norm, then the
candidate is excellent” may have any number of conditions, but
will always be in Rules category. This rule is equivalent to the eval-
uation of a candidate’s similarity to an ideal candidate. The state-
ment made in Pothos’s section 6.4 – “if processing of an object is
based on dimensional boundaries orthogonal to a few object di-
mensions, then we have a process of Rules (Erickson & Kruschke
1998)” – is imprecise. This is true for conjunctive logic, but thresh-
old logic provides category boundaries that are not orthogonal to
dimensional axes.
Why, then, do we intuitively associate conjunctive rules with
small number of relevant features and similarity with more com-
plex evaluations, when many features have similar weights? Con-
junctive rules that have few premises are easy to remember, can
be explained or expressed using linguistic terms, take fewer brain
resources, and are easier to use reliably in systematic reasoning.
Rules that involve many terms and cannot be chunked (recursively
reduced) to concise structures cannot be recalled because they do
not fit in the working memory (Cowan 2001). Similarity evalua-
tion, on the other hand, is more intuitive, automatically assessed
at the perceptual level comparing a large number of perceived and
memorized features, and relies on the powerful parallel brain
mechanisms. The same mechanisms operate on the abstract level:
Platonic ideas in the philosophy of mathematics are so compelling
precisely because Similarity plays an important role in mathemat-
ical thinking. The number of features involved in Rules is thus im-
portant only from a psychological point of view.
There are some statements in the target article that one should
treat with caution. For example, in section 5.3: “we can examine
any reasoning account in terms of whether the kind of conclusions
it tends to favor share few (Rules) or many (Similarity) properties
with the problem premises.” Conclusions do not need to share any
properties with premises. In section 5.4, Pothos writes “Rules are
certain”; this is true, but their applicability in real life is not cer-
tain, except in simple logical reasoning which is tested in psycho-
logical experiments. To use the same example as the target article:
upon seeing smoke, we do not quickly conclude that there is fire
without first checking that the smoke is not just a puff of soot re-
sulting from chimney cleaning. In section 6.2 the author himself
says: “classification as a member of a concept is likely,” rather than
certain, implying soft boundaries, that is, uncertainty of rules.
A network of soft threshold neurons used in the most popular
type of neural network (multilayer perceptron) implements asso-
ciative mappings (Schalkoff 1992). A simple regularization train-
ing procedure, enforcing decay of weak synaptic connections (in-
cluding lowering saliency of features) provided that it does not
spoil categorization, converts multilayer perceptron networks into
logical rules (Duch et al. 2001). Neural networks that use Gauss-
ian functions (Radial Basis Function networks) are obviously im-
plementing fuzzy logic rules (Duch et al. 2001). Therefore, the
statement in section 7.2 that neural networks reflect similarity op-
erations and they do not “‘rely in any obvious way on rules’ (Plun-
kett & Marchman 1991, p. 44)” is not quite true. The claim made
in section 7.4 (para. 2) that “neural networks learn by modifying
the similarity space of a set of instances so that instances associ-
ated with the same output are grouped together” is, at best, in-
accurate. Internal representations in neural networks do not aim
at grouping instances together; rather, they try to place instances
from different classes in regions that are linearly separable.
Although the understanding of the Rules and Similarity given
in the paper is flawed, the final conclusion that the transition be-
tween rules and similarity in cognitive psychology should be seen
as continuous is true. The brain does what it does, and our inter-
pretation in terms of Rules or Similarity is a matter of conve-
nience.
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Rules and similarity as conscious contents
with distinctive roles in theory
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Abstract: Difficulty of distinguishing rules and similarity in categorization
comes from reliance on relatively simple manipulation-response designs
and a style of modeling with abstract parameters, rather than assessment
of intervening and controlling mental states. This commentary proposes a
strategy in which rules and similarity would be distinguished by their dif-
ferent roles in a theory interrelating reportable conscious contents in de-
liberative categorization.
This scholarly analysis by Pothos is especially significant in argu-
ing the absence of a formal distinction between rules and similar-
ity in several literatures – and, I would add, significant for what
that reveals about the intrinsic limitations of a style of modeling
and experimentation that has dominated these literatures for
decades. The case is compellingly made for a range of categoriza-
tion paradigms, including artificial grammar categorizations; par-
adigms emphasized by the author throughout the target article.
With setting of parameters instead of assessment of mental
states as the practice, various General Categorization Models and
connectionist models, from Nosofsky (1986) and Gluck and Bower
(1988) onward, can accommodate a range of findings by adjusting
attentional or input parameters so as to favor one or a few features
for a rule model and many or all features for a similarity model.
Indeed, Pothos concludes that “the reviewed research is consis-
tent with an identification of rules and overall similarity as the op-
posite extremes of the same similarity process,” and thus, that “a
formal distinction between Rules and Similarity is not possible”
(sect. 8).
The author points in the right general direction with a call for a
distinction between sets of rule and similarity processes that could
“be shown to vary in theoretically important and experimentally
verifiable ways” (sect. 8), but once subjective relevance of features
is specified, something the author properly emphasizes, catego-
rization can be guided by use of either similarity or rules, formed
on any number of features, from one or a few to many or all. We
can group instances with similar sizes or shades of a color, or by
multi-feature rules of any Boolean heritage. This variability of sub-
jective relevance, and subjective meaning of similarity, can limit
the interpretation of model fits and also selective interpretations
provided by attempts to manipulate rule or similarity usage selec-
tively. For example, if creatures have the same mating habits de-
spite physical dissimilarity (e.g., Rips 1989), are they categorized
together by rule or by similarity of subjectively relevant habits? In
the absence of an underlying similarity process or rule process in
models, similarity for the investigator reflects a count of feature
overlap or distance between abstract points in semantic space
yielded by response-based scaling – and as a result, process the-
ory of concept representation and categorization can remain little
more than mood music.
Is there some way in which we might formally – and produc-
tively – distinguish between rules and similarity? On network
specifications of meaning, from Hempel (1952) to Carruthers
(2000) in philosophy, and from Cronbach and Meehl (1955) to
Dulany (2004) in psychology, the meaning of a theoretical con-
struct has been explicitly specified as given by a network of theo-
retical assertions. For a start, a rule is the subject of a category rep-
resentation; similarity is not. Similarity is the predicated relation
of an instance to a category representation; a rule is not. They oc-
cupy different positions in a theoretical network by virtue of be-
ing parts of different propositional contents of mental states, con-
tents carried by conscious belief modes.
Let us first consider deliberative categorization, the case in
which membership of particular instances is novel and not auto-
matically activated. For clarity, too, we can focus on an example
closer to our lives than classifying drawings of funny little animals:
the need to categorize graduate school applicants as “right for the
program” or not – applicants with multiple-feature GPAs, GREs,
prior research, letters, personal presentations, and so forth. We
may believe in varying degrees that some form of rule, from sim-
ple to complex and even probabilistic, may represent that cate-
gory; and also believe, to some degree, that a candidate satisfies
that rule. Thus, by inference we believe to some degree that this
candidate is “right for the program.” However, we could also be-
lieve to some degree that the category is represented by a proto-
type student, in the sense of best or average example, or by one or
more student exemplars, and believe to some degree that a can-
didate is similar enough to that representation. We could then by
inference also believe that this candidate is “right for the pro-
gram.”
Put more generally, a process theory of deliberative category
judgment could involve the following: (a) a belief that rule i rep-
resents category j, and (b) a belief that rule i is satisfied by instance
k, which together by inference imply (c) the belief that instance k
is a member of category j. Alternatively, (a) a belief that prototype
i or exemplar(s) i represent category k, and (b) a belief that in-
stance k is similar enough to prototype i or exemplar(s) i, together
by inference imply (c) the belief that instance k is a member of
category j. This provides for the distinctive network conceptions
of rules and similarity in deliberative categorization, though of
course their learning would call for further theoretical elabora-
tion.
With theory of this form, models can refine theory with func-
tions describing how these quantitative belief values combine in
classes of mental episodes – the deliberative categorizations.
Then, with reports of these conscious belief values and contents,
the fit of these equations could be examined. Intervening states
would be assessed, making abstract parameters unnecessary.
When theory and hypotheses of report validity together predict
results, they may be competitively supported together (Dulany
1997).
What of the common case of automatic categorization – when
we, for example, see a dog as a dog? First, critical reviews (e.g.,
Dulany 1997; Perruchet & Vinter 2002; Shanks & St. John 1994)
find no defensible evidence for use of unconscious rules in learned
categorization. Second, according to a view recently elaborated
(e.g., Dulany 1997; 1999; Perruchet & Vinter 2002), automatic
categorization occurs with direct activation of an awareness of
kind from awareness of features or form. With automatization,
category representations should drop out, not down to an uncon-
scious level – a view consistent with accumulating evidence for di-
minishing fMRI activation in relevant networks during automati-
zation (e.g., Schneider et al. 2003). Third, it is difficult to believe
that evolution has required us to activate a defining rule or our ca-
nine prototype or to shuffle through dogs we have known in order
to recognize a dog as a dog. Although we can, if required, form
one of these representations of a dog, and even compare dogs for
similarity, neither rules nor similarity need be represented by the
person automatically categorizing the very familiar – and there-
fore the issue addressed in the target article would not arise.
Although also discussed in the target article, questions about
rules and similarity take very different forms, I believe, in the lit-
eratures on reasoning and language. By what process does simi-
larity of current to prior reasoning problems influence the fit of a
normative model embodying classical rules of logic? Is there a bet-
ter theory than one in which the rules in the consciousness of the
sophisticated linguist are theoretically projected into an unas-
sessed “unconscious” of the unsophisticated speaker-hearer? In
this brief commentary, I have chosen to examine only the catego-
rization question emphasized throughout the target article.
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Is this what the debate on rules was about?
Ulrike Hahn
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3YG, United Kingdom.
hahnu@cardiff.ac.uk
http://www.cf.ac.uk/psych/home/hahnu/index.html
Abstract: The key weakness of the proposed distinction between rules
and similarity is that it effectively converts what was previously seen as a
consequence of rule or similarity-based processing, into a definition of rule
and similarity themselves – evidence is elevated into a conceptual distinc-
tion. This conflicts with fundamental intuitions about processes and
erodes the relevance of the debate across cognitive science.
The target article recommends a conceptual distinction between
rule-based and similarity-based processing based on the number
of object properties involved in the decision. Where a “small sub-
set of the relevant object properties” are involved (sect. 2, last
para.), we are dealing with a rule process, otherwise the process
moves, along a continuum, towards one of similarity.
One concern is the workability of this proposal: is it “small” in
terms of absolute numbers or proportions that is key, and how is
the set of “relevant” properties to be determined? The proposed
criterion for relevance as those properties “uniquely common to
the instances of each category” (sect. 2, para. 3) will not do, given
the fundamental insight of Wittgenstein, brought to cognitive psy-
chology by Rosch and others, that natural language categories typ-
ically do not possess minimal sets of features shared by all in-
stances. Therefore, typically, there will be no feature set which, as
a whole, is unique to a category; but nor will features of instances
likely be unique to a category when considered individually: both
dogs and cats are “mammals” and both houses and cars “have
doors.”
A further ambiguity surrounds what it means for properties to
be “involved” in the decision. This will be illustrated with an ex-
ample. Two people are asked to classify letter sequences as gram-
matical or agrammatical. Person A uses edit-distance; that is, per-
son A determines the number of operations required to change
one string into another as a measure of their overall similarity. If
the similarity between a training and a test string is high, A adopts
the same classification. Person B uses a finite state grammar and
classifies each item according to whether or not the sequence can
be generated with the grammar. Both are given a grammatical
training item for illustration, say sequence MSSX, and a subse-
quent test item, say MSSSX. Both classify this item as grammati-
cal according to their respective procedures. Crucial to the exam-
ple, we know exactly what procedures they used because they told
us so, and we have no reason to doubt their reports, which are en-
tirely consistent with all other aspects of their behaviour during
classification (e.g., A went back and forth between the training and
the test item on his sheet, whereas B looked only to the test item,
sketched out his grammar, etc.).
The further ambiguity in the proposal is about whether the
properties involved must be “many” or “few” with regard to (1) the
stimulus currently under consideration (i.e., the individual test
item), or (2) the entire set of properties evidenced across the cat-
egory as a whole. In the present example, both interpretations co-
incide. The same number of properties are involved in the deci-
sions of A and B, because the procedures of both require them to
consider every feature of the novel item in determining their clas-
sification (1) and trivially the same structural relationships obtain
between the old and new item for both (2).
In effect, the procedures of A and B which constitute paradigm
cases of similarity- and rule-based classification, respectively, and
which are meant to be two ends of the continuum collapse into
each other. The target article considers this issue in section 4.4,
where patterns of classification such as the present one are dis-
cussed. The claim there is that sometimes rules and similarity will
converge, and if we then want to classify participants as rule or
similarity oriented, as opposed to both, we must consider assem-
blies of judgements. Specifically, we should supplement the above
data set by providing the test sequence MSSSSSSX. If this string
is accepted as grammatical, then a rule process was involved.
This suggests that it must be the second sense of number of
“properties involved” that is intended, namely, whether there
were many or few with regard to the structural relationships be-
tween items across the category as a whole, because only this sec-
ond sense now distinguishes the edit-distance and the finite state
grammar case. With regard to just the properties of the test item
itself (1), the processes continue to be the same. To classify the
novel sequence MSSSSSSX, both person A and person B consider
all its letters: A, in the context of the edit-distance comparison,
must determine the number of operations required to generate
the test sequence from any of the old items; B, with the finite state
grammar, must check that the grammar allows generation of the
entire sequence for it to be grammatical.
What has changed, however, are the structural relationships be-
tween items in the data set. Specifically, what has changed is the
amount of feature overlap between old and new items. We see that
this is the only interpretation of the proposed criterion by which
these two paradigm cases of rule and similarity could ever be dis-
tinguished. However, basing the meaning of rule or similarity on
structural relationships in the data is ultimately no more satisfying
than basing it on the numbers of object properties of the test item
considered, even if it disambiguates the edit-distance and finite
state grammar application.
Structural relationships between old and new items have always
been viewed as evidence for rules or similarity, but the present
proposal, it seems, turns what was evidence of the conceptual con-
trast between rules and similarity into their definition. The degree
of featural overlap among members of a category is no longer a
consequence of a particular kind of mental process, that is, a sig-
nature effect which can be used to infer the use of this mental
process; rather, it becomes constitutive of being that mental
process. Minimal property overlap in classification is not a conse-
quence of rules, it is now what “rule” means.
The problem with this development is that it now necessarily
renders numerous other sources of evidence conceptually irrele-
vant. It is entirely irrelevant in the above example that we know
exactly what procedure A and B are using because they could tell
us so. A further, counterintuitive consequence is that the charac-
terization of what A and B are doing changes as the test set is ex-
panded because the structural relationships between old and new
grammatical items change once we add the further sequence
MSSSSSSX. Though B, in particular, did the very same thing with
his first test string MSSSX as he then did with MSSSSSSX, the
original “process” involved in classifying MSSX was conceptually
a rule- and similarity-based one in equal measure, whereas it is
now a rule-based one. We are forced to accept that it has subse-
quently changed in nature, even though it has remained the same
process, clearly described to us by B, all along.
This is a necessary consequence of defining “processes” exclu-
sively in terms of their outcomes, and one that makes clear that,
despite the terminology of the article, the distinction drawn is (if
it is to be compatible with the examples discussed in the article)
not about process at all. However, the proposed reduction of two
kinds of processes to structural patterns of behavioural data is not
just problematic because it means that the same process can be
“similarity” or “rule” depending on the data to which it is applied.
Whether or not peoples’ behaviour draws on many or few prop-
erties might or might not be an interesting question in its own
right. It is a contrast that seems to be at the heart of at least some
studies within the psychological literature on categorisation (e.g.,
Johansen & Palmeri 2002; Regehr & Brooks 1995). However, the
situation in the wider cognitive science literature is quite differ-
ent. People cared so much about the debate on mental rules in
general precisely because it involves a fundamental debate about
the computational characteristics of human information process-
ing, that is, a debate about the kinds of representations and
processes that underlie human cognition. Patterns of behavioural
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data were of interest (only) because they were thought to inform
this debate. This is true not only of the expert systems debate in
Artificial Intelligence, but in particular of the debate in the con-
text of language, from the longstanding controversy between rules
and connectionism prompted by Rumelhart and McClelland’s
(1986) model of the past tense to more recent contrasts between
grammars and data-oriented parsing (e.g., Bod 1998). Past pro-
posals of the rule/similarity distinction such as Hahn and Chater
(1998) have (successfully or not) sought to characterise the repre-
sentations and processes that might count as rules or similarity and
how they relate to data. The proposed distinction in the target ar-
ticle does more than turn this relationship on its head, in that pat-
terns of data are all that is to remain.
Rules and similarity – a false dichotomy
James A. Hampton
Psychology Department, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V
OHB, United Kingdom. hampton@city.ac.uk
www.staff.city.ac.uk/hampton
Abstract: Unless restricted to explicitly held, sharable beliefs that control
and justify a person’s behavior, the notion of a rule has little value as an ex-
planatory concept. Similarity-based processing is a general characteristic
of the mind-world interface where internal processes (including explicitly
represented rules) act on the external world. The distinction between rules
and similarity is therefore misconceived.
In order to maintain a meaningful theoretical distinction between
two explanatory notions such as rules and similarity, it is necessary
to be clear about how the terms are to be used. As Pothos notes,
there has been much discussion about whether “similarity” can be
rendered as a useful theoretical notion (Goldstone 1994a; Good-
man 1972). Similar issues arise in defining the notion of a rule.
The prototypical notion of a rule is an explicit code that governs
conduct – a school rule or a traffic rule would be a good example.
A legal code, for example, is a set of rules that governs the behav-
ior of those working in the legal/justice system. In framing rules
of this kind, lawmakers are meeting three aims. First, they select
the relevant dimensions on which decisions and actions should be
based, thus ensuring that legal decisions are not based on preju-
diced or arbitrary grounds. Second, they provide a basis for the
public justification of legal decisions; the application of the rules
allows a judge to make explicit the grounds for a decision using de-
ductive logic. Third, an explicit set of rules allows for the sharing
of beliefs. Any competent member of the community can reason-
ably be expected to understand and apply the rules to their own
behavior. The rules provide the conceptual framework within
which appeals and argument can take place.
How can this central notion of a rule be applied to models of
cognitive psychology? An uncontroversial use of the notion would
be to consider rules as explicitly held beliefs that people use to di-
rect their actions. To spell a word correctly, I remember the rule
“i before e except after c.” To avoid a hangover, I apply the rule of
never drinking spirits after dinner. This sense of rule as explicitly
codified principle can be seen in a number of cognitive models.
RULEX (Nosofsky et al. 1989) is a good example: A learner clas-
sifies a set of stimuli by choosing an explicit rule, and then learns
to spot the individual exceptions. This type of learning is familiar
from the experience of learning a new language in the classroom,
where the teacher provides the rule for forming a past tense and
then the student learns the irregular exceptions. Until the student
becomes more fluent, she may explicitly apply the rule when
forming a sentence in the new language.
Where the notion of rule becomes problematic, and quite pos-
sibly empty, as an explanatory tool is when it is applied to describe
regularities in behavior of which the agent has no explicit knowl-
edge. In such cases (such as using the syntax of one’s native lan-
guage, or following the rules of social interaction in everyday con-
texts) the person can be said to be following a rule, but this is not
evidence that the rule itself is represented in the part of the mind/
brain directing the behavior. Behaving in a regular manner “as if”
following a rule is a property of many different types of system, in-
cluding physical systems with no mental representations at all.
Water flows downhill as a rule, but does not represent this rule in
itself. Rule-governed behavior is not sufficient evidence for a
model in which the internal representation of those rules has a
causal role in the production of the behavior.
I would propose then that the notion of “rule” in cognitive sci-
ence should be restricted to those rules that can be explicitly
stated by the person following the rule. (It then becomes an in-
teresting question whether the rule is causally efficacious or
merely used for post hoc justification.) Of course such a restric-
tion will be very constraining on the range of situations in which
we can explain behavior in terms of a rule. There are, however,
clear examples. Situations in which rules control behavior would
include the classic concept identification experiments conducted
by Bruner et al. (1956) and experiments on inductive reasoning
where rules have to be hypothesized to account for observed data
(Wason 1960). More recently, Ashby et al. (2002) have a range of
very telling dissociations between learning contexts that involve
explicit reasoning and those that use implicit associative learning,
and also have evidence that different brain systems are involved.
The danger of not restricting the notion of rule in this way is
that, effectively, any systematic cognitive process could be thought
to involve a rule. Short-term memory follows rules (most recent
items are recalled first); attention and perception work according
to rules – the notion of rule simply becomes the notion of an ob-
served regularity. No causal mechanism involving representation
of the rule can be implied.
Having restricted the meaning of “rule” narrowly enough for it
to have some distinct explanatory value, we can then ask whether
“similarity” is the best concept with which to describe other forms
of behavior that are not directly controlled by explicit rules. Here
again I find the notion problematic, and indeed the dichotomy be-
tween rules and similarity to be false. Consider how a rule is ap-
plied in a given situation. A rule generally has two parts: a condi-
tion that must be satisfied to trigger the rule, and an action that
follows once the rule has been triggered. In deciding whether the
triggering condition of a rule has been satisfied, it is inevitable that
similarity will be involved. Some situations will trigger the rule in
a clear prototypical fashion. Others will partially match the condi-
tions, and will result in slow and uncertain application of the rule.
A learner who has decided to follow the explicit rule of putting all
red blocks in one pile and all orange blocks in another will need
to use similarity judgments when faced with colors intermediate
between red and orange. Generally speaking, with the exception
of artificial microworlds such as chess or baseball, there will always
be the potential for vagueness and uncertainty in how the rule ap-
plies to an individual case. All processes that involve the interface
between internal processes and the external world will exhibit
similarity-based effects, regardless of whether explicit rules are in-
volved or not.
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Illuminating reasoning and categorization
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Abstract: The proposal regarding rules and similarity is considered in
terms of ability to provide insights regarding previous work on reasoning
and categorization. For reasoning, the issue is the relation between this
proposal and one-process as well as two-process accounts of deduction and
induction. For categorization, the issue is how the proposal would simul-
taneously explain both similarity-to-rule and rule-to-similarity shifts.
We first pose a general question: Is this proposal empirical or
heuristic in nature? Is the claim that rules and similarity depend
on a single process with varying numbers of features meant to be
the sort of thing that is experimentally testable? Our own reaction
is that, at the present time, the proposal may be consistent with
the evidence presented, but it is not clear that the evidence bet-
ter supports this proposal than the alternative of separate
processes for rules and similarity. Therefore, our view is that it is
better to consider this proposal in terms of its potential heuristic
value. Does this proposal lead to important insights regarding the
nature of rules and similarity in various cognitive activities? By as-
suming that rules are like similarity with a small number of fea-
tures, how does this help to illuminate reasoning and categoriza-
tion?
Reasoning. In textbooks there is a distinction between deduc-
tion and induction, but it is still a matter of debate whether there
are two kinds of reasoning. This proposal appears to suggest that
there is single process of reasoning, encompassing both logic and
similarity. There have been many previous one-process accounts
of reasoning about both deductive and inductive problems
(Chater & Oaksford 2000; Harman 1999; Heit 1998; Johnson-
Laird 1994; Johnson-Laird et al. 1999; Osherson et al. 1990; Slo-
man 1993). For example, Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) applied an
account of deduction to a range of inductive problems, and Osh-
erson et al. proposed an account of induction that treats deductive
problems as a special case. However, none of the previous one-
process accounts are concerned with the issue of how many fea-
tures are required for different reasoning problems. Therefore, it
is not clear how this proposal leads to new insights about these ac-
counts. Perhaps the main point of contact is that the proposal
identifies judgments based on fewer features as being more cer-
tain – and the goal of deductive inference is to derive certain con-
clusions from a set of premises. But it is not clear whether the cer-
tainty associated with deductive validity is a consequence of using
a small number of features.
Other researchers have emphasized a distinction between two
kinds of reasoning (Evans & Over 1996; Sloman 1996; Stanovich
1999). In these two-process accounts there is a quick, associative
or similarity-based system, and a deliberative, rule-based system.
Although these two systems do not necessarily correspond directly
to induction and deduction, it is plausible that induction would de-
pend more on the first system whereas deduction would depend
more on the second system. In addition, there is some brain imag-
ing evidence for two anatomically separate systems of reasoning
(Goelet al. 1997; Osherson et al. 1998; Parsons & Osherson 2001).
It would be important to spell out how the proposal illuminates
these arguments. For example, why would a quicker system in-
volve the consideration of more features than a slower system?
Some of the arguments for two systems have been based on indi-
vidual differences, for example, there are correlations between IQ
and logical-type reasoning. Why would higher IQs be associated
with ability to deal with small numbers of features, as opposed to
large numbers of features? Finally, how does the proposal help to
explain the neuropsychological evidence?
Categorization. Likewise, in categorization research there have
been many previous one- and two-process accounts. Again, we
would question how Pothos’s proposal helps to illuminate the de-
bate about neuropsychological evidence for two systems of cate-
gorization (e.g., Ashby et al. 1998; Nosofsky & Johansen 2000;
Smithet al. 1998).
In comparison to reasoning research, in categorization research
there is greater consideration of the nature and number of fea-
tures. Some work has shown that the types of features extracted
from a given set of inputs will differ with the nature of the cate-
gorization task (Schynset al. 1998) and with background knowl-
edge (Heit 1997; Wisniewski & Medin 1994). Hence, it is not triv-
ial to state how many features are used as a basis for classification.
Nevertheless, there have been several important observations
of how feature numbers vary systematically in categorization. The
proposal suggests that with practice people select features that are
predictive or relevant to their current goals and suppress attention
to other features; hence, there would be a shift from similarity to
rules. There are indeed findings that are consistent with this pat-
tern. For example, Kruschke (1992) reported that adults showed
greater selective attention with increased practice in learning
novel categories. Likewise, for children, Smith (1989) character-
ized developmental changes in categorization as a shift from a
comparison of multiple features to a few criterial features.
However, there are many cases where the opposite pattern
holds. According to Johansen and Palmeri (2002), early stages of
category learning by adults depend upon single features, and
hence rules, whereas later stages would involve multiple features,
and hence similarity. Lamberts (2000) characterized fast classifi-
cation judgments as using a small number of features, with a
greater number of features accumulating at longer response in-
tervals. In category construction studies, where people are re-
quired to sort multidimensional stimuli into distinct groups, one-
dimensional sorting is the usual result (Medin et al. 1987; Spalding
& Murphy 1996). It is only when attention is drawn to the relations
between multiple stimulus dimensions that family resemblance
categories are constructed. In addition, Gentner and Medina
(1998) have described developmental changes in categorization as
a shift from the matching of individual features to comparisons
based on higher-order relations involving many features.
To describe these patterns purely in terms of number of fea-
tures (i.e., as a shift from similarity to rules in the first pattern, and
from rules to similarity in the second) does not illuminate these
findings very much. The important issue is not whether a few or
many features are used for categorization, but rather, the
processes involved, the kinds of features that are being processed,
and the way that features are integrated or combined (see Mark-
man & Ross 2003, for related arguments).
Conclusion. There are, no doubt, important relations between
the cognitive activities of reasoning, categorization, learning, and
language, and on that basis this ambitious proposal is welcomed.
However, what remains to be illuminated is an explanation of why
the number of features varies.
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Processing is shaped by multiple tasks:
There is more to rules and similarity than
Rules-to-Similarity
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Abstract: We argue that the Rules-Similarity continuum is only a useful
formalism for particular, isolated tasks and must rest on the assumption
that representations formed during a particular task are independent of
other tasks. We show this to be an unrealistic conjecture. We additionally
point out that describing categorization as selective weighing and ab-
stracting of features misses the important step of discovering what the pos-
sible features are.
We applaud Pothos’s push for a unitary understanding of rules and
similarity and agree with the general idea that rules operations
may be reducible to similarity ones. We find the main appeal of
the Rules-Similarity view to be its theoretical parsimony – it at-
tempts to unify disparate views of cognitive processing using a sin-
gle descriptive formalism. However, we have two concerns with
this particular approach. The first concern is that the Rules-Sim-
ilarity classification cannot be applied to an entire domain of re-
lated tasks. For example, it makes no sense to ask where lexical
processing is on the Rules-Similarity (henceforth R-S) continuum
– some lexical tasks (such as word inflection) may imply a Rule-
like process, while others (such as contextual priming) may imply
a Similarity-based process.
One alternative is to assume that while R-S classifications of dif-
ferent lexical tasks influence each other, the lexical system as a
whole employs a common blend of Rule and Similarity operations.
However, such an appeal to a domain holism mars the theoretical
attractiveness of the R-S formalism. Even if subjects’ behavior on
a given task is Rule-like, we cannot assume this is caused by Rules
operations because the underlying processes are assumed to be
shaped by the ensemble of tasks. Thinking in terms of the R-S con-
tinuum is most useful when applied to domains in which the tasks
are relatively independent (or compartmentalized) from each
other. The assumption of task independence further requires that
the representations employed by the different tasks be indepen-
dent of each other, otherwise, the R-S classifications of the differ-
ent tasks can influence each other via the shared representation.
So, is the assumption of narrow tasks a viable one? We argue
that it is not. For instance, while the syntax-level representation
needs only to represent aspects of the speech signal relevant to
syntactic tasks, the existence of a representation in its pure form
(a restatement of autonomy of syntax) is doubtful. The following
example illustrates the problem:
(1) The policeman shot the spy with the binoculars.
(2) The policeman saw the spy with the binoculars.
Autonomy of syntax predicts that that the syntactic representation
of sentences (1) and (2) would be the same given their identical
structure. This is clearly not the case considering the alternative
clause attachment suggested by the semantics of “saw” versus
“shot” (McClelland et al. 1989).
Semantic knowledge also influences morphology. In perform-
ing a past-tense judgment, people are sensitive to context, inflect-
ing a nonce word frink as frinked if its meaning is closer to blink
and as frank if its meaning is closer to drink (Ramscar 2002). In
addition, the preferred past-tense inflection of a word is related to
the frequency of its phonological use, that is, the morphology and
phonology mutually constrain each other (Burzio 2002). In speech
perception, the phonemic and talker characteristics of an utter-
ance (putatively, two separate tasks) are not in fact separate – lis-
teners can identify words more reliably when they are familiar
with the speaker’s voice (Nygaard & Pisoni 1998). Similarly, the
phonemic classification of a vowel is influenced by global charac-
teristics of the utterance (Ladefoged & Broadbent 1957). Finally,
the perceptual learning of new categories often affects the dis-
crimination behavior (Goldstone 1998; Guenther et al. 1999).
In summary, then, we feel that at least the language domain is
composed of many tasks that are not independent of each other.
Because representations are generally shaped by their use in mul-
tiple tasks, it is meaningless to assign a single R-S classification to
the entire task domain, or to assign a separate R-S classification to
each task.
Our second concern is that the R-S classification may prove in-
adequate even in those domains where tasks may be independent
of each other. Consider a perceptual skill such as wine tasting, or
a cognitive skill such as playing chess, both of which require the
learner to transform the perceptual domain into one with dimen-
sions useful for categorization. The R-S approach assumes that an
array of object properties is readily available and that the task
faced by the cognitive system is to map from this high-dimensional
space of object properties to a low-dimensional space of object
categories. This might be valid for objects such as “red circle” and
“blue square,” but how about a musician learning to “pick out” an
instrument in a symphony? She cannot accomplish the task by
weighting different aspects of the raw acoustic input, since the
acoustic signatures of the instruments overlap both in time and in
the frequency spectrum. Rather, she needs to discover how to
transform the acoustic information into a more manageable space
– to discover the array of object properties (Schyns et al. 1998).
With expertise, the transformation may become more reliable and
robust, and the musician may only depend on a few of the prop-
erties. However, characterizing this operation as Rule-like elides
the vital role of the initial transformation.
The above two concerns suggest to us that a single Rules-Sim-
ilarity continuum is not sufficient to capture the complex interre-
lation of tasks, at least in the domains of language and perception.
This insufficiency, we argue, is partly due to the emphasis on the
categorization task. Objects within a domain (e.g., words and
grammatical constructs in language) are not simply classified but
are means towards larger ecological goals. Both Rule-like and
Similarity-like operations may be concurrently recruited in order
to achieve a particular goal.
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Opposites detract: Why rules and similarity
should not be viewed as opposite ends
of a continuum
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Abstract: Criteria that aim to dichotomize cognition into rules and simi-
larity are destined to fail because rules and similarity are not in genuine
conflict. It is possible for a given cognitive domain to exploit rules without
similarity, similarity without rules, or both (rules and similarity) at the same
time.
Pothos’s target article does an admirable job of attacking a false
(but widely invoked) dichotomy between rules and similarity. But,
in my view, he has missed the real reason why one can’t so easily
cleave a line between rules and similarity: they simply don’t be-
long on opposite ends of some uncleavable continuum. Instead,
rules and similarity represent two totally different beasts alto-
gether, and the reason they cannot be dichotomized is that they
are no more opposites than are cells and tissues. Tissues are made
of cells, and (many) computations of similarity are made of rules.
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As I see it, similarity is a metric, whereas rules are computational
operations. Rules (or what I have called “algebraic” operations
[Marcus 2001]) can be used to construct an algorithm that com-
putes the similarity between two entities (e.g., by calculating the
cosine between two vectors or by tabulating what proportion of
features are shared by two members of a category), or to construct
something entirely different (e.g., to borrow an example from the
late Stephen Jay Gould, checkbook balancing). Although many al-
gorithms for computing similarity depend on the application of
rules, not all rules compute similarity, and – to the extent that eval-
uations of similarity might come about implicitly as the product of
memory retrieval rather than explicitly and algorithmically – some
computations of similarity may not depend on rule-application.
Most of the tests that purport to distinguish rules from similarity
are really about something else, such as a vaguely kindred dis-
tinction between rules and memory storage, that Pinker, Clahsen,
and myself have argued for elsewhere (Clahsen 1999; Marcus
2001; Pinker 1999). Our argument has been that the past tense of
an English verb (for instance), may be produced by one of two
pathways: a system that applies a concatenation operation (rule)
to a verb stem, or an alternative system that retrieves (irregular
and in some cases regular) past-tense forms from an associative
memory. That memory system is sensitive to similarity; such sim-
ilarity might in principle be computed via a rule (as it has in some
computational models of irregular inflection). All of this may be
merely terminological, but if one adopts the perspective I have de-
veloped herein, it follows that tests for discerning rule-application
and similarity should not try to neatly categorize all computations
into one of two mutually exclusive bins (Rules vs. Similarity, not
both) but, rather, seek to answer two separable questions: (a)
whether a particular given computation is instantiated by means
of the application of algebraic operations (such as the instructions
in a microprocessor), and (b) whether that computation depends
on calculating (perhaps as intermediate values) the extent to
which two inputs share representational material. To see why 
the two questions are to some extent dissociable, consider that a 
simple web search engine that returned a value based on the pro-
portion of matching words out of total words would be both rule-
based and similarity-computing; an alphabetizing (sorting) algo-
rithm, in contrast, might be implemented via rule but leave no
room for similarity. A system that relied purely on the strengths of
particular memory traces might be an instance of similarity-based
systems that did not invoke rules. The putative rules-and-similar-
ity contrast fails not because they are opposites, but because they
are orthogonal, answering separate questions, one about the na-
ture of the operations with which a given algorithm is imple-
mented, the other about what that algorithm computes. It is with
good reason that efforts to pigeonhole them in separate bins have
failed.
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Abstract: Pothos suggests dispensing with the distinction between rules
and similarity, without defining what is meant by either term. We agree
that there are problems with the distinction between rules and similarity,
but believe these will be solved only by exploring the representations and
processes underlying cases purported to involve rules and similarity.
Pothos suggests that the distinction between rules and similarity
is not necessary, because similarity processes alone can be used to
explain data previously thought to require rules. We agree that the
distinction between rules and similarity is problematic, but dis-
agree that the solution is to eliminate the problem by focusing 
selectively on similarity. Instead, it is more important to focus on
underlying representational and processing issues related to cog-
nition. Ultimately, it may be possible to use rules or similarity (or
both) to model these cognitive processes. However, progress on
understanding cognition will require focusing on a finer-grained
set of issues than a distinction between rules and similarity per-
mits. To illustrate this point, we first discuss three dimensions that
are often correlated with the rules versus similarity distinction. We
demonstrate that the poles of these dimensions can be imple-
mented using either rule-based or similarity-based models.
Three dimensions of processing. Intuitively, rules and similar-
ity appear to differ along (at least) three different dimensions.
Rules are assumed to be abstract, while similarity is assumed to be
based in the content of the domains compared. Rules pre-compile
the relative salience of properties, whereas similarity determines
the salience of properties contextually. Rules are involved in the
application of knowledge, while similarity is involved in the trans-
fer of knowledge to new domains.
Degree of abstraction. Similarity comparisons are assumed to be
relatively concrete and to preserve specific aspects of the items
compared. In contrast, rules are assumed to capture abstract reg-
ularities across situations. Figure 1a illustrates this point by using
bolded boxes to indicate the typical way that similarity and rules
are linked to degrees of abstraction.
There is no requirement that similarity models involve concrete
aspects of items, nor is it required that rules focus on abstractions.
For example, structural approaches to analogy and similarity
(Gentner & Markman 1997; Hummel & Holyoak 1997) permit
the outcome of a comparison to be an abstract relational match
between situations. Likewise, rule-based models of automaticity
assume that people may form specific productions that fire when
an automatized sequence should be carried out (Anderson 1983).
For example, Anderson (1983) suggests one might have a pro-
duction that fires only when the goal is to dial a particular friend’s
phone number.
The influence of general and specific information on cognitive
processing is an important area of research, and one that deserves
much further study (Medin & Ross 1989). However, as illustrated
in Figure 1, it is possible to implement models of processes re-
quiring various degrees of representational specificity using either
rules or similarity.
Determination of salience. Models incorporating rules and simi-
larity often differ in the expectation that the importance of rep-
resentational elements will be determined contextually (Fig. 1b).
Models of similarity assume that contextual factors affect salience
(Gati & Tversky 1984; Gentner 1983; Medinet al. 1993). For ex-
ample, Gentner’s (1983) systematicity principle suggests that a
given property is more important for a similarity comparison when
it is relationally connected to other matching information than
when it is not. Rule-based models typically assume that only
salient properties are encoded in the rules as part of the process
that extracts rules during learning. Once again, however, there is
no principled reason for this relationship between rules and sim-
ilarity. Most similarity models, while highlighting the importance
of contextually derived factors in the calculation of similarity, also
assume that particular features may have context-neutral degrees
of importance (Tversky 1977). Furthermore, production-system
models often have a limited-capacity working memory that deter-
mines both the information that can be matched to the precondi-
tions of productions as well as the strength those properties will
have in matching against rules in memory (e.g., Anderson et al.
1996). Thus, processes that influence the salience of properties
are critical for understanding cognitive processing, but they do not
strongly favor similarity models over rule-based models.
Knowledge application. A third distinction is between the appli-
Commentary/Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:1 29
cation and transfer of knowledge. Models of similarity are often
applied in contexts in which knowledge from one domain is being
transferred to another. For example, Osherson et al.’s (1990)
model of category-based induction assumes that the strength of
belief that a property is true of some new category depends
strongly on the similarity of that category to categories known to
have that property. In contrast, models of knowledge application
often involve rules. For example, models assuming that people
have domain theories, assume that causal relations are repre-
sented as rules that can be applied to new causal situations in the
same domain (e.g., Kim & Ahn 2002).
As shown in Figure 1c, models of knowledge application may
also be similarity-based. For example, Bassok et al. (1998) have
shown that arithmetic word problems written by undergraduates
(who should have a strong domain-general understanding of the
rules of arithmetic) are strongly constrained by the semantic con-
tent of the problems. These results suggest that undergraduates
are comparing the structure of the mathematics domain to the
structure of the semantic domain during knowledge application.
Finally, knowledge transfer need not be modeled by using sim-
ilarity comparisons. For example, Singley and Anderson (1989)
provide an extended demonstration that transfer between cogni-
tive domains can be conceptualized as occurring when perfor-
mance in each domain requires some of the same production
rules.
Conclusion. The three examples in this commentary are not
meant to be exhaustive. Instead, they represent three important
dimensions of processing whose poles are often assumed to be as-
sociated with the distinction between similarity and rules. Pothos
has pointed out cases where models of similarity can account for
aspects of processing typically thought of as requiring rules. Our
analysis suggests that similarity and rule-based models are both
sufficiently powerful to account for the same range of phenom-
ena. Thus, research must focus on extracting the relevant dimen-
sions underlying cognitive processing and understanding their in-
fluence on thought. The implementation of these dimensions in
models involving either similarity or rules should be of secondary
importance.
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Figure 1 (Markman et al.). Three dimensions of cognitive processing typically thought to be cor-
related with the distinction between similarity and rules. As these panels show, the poles of these di-
mensions need not reflect underlying use of similarity or rules.
It’s not how many dimensions you have, it’s
what you do with them: Evidence from
speech perception
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Abstract: Contrary to Pothos, rule- and similarity-based processes cannot
be distinguished by dimensionality. Rather, one must consider the goal of
the processing: what the system will do with the resulting representations.
Research on speech perception demonstrates that the degree to which
speech categories are gradient (or similarity-based) is a function of the util-
ity of within-category variation for further processing.
Pothos attempts to derive computational distinctions between rule-
and similarity-based processes from the observation that similarity
processes operate over many dimensions, whereas rules operate
over very few. He argues that dimensionality can account for the in-
tuitive characterization that similarity operations tend to allow gra-
dient mapping whereas rules operations require strict (discrete)
mapping. We argue, however, that whether the mapping is graded
or discrete is a primary distinguishing characteristic of the two sys-
tems and is not derivative upon high or low dimensionality.
Dimensionality is actually a relatively weak discriminator. It is
based on a decontextualized notion of cognitive processing that
pays too little attention to the goals of a given computation. Cog-
nitive processes like categorization must directly support either
action or further computation. Pothos’s error is to overlook the
significance of this aspect of the computational problem. The
usefulness of gradient information for carrying out a specific
cognitive task is a more useful guide for understanding why a
given process allows more or less (similarity-like) gradient map-
ping.
Our research in speech perception and spoken-word recognition
clearly demonstrates the primacy of processing goals over dimen-
sionality in discriminating rule and similarity operations. Work in
speech perception and phonology has long assumed rule-based op-
erations operating on discrete categories (e.g., Categorical Percep-
tion, Liberman et al. 1957). Voicing perception is an important case
because much of the evidence for categorical perception of voicing
comes from work in which a single stimulus dimension, voice onset
time (VOT), is manipulated (e.g., Liberman et al. 1961).
With its basis in a single dimension, the perception of voicing
should, in Pothos’s terms, be a clear case of rule-based processing.
However, recent work shows that voicing perception is gradient
for some purposes and categorical for others. McMurray et al.
(2002) presented subjects with arrays of pictures and asked them
to use a mouse to select a given picture identified by a spoken
word. VOT was manipulated to make continua between words like
beach and peach. Examination of subjects’ eye movements during
this task showed that subjects were increasingly likely to look at a
lexical competitor (e.g., the peach after hearing “beach”) as VOT
approached the category boundary. In other work using similar
VOT continua in another eye-tracking task, McMurray et al.
(2003) and McMurray et al. (in preparation) found very little sys-
tematic sensitivity to such within-category variation in VOT when
the task was to identify initial phonemes designated by ortho-
graphic letters rather than pictures.
Why do perceptual categories appear continuous (suggesting
similarity-based operations) in the first experiment, but discrete
(suggesting rule-based operations) in the second? The reason
seems to be that in the context of speech recognition (which is bet-
ter tapped by the picture-matching task), variation in VOT is cor-
related with future and past acoustic events (like vowel length,
pitch, and prosodic strength) that may be useful for processes in-
cluding rate normalization and the use of prosody to disambiguate
syntactic structure. While these processes may be essential to the
interpretation of connected speech, they play no role in the cate-
gorization of isolated CV syllables. Thus, in the phoneme catego-
rization task, within-category variability along the same single di-
mension is noise and is best discarded.
This observation is consistent with a growing literature showing
that within a category, variation affects the dynamics of lexical ac-
tivation during word recognition (Andruski et al. 1994; Dahan et
al. 2001; Gow & Gordon 1995). Strict matching in the form of cat-
egorical perception of speech sounds discards variation. This may
make higher-level processing more efficient, but only if the varia-
tion that is lost is uninformative.
Work in the perception of lawful phonological variation is a case
in point. In English, linguists describe a rule for coronal place as-
similation that states that a segment with coronal place of articu-
lation (e.g., /t/, /d/, or /n/) takes the place of articulation of a fol-
lowing non-coronal segment (e.g., /b/, /p/, /m/, /g/, /k/, or /ng/).
As a process operating on a single dimension (place of articula-
tion), place assimilation would appear to be a clear example of a
rules process. However, close analysis of the acoustic conse-
quences of coronal place assimilation suggests that it tends to cre-
ate graded variation. For example, in the phrase “right berries,”
assimilation gives the [t] properties that are intermediate between
those of a [t] and a [p] (Gow 2001; 2002; 2003).
This has fundamental consequences for perception. If modifica-
tion were complete, listeners would need to rely on higher-level in-
ferential processes to determine if the phrase “ripe berries” re-
ferred to the right berries or the ripe berries. Such a modification
would be perceptually destructive in that it would neutralize any
contrast between right and ripe. However, if modification is graded,
listeners may potentially rely on perceptual processes to both re-
cover underlying form and also anticipate upcoming context. That
type of process is perceptually enhancing because it preserves in-
formation about underlying form while potentially encoding infor-
mation about upcoming context. Evidence from explicit online be-
havioral tasks such as phoneme monitoring and form priming (Gow
2002; 2003), and implicit measures including spontaneous eye
tracking and ERP (Gow et al. 2003; Gow & Holcomb 2002) shows
that graded assimilatory modification creates a range of context ef-
fects that are not found when modification is discrete. These in-
clude regressive effects enabling the recognition of the underlying
form and progressive effects facilitating perception of the context
that follows assimilated segments. Gradient modification encodes
information about multiple segments, and listeners’ sensitivity to
that gradiency allows them to exploit it fully in perception.
In summary, processes operating on very few stimulus dimen-
sions may show either the strict matching associated with rule-
based processes, or graded matching associated with similarity-
based processing. The distinction between these types of
processes reflects the potential value of subcategorical informa-
tion for further processing, rather than the number of dimensions
under consideration.
Rule versus similarity: Different in
processing mode, not in representations
Rolf Reber
Department of Psychosocial Science, University of Bergen, N-5015 Bergen,
Norway. rolf.reber@psysp.uib.no
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Abstract: Drawing on an example from artificial grammar learning, I pre-
sent the case that similarity processes can be computationally identical to
rules processes, but that participants in an artificial grammar learning ex-
periment may use different processing modes to classify stimuli. The num-
ber of properties and other representational differences between rule and
similarity processes are an accidental consequence of strategies used.
If rule processes and similarity processes were separated by the
number of properties involved, as Pothos suggests, it would be im-
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possible to transform similarity processes into rule processes. In
contrast to this implication, rule and similarity processes are com-
putationally indistinguishable; it needs some other variable, such
as the strategy used (Smith et al. 1998), in order to distinguish rule
processes and similarity processes. In order to bolster this notion,
let us look at an example from artificial grammar learning (Reber
1967). Participants in an artificial grammar learning experiment
may use different processing strategies to classify stimuli: They
may, first, explicitly match test stimuli to the rule, taking each prop-
erty covered by the rule into account. This kind of classification in-
volves systematic processing, needs resources from short-term
memory, and includes rule following (see Hahn & Chater 1998, for
the distinction between rule-following and rule-describable pro-
cesses). Second, participants may retrieve items learned during a
test and assess their similarity to a given test item in order to clas-
sify a stimulus. This often involves less analytical processing than
rule application and at best yields rule-describable classifications.
In some situations, people may simply assess how easily they were
able to process the test stimulus and base their classification on
such processing experiences (e.g., Whittlesea & Dorken 1993; cf.
Shanks et al. 2002). It is this second kind of artificial grammar
learning that got a lot of attention in the last few decades.
Research has found that people use characteristics such as as-
sociative strength to classify test stimuli (Knowlton & Squire 1994;
1996; Meulemans & Van der Linden 1997). According to Pothos’s
distinction between Rule and Similarity processes, this would be
a typical similarity process. For each test stimulus, associative
strength can be calculated as averaged frequency of bigrams and
trigrams in the training stimuli (see Meulemans & Van der Lin-
den 1997, p. 1010). Mean associative chunk strength in their Ex-
periment 1A was about 3.6. Let us assume that participants in an
artificial grammar learning experiment without rule knowledge
classify stimuli according to associative strength, and we find out
that they classify stimuli as being grammatical when associative
chunk strength is above a value of 3.6, and as ungrammatical if it
is below this value. If we knew that, we could now teach partici-
pants the rule and instruct them to apply it for classification of test
items: For each test string, calculate first its associative chunk
strength and then classify it as grammatical if the result is greater
than 3.6, and classify it as ungrammatical if it is smaller than or
equal to 3.6. At least intuitively, most researchers probably would
classify the latter task as one that involves rule processes. In this
case, both rule and similarity have the same number of properties;
the difference is that participants with rule knowledge show rule-
following classification performance whereas participants without
rule knowledge show only rule-describable classification perfor-
mance. Please note that this rule does not result in 100% classifi-
cation accuracy; if only 50% of the strings with average chunk
strength above 3.6 obey the rule, accuracy will be at 50%. The rep-
resentations and the computational processes needed in order to
classify stimuli are identical in both similarity and rule processes,
and hence, the number of properties is identical. Of course, some
assumptions are simplified: Participants in an artificial grammar
learning experiment may classify stimuli as grammatical if chunk
strength is higher than 3.6 on average; some participants may have
a lower threshold, others a higher one. Rules, on the other hand,
are fixed (see Hahn & Chater 1998). It may even turn out that dif-
ferent participants use different properties in classification ac-
cording to similarity: Some may look at trigrams in anchor posi-
tions, others are assessing global similarity; a rule, on the other
hand, is identical for all participants. However, if it were known
how individual participants classified stimuli, we would be able to
transform these different similarity processes into rule processes
with identical computational characteristics.
Taken together, each similarity process can be transferred into
a rule process if we knew what the similarity process is based on.
However, the mere fact that rule processes can be transferred to
similarity processes implies that similarity processes and rule
processes cannot a priori be distinguished on the basis of repre-
sentational characteristics, such as number of properties.
We can distinguish the two kinds of processes in terms of pro-
cessing modes, however. Whereas people seem to assess similar-
ity processes easily, systematic application of rules soon exceeds
working memory capacity. Although there is only one criterion to
apply the rule, the algorithm that needs to be applied in our ex-
ample in order to calculate associative chunk strength is very com-
plicated. It may be easy for the cognitive system to apply this al-
gorithm automatically and in a rule-describable manner, as in
similarity processes. In contrast, it is definitely difficult to apply it
deliberately and in a rule-following manner, as it happens in rule
processes. As a consequence, people can process only few prop-
erties if applying rules, but they can process many properties if as-
sessing similarity. This may result in the fact that rule processes
normally involve a higher number of properties than do similarity
processes.
I have dealt with artificial grammar learning only, but the same
logic seems valid for reasoning, categorization, and language. In
all cases, similarity processes can be transformed into rule pro-
cesses, and in all cases, the number of properties would be the
same. Again, applying the rule is more effortful than use of simi-
larity processes, although a simple rule may be learned to auto-
maticity, resulting in effortless processing of rule application. In
conclusion, the real distinction between rule processes and simi-
larity processes lies in the mode people use to process this infor-
mation. Computational differences observed between rule pro-
cesses and similarity processes, such as many properties in
similarity processes and few properties in rule processes, are ac-
cidental consequences of the different processing modes used in
rule and in similarity processes.
Rules and similarity processes in artificial
grammar and natural second language
learning: What is the “default”?
Peter Robinson
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Abstract: Are rules processes or similarity processes the default for ac-
quisition of grammatical knowledge during natural second language ac-
quisition? Whereas Pothos argues similarity processes are the default in
the many areas he reviews, including artificial grammar learning and first
language development, I suggest, citing evidence, that in second language
acquisition of grammatical morphology “rules processes” may be the de-
fault.
Pothos argues that similarity processes in learning and categoriza-
tion are the “default” because rules processes require many prop-
erties of an object to be “suppressed” in coming to a decision about
classification. However, Pothos speculates in his conclusion, “even
if Similarity is the default, it is possible that some objects might be
processed spontaneously in terms of a Rule” (sect. 9), in cases, for
example, where a diverse range of objects are grouped together in
a category, making similarity judgments difficult to compute.
These issues are important to understanding what guides decision
making, not just in artificial grammar (AG) learning, and first lan-
guage (L1) development, but also in natural second language ac-
quisition (SLA). What is the “default” process for learning and cat-
egorizing natural second language (L2) stimuli as grammatical or
ungrammatical? One possibility, in line with Pothos’s speculation
above, is that the further the grammatical distance (measured in
ways briefly described below) the L1 is from the L2, the more likely
a rules process is spontaneously used to (correctly or incorrectly)
judge an L2 sentence as grammatical, and that frequency and sim-
ilarity information available from exposure to the L2 input is less
influential, or ignored. Rules processes would therefore be the de-
fault basis for classification in these cases, not similarity processes.
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In his review, Pothos summarizes claims about rule versus sim-
ilarity influences on AG learning. In reporting the results of Vokey
and Brooks (1992), Pothos claims, as Vokey and Brooks do, that
the judgments were based on “abstract analogy” (sect. 4.3; cf.
Brooks & Vokey 1991) and that suppression and rules processes,
which Pothos suggests Reber might invoke (cf. Reber 1989), were
not involved (sects. 4.3 and 4.4). However, it is an important ques-
tion how related AG learning and natural L2 learning are, and
whether similarity processes, and rules processes (involving sup-
pression) operate in the same way, or differently, on both sets of
stimuli. Studies of this issue are rare, and deserving of further em-
pirical research, given the claims Pothos makes in his review. One
such study (Robinson 2002; 2005) replicated findings by Knowl-
ton and Squire (1996; to which Pothos refers), with experienced
L2 learners. Robinson (2005) found that the high chunk strength,
and so similarity of training to AG transfer set items, influenced
these learners to incorrectly accept ungrammatical (UG) items
but did not influence judgments of grammatical (G) items. In a
separate experiment the same learners also learned a new natural
L2, Samoan, under incidental training conditions, in which they
were required to process sentences of Samoan for meaning, using
a rote-learned Samoan vocabulary, with no grammatical instruc-
tion about word order or morphology in Samoan. As with the AG
stimuli, in the transfer test grammaticality and chunk strength of
Samoan test items were controlled for. However, for natural L2
learning, chunk strength, and similarity of training to transfer set
items exerted a negative effect not only on correct rejection of UG
items (as in the AG experiment), but also on correct acceptance
of G items. High chunk strength influenced learners to wrongly
accept UG sentences, and wrongly reject G sentences. Why
should this be so?
Pothos suggests an answer in his concluding section, “Future di-
rections.” Novel UG sentences in that Samoan transfer set
“lacked” the necessary morphology present in the input during
training (making them ungrammatical), but novel G items in-
cluded it. The morphology, importantly, in the G items was very
different from (distant from) morphology in the subjects’ L1 (Jap-
anese), including ergative markers (which Japanese does not
have), locative markers preceding, not following, noun comple-
ments (in contrast to Japanese head direction), and noun-incor-
poration and affixation (which Japanese does not have). None of
these features characterizes Japanese. Therefore, in the case of G
items, the diverse range of morphology involved in categorizing
Samoan sentences correctly as grammatical may well have in-
volved spontaneous “rules processes” (as Pothos, sect. 9, specu-
lates) guided by L1 (Japanese) knowledge. Since L1 knowledge
was disjunct with the grammatical morphology in G items; this led
learners to incorrectly reject them, despite their similarity to the
training set. In contrast, the UG items lacking this morphology
were less diverse as a category, and high chunk strength therefore
influenced learners to incorrectly accept them on the basis of their
similarity to the training set.
In summary, although it may be that a similarity process is the
“default” basis for classification in many of the areas Pothos de-
scribes, there is some evidence that in learning natural L2 mor-
phology, rules processes may be the default. This evidence is not
inconsistent with the claim that some highly frequent, L1-shared
cues to form-meaning relationships in the input to L2 learning,
such as word order and agency in English, are more susceptible to
learning from mere exposure, and similarity-based “strengthen-
ing” of such cues, than others, such as the grammatical marking of
inflections (e.g., MacWhinney 2001). Neither is it inconsistent
with some claims concerning the effects of L2 instruction, that is,
that certain aspects of unfamiliar inflectional L2 morphology will
benefit from “explicit” instruction, since they activate rules
processes during learning (e.g., Robinson 1996), in contrast to in-
flectional morphology familiar from the L1, which can be learned
by similarity processes, following exposure to L2 input alone.
Such issues will be important to address in pursuing further im-
plications of Pothos’s proposal for the relationship of AG to nat-
ural language learning and classification, and for the issue of
whether similarity or rules processes are the default in natural L2
acquisition. With these issues in mind I suggest Pothos should
consider adding SLA (related to but different from “learning” and
“language,” by involving the study of both) to the areas of relevant
enquiry into the influence of rules versus similarity in cognitive
psychology. Explanations of SLA are characterized by all five types
of argument employed in the rules versus similarity debate, sum-
marized in Table 1 (sect. 4.3) – that is, classification, dissociation,
and suppression as I have indicated, and also introspective testi-
mony to L2 rule use, or lack thereof; and evidence of differential
performance, as well as a priori arguments for why L1 knowledge
should exert an influence on classifications of grammaticality in
the L2. This makes SLA an important, non-overlapping comple-
ment to the other areas of inquiry listed in Table 2 (sect. 8).
Avoiding foolish consistency
Steven Sloman
Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown University,
Providence, RI 02912. steven_sloman@brown.edu
http://www.cog.brown.edu/~sloman
Abstract: In most cases, rule-governed relations and similarity relations
can indeed be distinguished by the number of relevant features they re-
quire. This criterion is not sufficient, however, to explain other properties
of the relations that have a more dichotomous character. I focus on the dif-
ferential drive for consistency by inferential processes that draw on the two
types of relations.
In his provocative article, Pothos correctly points out that there
must be some coherence among representations to have an effec-
tive information processing system. He admirably places this re-
striction on his own formulation: Whether we call his representa-
tional elements rules or similarity or something in between, they
must be consistent with one another (i.e., they must not be mutu-
ally contradictory with respect to one or another logical calculus).
Consistency would seem to be a minimal requirement of a suc-
cessful system of reasoning.
The problem is that, where people are concerned, contradic-
tions abound. We believe that Linda seems more like a feminist
bankteller than a bankteller, and yet we agree that she is more
likely to be a bankteller. We are convinced that we should select
the “not Q” card in the Wason task (Wason 1966), yet we continue
to think the Q card provides more information (and maybe it does,
as Oaksford & Chater [1994] point out). We continue to smoke
even though we know what a bad idea it is. Divergence in the be-
liefs held simultaneously by a single person would seem to pro-
vide some reason to question the plausibility of a single system in
which all reasoning takes place within the same representational
medium.
Of course, in principle these contradictions could reflect some
general property of a single representational system. Maybe we
just don’t bother to check for all contradictions, or we live with
them, or we just make mistakes. However, the contradictions we
observe do not seem to have this homogeneous character. If our
more general principles conflict, we try to rectify them. We may
not want to believe that smoking is bad for our health, but reject-
ing such a claim is inconsistent with everything we believe about
the integrity of science and our own observations. We are forced
to conclude that we should select the P and not the Q card on the
basis of a logical argument, even though life would be easier if the
conclusion proved our original intuitions correct. Deliberation
about which rules to apply at what point in time is what debate of-
ten consists of, debate with others as well as with ourselves, be-
cause people share a propensity to make our rules consistent. In
some cases, it might be rational to keep inconsistent possibilities
in mind. For example, one may be considering two inconsistent
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theories and not have enough evidence to eliminate either one.
But this is not a desired state of affairs.
In contrast, our associations contradict one another as well as
non-associative beliefs and action willy-nilly. Any good story-teller
will have a story up their sleeve whose moral is “Look before you
leap” and another that suggests the opposite, “He who hesitates is
lost.” We may not support our country’s warmongering and yet the
prospect of losing a battle is horrifying. One frame tells us that
John would make a better president, another that Hillary would.
Lack of coherence when associations are at play is unexceptional.
This co-existence of contradictions is acceptable and unprob-
lematic within the associative system. We understand and even ex-
pect to respond in different ways to the same stimulus because as-
sociations do not have to be justified. Justification is the province
of rule-based deliberation, not associative responding. The need
for consistency arises when we are generating or applying rules,
rules that can find expression in language and other formal sys-
tems in order to be shared with other people and to provide a
check on the validity of our own reasoning.
Might rules just be an extreme case in which productions have
only a single condition, as Pothos suggests? Maybe. But the for-
mat of a mental representation does not by itself determine how
it is reasoned about, and it is the nature of the reasoning process
that seems to be consequential for understanding how people
learn and the kinds of inferences that they draw. Moreover, it is
not clear how we would know; conceptual relations may lend
themselves to many representational formats.
A variety of powerful systems for representing cognitive activ-
ity are out there. If a system is powerful enough, it can be used to
tell a story about any kind of inference. The argument that all of
reasoning can be modeled in a single system, although potentially
inspiring, does not cut very deep. More challenging would be a
theory that not only integrates rule- and similarity-based process-
ing but also explains why they are so different; a theory that ex-
plains why the phenomena of thought cluster as they do, into a set
that invokes justifications, explanations, slow deliberation, atten-
tion, often language, and elicits consistency checking, versus a set
that invokes principles of association like similarity, involves fast
processing without large demands on attention, and is much more
liberal about the conclusions it draws. If Pothos believes that he
has done that, then his argument is persuasive that the systems of
reasoning are different.
Rule and similarity as prototype concepts
Edward E. Smith
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
48109-1109. eesmith@umich.edu
Abstract: There is a continuum between prototypical cases of rule use and
prototypical cases of similarity use. A prototypical rule: (1) is explicitly rep-
resented, (2) can be verbalized, and (3) requires that the user selectively
attend to a few features of the object, while ignoring the others. Prototyp-
ical similarity-use requires that: (1) the user should match the object to a
mental representation holistically, and (2) there should be no selective at-
tention or inhibition. Neural evidence supports prototypical rule-use.
Most models of categorization fall between the two prototypes.
At times, Pothos seems to be claiming that the main difference be-
tween rules and similarity is simply that rule-use considers fewer
features than do similarity judgments, for example, “A rules
process is considered to be a similarity one where only a single or
small subset of an object’s properties are involved” (target article,
Abstract). But this does not seem right. Consider a case in which
an individual is trying to determine the similarity of two pictured
objects. If in one case the individual can see both objects fully, but
in another case most of the pictures are obscured, then we would
not want to say that in the first case the individual is using simi-
larity but in the second they are using a rule. Rather, I still endorse
our earlier attempt to formulate rule-following in categorization
and reasoning (Smith et al. 1992). For rule-following to occur, the
individual must (1) recognize that the input (e.g., If it’s a flying an-
imal, then it’s a bird and it’s a flying animal) is of a certain abstract
kind and, as a consequence, it is subsumed by a certain kind of rule
(If p, then q), and (2) apply that rule to the input (instantiates If 
p, then q with If it’s a flying animal, then it’s a bird, instantiates p
with flying animal and concludes q, it’s a bird).
But although I do not agree with Pothos’s characterization of
rule-following, I am sympathetic to his claims that rules and sim-
ilarity may be extremes of some underlying continuum. The rest
of this commentary is devoted to this point.
Let us start by assuming that like most concepts, RULE and
SIMILARITY (capitals designate concepts), are vague and have a
prototype structure (or an exemplar structure if you like) (Smith
& Medin 1981). It is useful to describe what seem to be the pro-
totypes for these two concepts. A prototypical rule (1) is consis-
tent with the two-step characterization given above; (2) is explic-
itly represented; (3) can be verbalized (if the user is human); and
(4) requires that the user selectively attend to only a few features
of the test object or situation, namely those that correspond to the
antecedent of the rule, and inhibit all other features of the input.
In contrast, a prototypical case of using SIMILARITY requires
that (1) the individual match the test object to a mental represen-
tation holistically and (2) there be no selective attention or inhi-
bition. There may be few experiments in which these prototypes
are in play, but it is worth considering a couple of cases that have
used neurological patients or neuroimaging of normal volunteers.
In a recent study, one group of normal participants was asked
to categorize pictured artificial animals on the basis of whether
they contain at least three of four verbalizable features (e.g., “long
tail”), while another group had to categorize these animals on the
basis of their similarity to known exemplars of the categories. Both
groups performed these tasks while having their brains scanned
by PET (Patalano et al. 2002). When the similarity condition was
compared to a control condition, all of the areas activated were in
the back of the brain. This indicates the process is visual, though
it hardly shows it is holistic. When the rule condition was com-
pared to the control condition, in addition to back of the brain ac-
tivations, activations were found in the posterior superior parietal
cortex, which is known to be involved in spatial selective attention,
and in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is
known to be involved in selective attention and inhibition. These
results fit nicely with our notion of prototypical rule-use.
Similar results have been obtained with natural concepts. In
one paradigm, normal participants were given the description of
an object – “a round object 3 inches in diameter” – along with
two possible categories, for example, Pizza and Quarter. One
group of participants was asked to choose the category that is
most similar to the described object, while another group was
asked to pick the correct category for the test object. To deter-
mine that Pizza is the correct answer, the participants must con-
sult their semantic representations for Pizza and Quarter, selec-
tively attend to the size feature while inhibiting others, and note
that, by stipulation, a quarter cannot be as large as three inches
(a case of rule-use); so Pizza must be the correct answer (Rips
1989). When normal participants are scanned by fMRI while do-
ing these tasks, and the similarity condition is subtracted from the
rule condition, one again finds that the DLPFC is activated
(Grossman et al. 2002). Furthermore, when this same paradigm
was used with neurological patients with damage in the DLPFC,
they performed normally in the similarity condition, but were se-
verely impaired in the rule condition. Their degree of impairment
in the rule condition was negatively correlated with their perfor-
mance on tests that measure one’s capacity for selective attention
and inhibition.
Evidence for prototypical similarity-use seems harder to come
by. Most likely, it would require a picture categorization task, and
data showing that the time to reach a categorization decision does
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not depend on the number of features involved, and that no fea-
ture is more important than another.
What about proposals that are intermediate on our prototype-
similarity continuum? The most frequent of these hybrid models
are similarity models that posit the use of selective attention to
some features (or dimensions). Indeed, similarity-based models
with selective attention have dominated the recent categorization
literature (e.g., Estes 1994; Medin & Schaffer 1978; Nosofsky
1986). Perhaps the most frequent variant among hybrid rule mod-
els are those that claim that the rules need not be explicitly rep-
resented nor verbalizable, namely, most symbolic models of lan-
guage use (e.g., Pinker 1999; Ullman 2001).
The point of all this is that many of what we call similarity or
rule models are generally not pure cases. Furthermore, because
processes like selective attention and inhibition are frequently
critical in accounting for data, perhaps we should focus less on the
rule-similarity distinction, and more on the mechanisms that char-
acterize the prototypes of these models. It is these mechanisms,
not the models, that will likely be linked to specific neural pro-
cesses.
In search of radical similarity
Oscar Vilarroya
Unitat de Recerca en Neurociència Cognitiva, IMPU, Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona, 08035 Barcelona, Spain. oscar.vilarroya@uab.es
Abstract: It is difficult to see how one can support the continuum between
rules and similarity, as Pothos proposes. A similarity theory could dispense
with the rules end of the continuum. The only thing that we need is one
(or more than one) theory of similarity that goes beyond the stimulus-car-
rying information and behavioristic restrictions that have usually been at-
tributed to similarity theories.
I am, to be sure, very sympathetic to the proposal submitted by
Pothos. The only objection I have is that Pothos’s proposal is not
radical enough, even if I have to admit that there is good reason
to be cautious. I agree with Pothos’s idea that there is a continuum
between different types of similarity processes, but it is difficult to
see how one can maintain the rules approach as a part of such a
continuum. Moreover, I fail to see how one can support a contin-
uum while at the same time distinguishing two different core
processes in such a continuum. Anyone defending a divide be-
tween rules and similarity can agree with the approach taken by
Pothos – can accept that both types of similarity processes are rad-
ically different, yet overlapping.
My view is that the central process in learning, categorization,
and even reasoning is the ability to discern similarities (Vilarroya
2002). The use of algorithmic rules seems to me marginally ap-
plied in highly specialized domains of expertise. As an explanation
of many learning and categorization processes the use of rules
(such as “if it barks, it is a dog”) is simply a shortcut of a process
that we hardly understand or know about. Of course, it is true that
we are far from having a similarity theory or model (one or more)
that can account for all the core categorization and learning
processes. This is the reason for being cautious. The main deter-
rent to the radical thesis is that we still lack an adequate theory of
similarity. Following Goldstone (1999) we can enumerate four
main approaches to similarity modelling: geometric, featural,
alignment-based, and transformational. Geometric models have
been criticized (Tversky 1977) on the grounds that violations of
their assumptions are empirically observed. Featural models of
similarity are badly suited for comparing things that are richly
structured rather than just being a collection of coordinates or fea-
tures. Alignment-based models and transformational theories
have also been criticized on the grounds of artificiality and insuf-
ficiency (Goldstone & Son, in press). The upshot, then, is that the
jury is still out on the question of having a comprehensive simi-
larity theory that can account for learning and categorization
mechanisms.
In my view, any similarity theory or model that aims at being
successful as a core theory of learning and categorization requires
going beyond two restrictions that have been commonly attrib-
uted to similarity processes. First, a similarity theory need not be
restricted to account for processes based exclusively on the infor-
mation carried in the stimulus in question. Secondly, similarity
processes need not be reduced to behavioristic, stimulus-re-
sponse, co-occurrence statistics processes, as some authors seem
to assume (Hahn & Chater 1998). Overcoming these limitations
is crucial to making headway on the problem of similarity.
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that stimulus ob-
jects are internally represented and that similarity between ob-
jects comes from some sort of comparison between their repre-
sentations. Similarity theories have been directed at explaining,
among other things: (1) the information carried in the stimulus;
(2) how this information is combined or structured within the rep-
resentation; (3) how representations are compared; and (4), given
a set of stimuli, how their similarities are determined and best rep-
resented. These questions leave open the possibility that similar-
ity processes and representations go beyond the description of the
information that is carried in the stimulus and need not be re-
duced to behavioristic learning mechanisms. We only need a good
perceptual theory to do that (see Barsalou 1999; 2003). In such
theories, perceptual representations are characterized, at least to
some extent, not only as the processing of stimulus information,
but also as the manipulation of such information by cognitive and
emotional processes. Perception is a highly rich process and the
similarity judgment that may come out from a perceptual process
does not reduce to the information that carries the stimulus.
Take for example the case of domain-specificity of perception.
Classical views of perception consider each sensory modality – vi-
sion, hearing, and so forth – in isolation, as if each modality pro-
cessed its information without relevant interactions with other
senses. However, integration among different modalities is not only
a common phenomenon in the brain, but it is also prerequisite for
many types of perception and behavior. Of course, nobody ques-
tions that at some level there is some sort of integration between
different modalities (such as that the concept rose could include vi-
sual and olfactory cues). The relevant point is that the integration
affects the representation of the stimulus. Cross-modal integration
of multisensory cues (e.g., visual and auditory) is one of these ex-
amples. In the cross-modal integration, two or more modalities are
integrated in the same process. Many research results suggest that
cross-modal integration is not only a fact, but it is also necessary in
perceptual processing in early stages (Driver 1996; Macaluso et al.
2000; Vroomen & de Gelder 2000). Other studies suggest that all
perceptual processes can be modulated and affected by emotional
cues (Anderson & Phelps 2001). Other interesting processes that
go beyond the mere metrics of stimulus features or distances be-
tween dimensions are selective attention (Lamberts & Shanks
1997) and figure-ground. It is difficult to see how a metric or di-
mensional system of representation can account for similarity judg-
ments in cases where the similarity judgments depend on cognitive
processes that transform the information carried in the stimulus.
The question is, then, not only how a theory of similarity can
overlook, among others, cross-modal phenomena, but also how it
can account for the similarity judgments that derive from such
processes. When theories of similarity jettison the notion of stim-
ulus-carried information and behavioristic stimulus-response re-
strictions, then the power of similarity processes will be enhanced.
Abstraction was a rule-protected domain, until certain perceptual-
based knowledge theories began to appear (see Barsalou 1999).
My view is that the progress of similarity-based theories of learn-
ing and categorization will reduce the area of influence of rules to
a small corner.
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Integration of “rules” and “similarity” in a
framework of information compression by
multiple alignment, unification, and search
J. Gerard Wolff
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Abstract: The Simplicity and Power (SP) theory (Wolff 2003a) provides
support for Pothos’s proposals by illustrating how the effect of “rules” and
“similarity” may be achieved within an integrated model that makes no ex-
plicit provision for either concept. The theory is described here in outline
with simple examples to show how rules and similarity can emerge as prop-
erties of the system in learning, reasoning, categorization, and the parsing
of language.
“Rules versus Similarity” is one of those “oppositions” in psychol-
ogy where decisive evidence, one way or the other, seems always
to elude us (see Newell 1973, pp. 284–89). Pothos’s paper is a wel-
come reminder that, with oppositions of this kind and this one in
particular, the truth may be “both” and “neither.” An integrated
theory or model may have no explicit provision for “rules” or “sim-
ilarity,” but such concepts may be emergent properties of the the-
ory, in much the same way as “turbulence” or “laminar flow” may
be seen to be emergent properties of water flowing through a
pipe.
In this short commentary, I outline one such integrated model
and sketch how rules and similarity may be seen in the workings
of the model in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language.
The model is broadly in keeping with Pothos’s proposals, but its
origins and motivation are somewhat different.
The “Simplicity and Power” (SP) theory (Wolff 2003a) is an ab-
stract model of computing and cognition that represents all kinds
of knowledge in the form of “patterns”: arrays of atomic symbols
in one or two dimensions. The system receives “New” patterns
from its environment (e.g., spoken or written language or visual
patterns) and transfers them to a repository of “Old” patterns. At
the same time, the system tries to compress the information as
much as possible by searching for patterns or parts of patterns that
match each other, and merging or “unifying” the patterns or parts
of patterns that are the same. A key part of this process is the build-
ing of “multiple alignments” like the example shown in Figure 1.
Here, row 0 contains a New pattern and each of the remaining
rows contains an Old pattern. An alignment is “good” if it allows
the New pattern to be encoded economically in terms of the Old
patterns.
In this example, the New pattern represents a sentence to be
parsed and each Old pattern represents a grammatical “rule.” For
example, “ S  N   V  ” (in row 2) is equivalent to the
re-write rule “S r N V”, representing the idea that a (simple) sen-
tence comprises a noun followed by a verb. The entire alignment
achieves the effect of parsing the sentence into its parts and sub-
parts, with labels representing grammatical categories. More elab-
orate examples may be found in Wolff (2000).
In the second example, shown in Figure 2, the symbols in the
New pattern (in row 0) may be seen as some of the features of
some unknown entity and the Old patterns (in the other rows) rep-
resent categories such as “animal” (A) in row 4, “vertebrate” (V) in
row 5, “mammal” (M) in row 2, “cat” (CT) in row 3, and an indi-
vidual (Tibs) in row 1. The whole alignment may be seen as the
end result of a process of recognition or categorization at multiple
levels of abstraction. When the SP system builds multiple align-
ments, it searches for good partial matches between patterns as
well as exact matches. As can be seen in the example, it is not nec-
essary for every New symbol to be matched with an Old symbol,
and vice versa. Thus, the system naturally accommodates the no-
tion of categorization by similarity, with varying degrees of simi-
larity depending on the degree to which New patterns and Old
ones have features that match each other. In connection with cat-
egorization, the system supports the representation of intensional,
extensional, and “family resemblance” categories, class hierarchies
(as we have seen), part-whole hierarchies, and cross-classifica-
tion.
Given that an unknown entity, X, has been categorized as
shown, it is possible to draw inferences from the multiple align-
ment. We can, for example, infer that, as an animal, X breathes;
that, as a vertebrate, X has a backbone; and that, as a cat, X purrs.
None of this information is contained in the New information re-
ceived from the environment. In general, any Old symbol in an
alignment that is not matched with any New symbol represents an
inference that can be drawn from the alignment.
Within the SP framework, this principle provides the basis for
several different kinds of probabilistic reasoning, including prob-
abilistic “deduction,” abduction, chains of reasoning, non-monot-
onic reasoning and “explaining away” (Wolff 1999), and for exact
forms of reasoning too (Wolff 2003a). In most cases, the relevant
patterns may be seen to represent “rules” such as “where there is
smoke there is fire,” “black clouds mean rain,” and so on.
Partial matching between patterns also provides the basis for
unsupervised learning. When, for example, the system finds a 
partial match between two patterns like “t h i s b o y r u n s” and
“t h i s g i r l r u n s,” it is able to derive new patterns such as 
“ %1 t h i s ,” “ %2 1 b o y ,” “ %2 2 g i r l ,” “ %3 
r u n s ,” together with an abstract pattern, “ %4  %1 
 %2   %3  ,” which ties the smaller patterns together.1
In this kind of way, the system can derive grammars and other
kinds of knowledge structure from raw data (Wolff 2003b).
In summary, the SP system provides support for the thesis that
Pothos has proposed. The system makes no explicit provision for
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Figure 1 (Wolff). An example of a multiple alignment in the SP framework that achieves the effect of parsing a sentence.
rules or similarity, but we can recognize these concepts in the way
the system operates in processing natural language, in categoriza-
tion of an unknown entity, in various styles of reasoning, and in the
unsupervised learning of new structures.
NOTE
1. Notice how “b o y” and “g i r l” have been assigned to the same cat-
egory (“%2”), in the spirit of distributional linguistics.
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Preferring Rules to Similarity: Coherence,
goals, and commitment
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Abstract: This response to the open peer commentary discusses
what should be the appropriate explanatory scope of a rules ver-
sus similarity proposal and accordingly evaluates the Rules versus
Similarity one. Additionally, coherence, goals, and commitment
are presented as inferential notions, fully consistent with the Rules
versus Similarity distinction, that allow us to predict when Rules
would be preferred to Similarity.
R1. What is the aim of a rules versus similarity
proposal?
Evaluating a rules versus similarity (r-s) proposal is a com-
plex issue, not least because, as the commentaries show,
there is no universal agreement of what the explanatory
scope of such a proposal should be. In his commentary,
Duch examines whether brain neurons might be seen as
computing rules. But clearly an r-s proposal aims to char-
acterize psychological behavior (neuronal collective activ-
ity), not biological or neurological functions. Now, as Marr
(1982) discussed, brain function can be investigated at 
different explanatory levels and explanations at different
levels must be consistent with each other. However, our
current knowledge of neuron properties offers weak con-
straints in preferring one notion of rules as opposed to an-
other (Campion).
The second point to address is how much of psychologi-
cal behavior we should aim to explain within a model of 
r-s. Unfortunately, psychological behavior is not a one-
dimensional system that can be neatly divided into non-
overlapping units for analysis. Campion goes through an
example of real-life inference in order to make the point
that the “subtle psychological mechanisms” supporting the
inference are obscured in a characterization in terms of
rules or similarity. However, an r-s proposal is most cer-
tainly not meant to constitute a universal model of cogni-
tion. It goes without saying that beyond rules and similar-
ity, several other characterizations for a cognitive process
would be possible.
How detailed should an r-s proposal be? Several re-
searchers, including myself in the target article and some of
the commentators (Duch; Hampton; Markman, Blok,
Kim, Larkey, Narvaez, Stilwell, & Taylor [henceforth
Markman et al.]), have pointed out that, unconstrained,
the general notions of rules and similarity are so flexible so
as to enable arbitrary characterizations of performance.
Therefore, the least we should require of an r-s proposal is
that it enables a principled distinction of cognitive opera-
tions into rules and similarity. Dominey goes further to ar-
gue that such a proposal must also be successfully imple-
mented in a computational model. However, the lack of a
suitable computational model for an r-s proposal should not
determine exclusively the validity of the proposal, insofar
that our limitations in proposing adequate computational
models for cognitive theories cannot always inform us of the
validity of the theories (but of course it has to be shown that
the cognitive processes postulated in a theory are com-
putable by the brain; cf. Newell 1990).
An r-s proposal should aim to clarify which operations we
would like to consider rules and which similarity. But what
would be the basis of such an endeavor? Clearly, we should
start with situations that most psychologists would infor-
mally want to characterize as rules (e.g., deciding that a
number is even) and empirical data that are generally ac-
cepted as showing rule performance (for example, recog-
nizing that a sentence such as “colorless green ideas sleep
furiously” is grammatically correct). Some of the character-
istics of these situations and empirical data would serve as
the assumptions of an r-s proposal, on the basis of which we
would try to predict the remaining characteristics (and, of
course, r-s dissociations more generally). In doing this, we
can recognize two facts of scientific reality: first, we should
aim to formulate our theory with the least number of as-
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Figure 2 (Wolff). A multiple alignment showing how an unknown entity may be recognized or categorized at multiple levels 
of abstraction.
sumptions, and second, which characteristics serve as as-
sumptions is a somewhat arbitrary choice. Therefore, the
predictions of one r-s model could be the assumptions in
another, and characteristics that are central in some pro-
posals may be obscured in others (cf. Brooks & Hannah).
For example, McMurray & Gow imply that we should
consider an operation as similarity depending on the grad-
edness of the operation. Within the Rules versus Similarity
(R-S) proposal, the definitional centrality of gradedness is
rejected, even if in practice most Similarity operations
would be graded and most Rule ones discrete (as in the tar-
get article, capitalized “Rules” and “Similarity” refer to the
present proposal). To conclude with the above points, an r-
s proposal is considered partly a definitional issue (as dis-
cussed further in sect. R4.2). In this sense, Hahn’s criticism
that “Structural relationships between old and new items
have always been viewed as evidence for rules or similarity,
but the present proposal . . . turns what was evidence of
the conceptual contrast between rules and similarity into
their definition” (para. 8), simply illustrates the definitional
choices made in the R-S proposal. Rather than denounce
these choices a priori, we should aim to examine how well
they serve the explanatory purpose of an r-s proposal.
The aim of the target article was to provide a formulation
of the r-s distinction in a way that would enable consistent
and unambiguous characterizations of cognitive processes
as rules or similarity. However, Sloman correctly observes
that “More challenging would be a theory that . . . explains
why the phenomena of thought cluster [in terms of rules of
similarity] as they do” (cf. Heit & Hayes). The primary aim
of the present response is to discuss the implications of the
R-S proposal with respect to when we would expect Rules
behavior as opposed to Similarity.
R2. Assumptions: Clarifying the Rules versus
Similarity formulation
R2.1. Relevant properties and representation
Some commentators (Hahn, Heit & Hayes, Lupyan &
Vallabha) have questioned the appropriateness of the rep-
resentational assumptions made in the R-S proposal. For
example, Hahn claims that the notion of uniquely common
properties is not robust and Lupyan & Vallabha observe
that object representations can develop dynamically as a re-
sult of experience (Goldstone 1998).
Starting with Lupyan & Vallabha, the R-S proposal is
consistent with their observation. The proposal requires
that when we process an object it is possible to specify its
properties relevant to the process. The specification of this
representation depends on the particulars of the process.
To use Smith’s example: If two obscured pictures were
compared, the psychological representation of the pictures
would correspond only to the shown parts of the pictures
(so the comparison would be Similarity, if it takes into
account all the shown information). Analogously for
McMurray & Gow, an R-S characterization does not de-
pend on whether a process involves one or more properties,
but, rather, on the number of properties involved out of all
the relevant properties. For example, are there alternative
voicing perception operations that depend on multiple
stimulus dimensions? If there is always only one dimension
then the operation is Similarity. Note that the representa-
tion in itself does not necessarily (sect. 3.1) determine
whether a Rules process will be preferred to a Similarity
comparison; if it did, the R-S proposal would be circular
(Sloman).
I agree with Hahn’s observation: The lack of an adequate
theory for representation is one of the important current
shortcomings in psychology, and the R-S proposal does not
claim to address it. However, the corresponding assump-
tions made in the R-S proposal are analogous to the as-
sumptions made in models of categorization generally (e.g.,
Nosofsky 1991). Despite the acknowledged inadequacy of
these assumptions, such models work impressively. There-
fore, the assumptions cannot be entirely inappropriate, and
are plausibly approximate to whatever more compelling ap-
proaches would be forthcoming in the future. With respect
to the R-S proposal, the enumeration of relevant properties
is done by considering the properties that would be
(uniquely) required under each reasonable possible version
of the operation of interest on a target representation. In
this way, when, for example, inflecting a verb in English, we
could be taking into account its phonology, its status as reg-
ular or irregular, and its semantics.
Davidoff discusses results that show a dissociation be-
tween the perception of abstract and concrete properties.
The R-S proposal is concerned not with how the properties
involved in a representation arise, but, rather, with whether
they are differentially considered in object judgments. For
example, would it be the case that a Rule operation would
be behaviorally different if it is based on a single abstract
property instead of a single concrete one? According to the
R-S proposal the answer is no, and Davidoff ’s results sug-
gest no reason to revise this answer. Note that Rules will be
more abstract than Similarity in the sense that Rules are op-
erations on a target representation that involve few proper-
ties of the representation (Bailey).
R2.2. Computations of Rules versus Similarity
The discussion below has two parts. We first clarify the as-
sumptions about Rules processes versus Similarity ones
that are integral in the definition of the proposal. We then
consider some implications.
Consider a task whereby participants are presented with
three letter strings: MSSSSSV, MSSV, and MSSSSV. Partic-
ipants subsequently decide that new string MSSSV is com-
patible with the training ones. Hahn observes that such a
judgment could equally be considered Similarity (the fea-
tures of the new string overlap with the features of the old
ones) or Rules (old items considered to conform to the cat-
egory “strings start with an M, end with a V, and have S’s in
between”). Strictly speaking, an R-S characterization is
forthcoming only for an assembly of judgments. When a di-
verse enough set of judgments is examined (e.g., how would
participants characterize item MSSSSSSSV?), then we
could conclude: “Well, it turns out the person was using
Similarity,” or “It turns out the person was using Rules.” Ac-
cordingly, our characterization of what participants do may
change as the test set is expanded. However, contrary to
Hahn’s view, such an implication is hardly inappropriate: It
means that the more information we have about people’s
behavior, the more accurate our characterization of the cor-
responding psychological process. Indeed, dissatisfaction
with the r-s distinction is possibly due to researchers’ incli-
nation to define the distinction in terms of inadequate em-
pirical measures (Dulany). Finally, note that the letter
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string discussion is equivalent to the one in the target arti-
cle for conditionals. However, as Arló-Costa’s commentary
shows, we need to be careful about how we interpret per-
formance with conditionals. In this respect, the discussion
in the target article should be simply seen as an illustration
of how an R-S analysis could proceed in reasoning.
Commentator Reber asks us to consider participants
who are told exactly how to compute the associative chunk
strength of the new string (a Similarity measure) in order to
decide whether the new string is consistent with the old
ones or not. Reber claims that for participants to carry out
such a computation they must be using rules; however, by
the R-S proposal, the outcome of the computation would
still be (inappropriately) considered Similarity. I agree that
the individual computations required to compute associa-
tive chunk strength would correspond to Rules (cf. Hamp-
ton, Smith). However, an overall characterization of the re-
sult of the computation in terms of Rules or Similarity is no
longer appropriate, since the string classification is no
longer a single process (or a set of integrated processes –
see the discussion for Lupyan & Vallabha later on), but
the result of a set of independent processes. Reber further
suggests that the use of a threshold should be considered a
rule. However, evaluating the outcome of a computation on
a representation in terms of a threshold can equally corre-
spond to Similarity or Rules, depending on whether most
or few of the properties of the representation are taken into
account (cf. Duch). Indeed, in psychology, thresholds are
not generally associated with psychological rules: For ex-
ample, the operation of exemplar categorization models
can be seen as involving thresholds, but no one would ar-
gue that such models reflect rules.
Most cognitive processes are the result of an assembly of
integrated tasks and influences. For example, the past-
tense inflection of a verb might depend on processing of its
phonology, semantics, and so forth. Lupyan & Vallabha
observe that it is not appropriate to characterize each of
these influences as Rules or Similarity individually and thus
question the practical utility of the proposal. In such cases,
the meaningful way to apply an R-S characterization is with
respect to the aggregate result of the processing on a target
representation, by considering together all the components
of the processing. For example, is it the case that the com-
ponent parts of a past-tense inflection collectively result in
a process that involves most of the relevant properties of the
verb, or only a small subset? By contrast, when a set of tasks
is carried out independently of one another, each task
should be individually examined as to whether it is a Rule
or Similarity (Reber). Note that these considerations ap-
pear relevant to any r-s proposal.
Sloman notes that in a rules system we typically require
consistency, in an associative system we do not, and that this
is a qualitative difference between rules and similarity that
cannot be accounted for within the R-S framework. I think
that an obvious inconsistency in Similarity will bother us as
much as an obvious inconsistency in a Rule. For example, I
will never believe that the object in front of me is both red
and not red ( judgment depends on one feature; a possible
Rule inconsistency). Likewise, I will never believe that the
object in front of me is both a chair and not a chair ( judg-
ment depends on several features; a possible Similarity in-
consistency). So let’s just assume that the cognitive system
would avoid obvious inconsistencies. Now, for a Rules sys-
tem, the consistency requirement is more stringent than for
a Similarity one, because Rules are more certain and there
is less ambiguity as to whether they apply or not. By con-
trast, Similarity judgments depend on most properties of
the representations that are compared, so that two objects
will be Similar (or Dissimilar) in several different ways. In
other words, there would be more ambiguity in Similarity
judgments and therefore the need for consistency in such
judgments would be less pronounced.
R2.3. Memory involvement
In this section we continue our consideration of Rules com-
putations versus Similarity ones, but with an emphasis on
the way memory supports these operations.
Marcus points out that rules are computational opera-
tions on a target instance that may have arbitrary algebraic
complexity; by contrast, similarity is a metric that “depends
on . . . the extent to which two inputs share representational
material.” An analogous point is made by Bailey, who sug-
gests that rules are operations on a single target represen-
tation, which is checked with respect to whether the rule
applies or not. By contrast, similarity is a comparison be-
tween two representations. Smith also assumes that in sim-
ilarity comparisons an object is compared to a representa-
tion holistically, whereas in rules operations the features of
the target representation must be examined explicitly to de-
termine whether the rule applies.
Let’s start with Similarity operations, because there ap-
pears to be less controversy about how these are carried
out. Suppose we have a target representation, say a partic-
ular telephone (“the telephone John has”), and we wish to
determine how Similar it is to other telephones in our
memory. This operation must (effectively) involve some
comparison of the properties of telephones in our memory
and the properties of the target representation. Consider
now a Rules operation, whereby we try to determine
whether the target representation is a telephone or not: Our
Rule for telephones is that “a telephone is any device which
conveys sound over a distance.” There must be some rep-
resentation for the Rule that is activated in order to apply
the Rule. Then, we need to examine whether the (few)
properties involved in the Rule representation match the
(correspondingly few) properties of the target representa-
tion. This is just like the Similarity process above, but in a
reduced scale: Instead of comparing all the features be-
tween (say) the two representations, I only compare a small
subset of these. Additionally, the comparison of features be-
tween the Rule representation and the target representa-
tion must be based on a process analogous to the compari-
son of features for a Similarity operation, because in both
cases (effectively) the basic elements of the cognitive oper-
ations are the same: pairwise comparisons of features (cf.
Brooks & Hannah, Dulany, Hampton).
Now, with respect to memory, it is typically assumed that
Rules correspond to knowledge that is somehow indepen-
dent of particular instances. Within the R-S proposal this
does not have to be the case (contra Bailey). A rule opera-
tion for a set of instances specifies a restricted representa-
tion for the instances, so that they can differ only in terms
of the properties involved in the Rule. For example, when
I consider the Rule for regular past-tense inflection in En-
glish, from the perspective of this operation all regular
verbs are nearly identical. Accordingly, my knowledge of
regular inflection is supported by many exemplars, in the
Response/Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:1 39
same way that my knowledge of different kinds of irregular
inflection is supported by exemplars. In fact, it looks like my
knowledge of a Rule fact would often be supported by more
exemplars than my knowledge of a Similarity fact (cf. Hintz-
man 1986). For example, by the present account, regular
inflection in English involves more instances than irregular
inflection. Therefore, regular inflection would be predicted
to depend less on the intactness of memory representations
compared to irregular inflection (cf. Joanisse & Seidenberg
1999; Miozzo 2003). Moreover, even if Rules operations are
less graded than Similarity ones (because of certainty),
Rules operations would still display some gradedness. In-
deed, Albright and Hayes (2003) have shown gradedness in
acceptability of past tense forms for nonce English verbs for
both regular and irregular verbs.
To conclude, there is little doubt that rules and similar-
ity computations are different and also that knowledge of
rules is supported in memory in a different way from knowl-
edge of similarity, as Bailey, Marcus, and Smith have
pointed out. The R-S proposal provides an alternative per-
spective for this issue by showing how some of these dif-
ferences can result from minimal assumptions about how
Rules differ from Similarity in degree and not qualitatively.
R3. Implications – predicting Rules behavior as
opposed to Similarity
R3.1. Coherence
In this section we are interested in when Rules would be
spontaneously preferred to Similarity. Heit & Hayes point
out that in reasoning there is a lot of evidence for a dual
process system, whereby an analogy (Similarity) mode ap-
pears to be the default and a rules (Rules) mode is possible
after additional effort. Recent empirical investigations cor-
roborate this view. For example, Schroyens et al. (2003)
found that under time constraint participants preferred log-
ically invalid conclusions to valid ones, so that it looks as if
reasoning on the basis of (logical) rules is not the default.
Note that Rules performance in reasoning implies that few
of the properties of a problem (its abstract logical structure)
are taken into account in reaching a conclusion. It is not the
case that an (overall) similarity heuristic for all reasoning
processes is advocated (Arló-Costa).
Heit & Hayes (and Ashby & Casale) also observe that
in spontaneous categorization experiments participants
typically produce single-dimensional sorts. That is, partici-
pants ignore most of the dimensions of the objects and de-
rive a grouping for the objects on the basis of a single di-
mension. Therefore, it looks like Rules is the default in
spontaneous categorization, even if that’s not always the
case (Pothos & Chater 2002).
To paraphrase Heit & Hayes, why does the number of
features vary (cf. Sloman)? Why is it the case that in rea-
soning the default appears to be Similarity but in sponta-
neous categorization experiments the default appears to be
Rules? According to the R-S proposal, this is a problem of
category coherence (Murphy & Medin 1985). We sponta-
neously recognize certain groupings of objects as more in-
tuitive than others. For example, the grouping of all in-
stances of a “cat” into the same concept is highly intuitive,
however, this is hardly the case for the grouping of “the Eif-
fel tower, dolphins, and the moon.” Now, coherence be-
tween the members of different categories could be estab-
lished in different ways. For example, consider the category
of chairs: The instances of this category appear to cohere
together because they are all highly Similar to each other
(any two instances of the category will share many charac-
teristics). By contrast, the instances of the category of pens
can vary greatly in terms of most of their properties. What
they have in common is their function, so that the instances
of the category of pens appear to cohere together in terms
of a Rule. Correspondingly, with a model of category co-
herence (e.g., Pothos & Chater 2002) we can predict
whether a set of objects would be spontaneously perceived
in terms of a Rule or Similarity, depending on which possi-
bility enhances the coherence amongst the objects more.
In this way, it appears that in reasoning problems the
spontaneous predisposition would be to take into account
all the properties of the problems – both their pragmatic
content and their logical structure. Therefore, in looking for
conclusions that depend only on their logical structure (see
sect. R3.2, Goals) we have to use selective attention to fo-
cus on some of the problem properties (logical structure)
and suppress others (pragmatic content). The use of selec-
tive attention implies that Rules in logical reasoning would
be more effortful (Heit & Hayes) and explicit (Smith –
this is the reason that Rules operations are typically explicit;
sect. R4.2). Analogous considerations apply to spontaneous
categorization experiments. Note that this conclusion can
be seen as partly confounding the correlations between IQ
and ability in logical reasoning, as IQ measures have also
been shown to correlate with ability in attentional tasks
(e.g., Nijenhuis & van der Flier 2002). Furthermore, this
discussion should clarify that the R-S proposal is more con-
sistent with dual process models of reasoning (cf. Heit &
Hayes); the fact that Rules and Similarity are assumed not
to differ qualitatively far from implies that they do not dif-
fer in many and important respects. With respect to single
process models of reasoning (e.g., Oaksford & Chater
1994), I suggest that such models often have an explanatory
objective that is different from that of characterizing the
reasoning process in terms of rules or similarity.
R3.2. Goals
Category coherence would determine the spontaneous bias
for processing a set of objects. Clearly, our goal associated
with the objects may not be consistent with this sponta-
neous bias, in which case we would have to employ selec-
tive attention to process the objects in a particular way.
Goals can be explicit, as in the reasoning example above.
We can also identify what we could call, following
McMurray & Gow, system goals: We can (minimally) as-
sume that the cognitive system will aim to be as efficient as
possible while avoiding errors. Below we present some cor-
responding implications for the R-S proposal.
Let’s first consider whether second language (L2) acqui-
sition involves Rules or Similarity (Robinson). If there is a
lot of superficial mismatch between L2 representations and
L1 (mother tongue) representations, in trying to make
sense of L2 stimuli it would be reasonable to focus on
whichever few aspects of L2 stimuli are analogous to L1
ones. In other words, the cognitive system would be trying
to encode L2 stimuli in terms of Rules that are guided by
L1 knowledge. Likewise, if the structures of L1 and L2
share many commonalities, encoding an L2 stimulus could
take place by matching many of its properties to a corre-
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sponding L1 stimulus (Similarity). Accordingly, following
Robinson, in second language acquisition we can empha-
size learning on the basis of Rules or Similarity, depending
on the characteristics of L2 and the relation of L2 to L1.
Wolff ’s model can illustrate the above. The model
searches for the briefest code for new instances in terms of
previous ones (Chater 1999). For example, new stimulus
MSSSV could be encoded with stimulus MSSS from my
memory or pattern MS, abstracted across many stimuli in
my memory. MSSS provides more complete coverage of
MSSSV, but it would (generally) be associated with a low
frequency (hence high codelength). MS covers MSSSV
very partially, but it would have a high frequency and hence
low codelength. Information theory can help decide which
will be preferred and so, whether a Rule (choosing MS to
encode the new instance) would be preferred against Sim-
ilarity (choosing pattern MSSS).
McMurray & Gow point out that “Research on speech
perception demonstrates that the degree to which speech
categories are gradient (or similarity-based) is a function of
the utility of within-category variation for further process-
ing” (Abstract). I endorse the general point McMurray &
Gow make. The cognitive system ignores information all
the time. For example, we rarely take into account orienta-
tion information in processing a pen, presumably because
historically such information is useless. Likewise, whether
the properties in a representation are given equal salience
(Similarity) or not, is plausibly influenced by (statistical) ex-
pectations of how the representation will be utilized in the
future (since in this way future needs can be anticipated and
dealt with more expediently). The above discussion leads to
Diesendruck’s notion of commitment.
R3.3. Commitment
Diesendruck’s main point is that a fundamental distinction
between rules and similarity is that rules require commit-
ment. In other words, “rules have a motivational and stabi-
lizing force that derives from people’s commitment to
rules. . . . Commitment is what licenses leaps of faith, allow-
ing categorizers to draw inferences even about novel cate-
gories and properties in familiar domains” (Diesendruck,
para. 2). Diesendruck suggests that commitment depends
collectively on our experiences and knowledge base. The
commitment point is echoed in Dulany’s commentary as
well. According to Dulany, we form explicit beliefs about
which rules (or similarity comparisons) will allow us to de-
cide how novel instances should be categorized.
Suppose we initially represent an object in terms of fea-
tures ABCDE and we want to process it in terms of a Rule
that involves feature A. However, we may later revise the
object’s representation and identify new feature A?, which
we would want to consider more important than A
(Lupyan & Vallabha). Plausibly, the cognitive system will
not be “convinced” to attend to a single feature in a repre-
sentation and suppress the rest, unless it is “convinced” that
additional processing would not lead us to identify new, po-
tentially important, features (equivalently, that in additional
processing of the object certain few features would always
be more significant than the rest). This “conviction” will
likely depend on general knowledge and appears equivalent
to Diesendruck’s commitment. Moreover, the above can
be rephrased in the context of McMurray & Gow’s dis-
cussion in the previous section. For a domain of stimuli for
which even though a single aspect of their representation is
important, other aspects of the stimuli may also be useful
in the context of the same or a similar operation in the fu-
ture, suppression of the irrelevant properties would be less
forthcoming.
The above interpretation of commitment is consistent
with the R-S proposal in that it shows circumstances that
would enhance Rules performance as opposed to Similar-
ity but does not show rules that have to be qualitatively dif-
ferent from similarity.
R4. Evaluating the Rules versus Similarity
proposal
R4.1. Coverage of existing data – do we need separate
rules versus similarity systems?
The most direct prediction of the R-S proposal is that Rules
operations are not qualitatively different from Similarity
ones. Ashby & Casale present a series of studies to show
separate (qualitatively distinct) systems of rules and simi-
larity. Ashby & Casale argue that these results are inconsis-
tent with any unified r-s proposal, including the R-S one. I
agree that these results show separate systems, but these do
not (necessarily) correspond to rules and similarity, rather
(plausibly) to implicit and explicit learning modes. Implicit
versus explicit modes of learning may be confounded with
r-s learning in experiments such as the ones discussed by
Ashby & Casale in the following way: We can generally as-
sume that the default mode of processing for objects such
as those in the experiments they discuss would be Similar-
ity, in that most of the object properties would be initially
perceived as having equivalent salience. Therefore, partic-
ipants required to process the objects in terms of a Rule,
would have to selectively attend to some of the object fea-
tures (cf. Brooks & Hannah, Smith). The intentionality
required for a selective attention process implies that this
process would be explicit (sect. R4.2). By contrast, when no
selective attention is needed, the stimuli are plausibly
processed implicitly (where implicitly is used here in the
sense of incidental; cf. artificial grammar learning). So, the
behavioral differences discussed by Ashby & Casale could
be partly due to differences in rules and similarity and
partly due to differences in implicit and explicit learning.
Given that it is possible that implicit and explicit learning
could correspond to separate systems, I suggest that with-
out further insight about which performance differences
are due to a contrast between rules and similarity and which
due to a contrast between implicit and explicit learning, it
is not possible to claim that rules and similarity necessarily
correspond to separate systems. The R-S proposal is not
about there being a single R-S continuum to characterize
all, but, rather, that we can interpret rules and overall sim-
ilarity in the same system as extremes in an R-S continuum
(cf. Brooks & Hannah, Sloman).
An analogous point applies to the imaging results
Dominey and Smith discuss. Smith notes that in the con-
dition requiring an explicit rule there was activation in the
areas mediating selective attention and inhibition, but not
in the similarity condition. This finding is consistent with
the R-S proposal, as Rules operations require selective at-
tention when Similarity is the default. More generally, in
evaluating the implications for the r-s debate from such re-
sults, the perspective of Juola and Plunkett (1998) is useful.
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Using neural networks, they showed that dissociation re-
sults can correspond to extreme aspects of the operation of
a single system, rather than indicating separate systems.
R4.2. Do rules have to be explicit?
Many commentators believe that rules have to be explicit
(Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, Hampton, and Smith). In
Smith’s model the first defining characteristic of rules per-
formance is that rules are explicitly represented and the
second defining characteristic is that rules can be verbal-
ized. Cleeremans & Destrebecqz emphasize this point even
more by titling their commentary “Real rules are con-
scious.”
If we restrict rules to consciously accessible entities then
we have difficulty in characterizing the operation via which
we can instantly recognize the sentence “colorless green
ideas sleep furiously” as grammatically correct. Because
this sentence is meaningless, there are no instances in our
experience we could use to classify it as grammatical on the
basis of similarity. Additionally, we do not explicitly apply
grammar rules – many of us hardly know what these are (in
other words, no metaknowledge of grammar rules; cf.
Cleeremans & Destrebecqz). We have to postulate that
we use rules knowledge that is not explicit. Hampton sug-
gests that in such cases “the person can be said to be fol-
lowing a rule, but this is not evidence that the rule itself is
represented in the part of the mind/brain directing the be-
havior” (cf. Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, Smith).
Objections to the psychological status of nonexplicit rules
appear to boil down to the following issue: Unless we know
we are using a rule, there is no evidence that a rule is being
used. A fundamental aspect of the R-S proposal is that, re-
gardless of whether rules are implicit or explicit, it is not
possible to prove their existence, because their specifica-
tion is partly a definitional issue. This perspective can be
justified by generalizing Smith’s profound insight: An ex-
planatory notion in psychology, such as a rule, is like a con-
cept that groups together certain psychological behaviors.
Subsequently, by studying the behaviors in, for example,
the rules category, we can try to determine whether it is
possible to characterize them in some parsimonious way.
However, as is the case with the psychological process of
categorization, there is often considerable arbitrariness
about which instances/behaviors will be associated with a
theoretical concept, which then affects the characterization
of the concept. In this way, I suggest that rather than seek-
ing to prove an r-s proposal, we should examine whether it
allows for a more convenient (from an explanatory per-
spective) categorization of psychological processes (Heit &
Hayes).
Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, Hampton, and Smith
argue that we ought to categorize differently behaviors
based on explicit rules from behaviors that could be de-
scribed in terms of (implicit) rules. However, in both cases,
rules reflect collective neuronal activity, so they do not ex-
ist in any way other than as emergent properties of neurons.
So, from such a perspective, the brain is a physical system,
just like a river, whose properties we seek to characterize in
some mathematical way (Hampton). Moreover, neural net-
works do not have metaknowledge of rules, but arguably
they have no metaknowledge of any aspect of their knowl-
edge (Cleeremans & Destrebecqz; cf. Dienes & Perner
1999). Additionally, while we may explicitly believe that we
are using a rule, our metaknowledge may be misleading and
the actual psychological process could have an alternative
basis (cf. A.R. Reber et al. 1985).
Having said the above, it has to be appreciated that most
of our intuitions of rule following correspond to explicit,
verbalizable rules. Regardless of whether a particular r-s
proposal includes in its definition rules explicitness (and as-
sociated features), these intuitions must be explained. The
R-S proposal predicts that most Rules would be explicit and
require selective attention if the default mode of process-
ing for the stimuli we encounter is Similarity. As noted in
section R3.1 above, whether this is the case is an issue of
category coherence. Intuitively, however, it would seem
reasonable to assume that when the cognitive system en-
counters a novel object it would not spontaneously ignore
most of its properties, so that Similarity is indeed the de-
fault.
To summarize, if we define Rules as operations that in-
volve few of the properties of a target representation, then
selective attention and explicitness for rules operations are
implications of this definition in (what appear to be) the
most common rules situations.
R4.3. Do we need rules (or similarity)?
Several commentators question the validity of the r-s de-
bate (Calvo Garzón, Hampton, Markman et al., Smith,
Vilarroya, Wolff). For example, Markman et al. discuss
three performance dimensions along which rules and sim-
ilarity have been traditionally distinguished, to argue that
distinctions along these dimensions are misguided. They
suggest that researchers should emphasize the study of the
performance dimensions themselves and worry less about
r-s characterizations. Vilarroya articulates these concerns in
a more forceful way, pointing out that “the progress of sim-
ilarity-based theories of learning and categorization will re-
duce the area of influence of rules to a small corner.” Ac-
cording to this logic, maybe we should just abandon rules
as an explanatory concept in psychology.
It must be appreciated that unconstrained rules and sim-
ilarity are indeed vacuous in that we can always conceive of
alternative notions of rules (or similarity) to describe arbi-
trary patterns of performance. Indeed, this has been the
motivation for the R-S proposal – and another way of say-
ing that the specification of rules and similarity is partly a
definitional issue (sect. R4.2). If the notions of rules and
similarity are restricted in a suitable way, then the problems
raised by Hampton, Calvo Garzón, and Markman et al.
disappear. For example, with respect to Markman et al.,
Rules cannot be distinguished from Similarity in terms of
whether they involve abstract properties or not. But this in-
sensitivity to abstraction of properties is not arbitrary.
Rather, it is an explicit choice in the definitional specifica-
tion of the model. In alternative r-s models abstraction may
have a more central role (e.g., cf. Brooks & Hannah). As
noted, which proposal is preferred should be an issue of ex-
planatory convenience.
Calvo Garzón further suggests that the information-
processing framework for cognition, within which the rules
versus similarity debate has been formulated, may be inap-
propriate. His discussion is a useful reminder that some-
times we are so immersed in the specifics of a particular de-
bate that we lose sight of plausible alternative frameworks
for describing cognition. It is beyond the scope of this pa-
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per to examine how the information processing framework
might measure up to alternatives. Nevertheless, there has
to be a sense in which the initial basis of cognitive models
is our introspective understanding of cognition (sect. R1).
As discussed in the target article, we do have a strong intu-
itive sense in which sometimes we are applying a rule while
in other cases we are carrying out similarity comparisons
(and indeed, some models of r-s performance are derived
almost entirely from this intuition; e.g. Smith). Accord-
ingly, there has to be a specification of theories of cognition
that enables some role for rules and similarity (cf. Vilar-
roya). Moreover, from a purely theoretical perspective, it
would be useful to retain a distinction between rules and
similarity to the extent that the processes considered rules
differ interestingly from the processes considered similar-
ity. The data discussed in the target article suggest this to
be the case.
In conclusion, a priori there is every reason to expect that
an r-s distinction would be important in psychological the-
ory. It is argued that dissatisfaction with existing r-s pro-
posals is either due to underspecification (so that re-
searchers worry that the distinction is vacuous; cf. Dulany),
or because they do not afford a useful/interesting differ-
entiation of cognitive processes. The above observations
suggest that rather than dismissing the r-s distinction alto-
gether, we should seek to develop alternative r-s approaches
that address the shortcomings of previous ones.
R5. Summary
Operations on a target representation can be characterized
in terms of Rules or Similarity depending on whether few
or most of the properties of the target representation are in-
volved. In this way, a distinction between Rules and Simi-
larity is understood as a distinction in degree, not quality, so
that Rules and Similarity are extreme aspects of the same
(similarity) operation. In other words, rules are certainly
not dismissed in favor of similarity (cf. Markman et al.);
rather, it is suggested that the relation between rules and
similarity is such that we need not postulate a separate rules
system from a similarity one.
The R-S continuum is only one possibility amongst many
in how to characterize processes as rules and similarity. Fol-
lowing Smith, it is suggested that such explanatory notions
are like categories that group together certain behaviors.
Accordingly, there is some definitional arbitrariness re-
garding how rules and similarity are specified – in other
words, regarding which behaviors we group in the category
of “rules” and which in the category of “similarity.” Despite
this arbitrariness, there are certain characteristics that we
would generally wish to associate with rules and others we
would want to associate with similarity.
The claim in the R-S proposal is that these characteris-
tics can be predicted if we define rules as Rules and simi-
larity as Similarity. Therefore, Rules are predicted to be
more certain and less graded than Similarity, and in many
cases Rules would be explicit, verbalizable operations that
require selective attention (Hampton, Smith, Cleere-
mans & Destrebecqz). Rules would be more abstract
(Bailey) and less sensitive to context than Similarity. Func-
tionally, pure Rules operations on novel instances would be
indistinguishable from the same operations on old ones
(Cleeremans & Destrebecqz). In a Rules system our re-
quirement for internal consistency is typically more strin-
gent than in Similarity knowledge (Sloman). The applica-
bility of a Rule is usually restricted, but Similarity compar-
isons are generally very flexible. Additionally, the R-S
proposal has a number of implications that are less intuitive:
Rules operations could be supported by many exemplars in
the same way as Similarity operations – it’s just that for
Rules operations these exemplars would be a lot more sim-
ilar to each other. Rules effects would show some graded-
ness, even if not as much as for Similarity operations. Could
we test an r-s proposal in terms of predictions like the above
(cf. Heit & Hayes)? Since there is definitional arbitrariness
in such a proposal, I suggest that the important issue is to
agree on which behaviors should be characterized rules and
which similarity. In other words, an r-s proposal is primar-
ily a descriptive tool in psychological theory.
Accordingly, an r-s proposal should be evaluated along
the following two dimensions: First, does it provide a prin-
cipled characterization of processes as rules or similarity
with the least number of assumptions, consistently with our
intuitions of which processes should be considered rules
and which similarity? This issue was discussed in the target
article. Second, does it enable interesting implications
about rules and similarity behavior? The primary aim of this
paper was to demonstrate how the R-S proposal could be
integrated with inferential machinery (coherence, goals,
and commitment) to predict when Rules would be pre-
ferred relative to Similarity. It is suggested that an r-s pro-
posal is successful only to the extent to which it can address
these questions and that no more formal investigation of the
proposal is possible.
In closing, even though the R-S proposal has been criti-
cized on account of its simplicity, it has been successfully
applied to a wide range of empirical data to a reasonable de-
gree of specificity. And the R-S proposal is most certainly
not meant to exhaust r-s theorizing. Instead, it can serve as
a principled framework through which we can further de-
velop our understanding of these operations (the present
utilization of coherence, goals, and commitment is an illus-
tration of this point).
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